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Introduction 
 
A large number of countries around the world have done considerable efforts to improve the 
regulation of security markets, corporate governance and financial reporting in recent years. 
Many of these reforms were introduced in response to the accounting scandals and corporate 
frauds at the beginning of the 2000s, with the general objective to enhance the quality of financial 
reporting and investors’ confidence over the functioning of financial markets (Leuz 2011). 
Moreover, many countries have converged to a unique set of reporting rules by moving to the 
International Financial Reporting Standards, under the assumption that the adoption of  unique 
set of capital market oriented accounting standards should uniformly lead to an increase in 
comparability, corporate transparency, and financial reporting quality. 
Despite this considerable effort, a growing stream of study in the international accounting 
literature claims that differences in the observed reporting behavior, and hence in financial 
reporting quality, across firms are likely to persist even if enforcement and accounting standards 
were held constant. Overall, this literature suggests that the outcomes of the financial reporting 
process strongly depends on firm incentives to provide financial information of high or low 
quality (Ball et al. 2000; Ball et al. 2003; Leuz et al. 2003; Burgsthaler et al. 2006). Therefore, a 
regulatory change is unlikely to have a direct effect on financial reporting quality, rather 
reporting incentives would shape the effects of regulatory changes on financial reporting quality. 
Firm reporting incentives are affected by many forces such as country’s legislation, the strength 
of the legal enforcement, capital market pressure, security regulation, accounting standards and 
other firm-level factors (e.g. auditor quality, ownership structure and governance structure). 
In this vein, international accounting literature (see Wysocki 2011 for an overview) has 
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started to examine how across country institutional and legal differences and within country 
variation in firm characteristics affect the properties of accounting numbers, firms’ disclosure 
strategy, corporate transparency, and economic or capital market outcomes. This literature points 
out the pivotal role of these institutional reporting incentives for the observed heterogeneity in 
financial reporting practices and attempts to identify: (i) which are the country-level institutions 
and firm-level factors that cause firms’ reporting choices; (ii) how country-level institutions 
interact, by complementing or substituting one with the others, in shaping financial reporting 
outcomes; (ii) how and whether firm-level mechanisms interact with country-level institutions; 
(iv) which are the mechanisms or channels by which institutions influence firms’ reporting 
practices, corporate transparency and economic outcomes. Despite several studies have already 
contributed to this area, international accounting literature still provides scant evidence on the 
specific factors that shape the outcomes of the financial reporting process (Holthausen et al. 
2009). In particular, it is not obvious which is the marginal effect of the legal enforcement, 
capital markets’ regulation, disclosure requirements, accounting standards and firm-level 
monitoring mechanisms on the quality of financial reporting. Most importantly, international 
accounting research still treats firms homogenously within a given country while many authors 
suggest that this approach is unlikely to be very productive (Holthausen 2003; Wysocki 2011). 
Indeed, this design does not take into account that some firms in a given country may bear 
incentives to opt out of their institutional regime by, for example adopting good governance 
mechanisms or cross-listing in more demanding legal environment. Without considering this 
variation, cross-country studies are unlikely to properly identify the marginal effect of the forces 
that shape financial reporting quality as the results of these studies  “…will be a weighted 
average of all firms in the economy…” (Holthausen 2003, p. 282). 
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Given the importance of financial reporting quality and corporate transparency for 
economic growth, the efficient allocation of financial resources and the development of capital 
markets (Levine 1998, Rajan and Zingales 2002, Francis et al. 2009) it appears relevant and 
timely to identify, and disentangle one from the others, the effects of country-level institutions, 
legal enforcement, disclosure regulation, accounting standards, and firm-level factors on firms’ 
reporting choices to explain differences in the observed financial reporting quality. 
This thesis is in three research papers. The first chapter, a joint work with Saverio Bozzolan 
(University of Padova) investigates the effect of the legal enforcement on the use of income 
increasing earnings management and downward expectation management to meet or beat analyst 
forecasts. The second chapter, a join work with Antonio Parbonetti (University of Padova) and 
Michel L. Magnan (Concordia University) examine how firm-level governance, as proxied by 
board attributes, and country-level enforcement interplay in affecting financial reporting quality 
once IFRS became mandate. The third chapter examines whether information environment 
benefits following cross-listing in the U.S. vanish when the financial reporting process suffers by 
internal control deficiencies according to the Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
More in detail, the first chapter investigates the effect of the legal enforcement on the use of 
income increasing earnings management and downward expectation management to meet or beat 
analyst earnings forecasts. Literature suggests that managers put considerable emphasis on 
reporting earnings that meet or beat analyst earnings forecasts (Graham et al. 2005), as long as 
capital markets reward firms that meet analyst forecasts and penalizes firms that do not (Bartov et 
al. 2002; Brown and Caylor 2005). To the extent that managers recognize the signalling 
implications of meeting/beating analyst forecasts, research suggests that they bear strong 
incentives to take actions to avoid a negative earnings news. When a firm’s realized earnings fall 
short of analyst forecasts, managers seek to avoid negative earnings surprises by manipulating 
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accruals upward (EAR) or guide analyst earnings forecasts downward (EXP) as a competing or 
substitute action. Research has mainly examined EAR and EXP in isolation by assuming that 
they are simply used in conjunction (Matsumoto 2002, Athanasakou et al. 2010). Only recently, 
literature has considered that EAR and EXP might be substitutes or complements with respect to 
their constraints: firms rely more on expectations management when firms’ capacity for earnings 
management is bounded. So far, literature has exploited only cross-sectional variation in firm-
specific constraints as determinant of the choice between EAR and EXP. On the other side, 
international accounting literature underlies that country-level institutional characteristics such as 
the quality of a country’s enforcement environment shape firms’ reporting choices and, thus, 
across-country differences in observed reporting behavior.  
This chapter examines how EAR and EXP contribute to meeting or beating analyst 
forecasts in relation to legal enforcement, while holding constant accounting standards. Using a 
sample of 4,934 firms from fourteen European countries, we document that the strength of the 
legal enforcement is negatively associated with EAR and positively associated with EXP. We 
provide evidence of a substitution effect between EAR and EXP only in the presence of strong 
legal enforcement, while they are complements when the legal enforcement is weak. We show 
that the capital market rewards meeting/beating firms, but it penalizes the concurrent use of EAR 
and EXP and this penalty is positively associated with the strength of the legal enforcement only 
for EAR. Our results show that legal enforcement has a significant role in the choice between 
EAR and EXP and that a change in the strength of legal enforcement drives how firms operate to 
meet or beat analyst forecasts.  
The contribution of this chapter is two-fold. This is the first study that examine how cross-
country variation in the level of enforcement affects the interaction between EAR and EXP to 
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meet/beat analyst forecasts. Second, this chapter is the first study to explore whether the capital 
market’s reaction to an earnings surprise is related to the strength of the legal enforcement.  
The second chapter exploits cross-sectional variation in board-based monitoring intensity 
and country-level enforcement to examine heterogeneity in IFRS mandatory adoption 
consequences on financial reporting quality. Extant research shows substantial economic benefits 
stemming from IFRS mandatory adoption, suggesting that a simple switch from local GAAP to 
IFRS leads to an increase in comparability, transparency, and financial reporting quality. 
However, it is still challenging to attribute such benefits to the IFRS adoption per se. To the 
extent that the application of accounting standards provides insiders with substantial discretion, 
research stresses that firms’ reporting behavior, and hence the observed financial reporting 
quality, is likely to be shaped by institutional factors and firm-level reporting incentives, rather 
than a simple change in accounting standards (Ball et al. 2003; Leuz et al. 2003; Burgsthaler et al. 
2006). Consistently, much of the previous studies (Daske et al. 2008; Christensen et al. 2012) 
document substantial heterogeneity in the effects of IFRS adoption due to differences in legal 
institutions, pointing out the role of country-level infrastuctures for across-country differences in 
observed reporting practices. Those studies explain the heterogeneous effects of IFRS adoption 
across countries but miss to examine heterogeneity across firms within similar legal environment. 
This paper tries to fill this gap in the literature analyzing how firm-level governance, as 
proxied by board attributes, and country-level enforcement interplay in affecting financial 
reporting quality. We operationalize financial reporting quality using earnings informativeness, 
accruals management, and real earnings management. We use a treatment sample of 3,476 firm-
year observations from 14 European countries that mandatorily adopt IFRS in 2005 and 29,596 
firm-year observations from 11 non-IFRS adoption countries. To account for the confounding 
effects of general trends in financial reporting quality or concurrent events unrelated to IFRS 
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adoption, we estimate annual panel regressions for IFRS adopter firms and non-IFRS adopter 
firms using industry-country and separate year fixed effects for the treatment and control sample.  
 Three key findings emerge from our analyses. First, IFRS adoption is, on average, 
associated with an increase in financial reporting quality. However, there is considerable 
heterogeneity in financial reporting quality changes, suggesting that IFRS mandatory adoption is 
not sufficient, per se, to change firms’ reporting practices. Second, in countries characterized by 
weak enforcement, strong board-level monitoring appears to enhance financial reporting quality, 
thus suggesting a substitutive effect between firm- and country-level governance. Third, in 
countries characterized by strong enforcement, firms with strong board-level monitoring exhibit a 
higher level of financial reporting quality than firms with weak board-level monitoring, thus 
suggesting that country- and firm-level governance are complementary.  
The chapter contributes to the literature in two ways. First, this is the first study that 
examines whether board-based monitoring mechanisms shape IFRS mandatory adoption 
consequences on financial reporting quality. Second, the chapter contributes to the growing 
literature on the interplay between firm-level governance and country institutional characteristics. 
The findings point toward a substitution effects between firm-level monitoring mechanisms and 
country-level enforcement mechanisms when the legal system is lax, while board monitoring and 
legal enforcement complement each other when the legal system gets stricter.  
The third chapter examines whether informational environment benefits following cross-
listing in the U.S. vanish when the financial reporting process suffers by internal control 
deficiencies according to the Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX, hereafter). Previous 
literature documents an increase in the quality of the firm information environment following 
cross-listing in the U.S. and motivates this result with the bonding effect. Indeed, cross-listing in 
the U.S. provides an effective way for firms incorporated in countries where investors rights are 
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weak and bad enforced to credibly commit to increase corporate transparency as they voluntary 
subject themselves to U.S. security law and SEC enforcement. The stronger capital market and 
enforcement scrutiny triggers an increase in the availability of information of higher quality and 
enhances firm information environment.  
This study disputes the idea that the cross-listing per se enhances the quality of firms’ 
information environment. We challenge this idea considering whether the quality of the 
information environment for cross-listed firms depends on an effective commitment to achieve   
higher levels of corporate transparency. As research setting, we use Section 302 of the SOX that 
requires to disclose any discovered internal control deficiency on internal controls over financial 
reporting.  
To account for the impact of general trends or concurrent events unrelated to SOX302 
disclosures on information environment of cross-listed firms, we employ as benchmark group all 
firms listed in their home market but not in the U.S. In addition, we employ propensity-score 
matching models to take into account differences in firm-characteristics between cross-listed and 
non-cross-listed firms while estimating SOX302 disclosure treatment effect. Our analyses 
encompasses both changes and cross-sectional association tests.  We show that cross-listed firms 
disclosing internal control deficiencies do not have a better information environment than their 
home-country peers, but only after the first disclosure on internal control deficiencies according 
to SOX302. Second, we show that cross-listed firms experience an improvement in the 
information environment if they remediate to previously disclosed internal control deficiencies. 
Finally, we show that these results hold only for firms domiciled in countries with weak legal 
institutions, while cross-listed firms from countries with strong legal institutions do not 
experience a significant change in the quality of the information environment once they became 
cross-listed, irrespective from the disclosure of an internal control deficiency. 
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The study contributes to the literature on cross-listing in two ways. First, we show the 
existence of substantial heterogeneity in cross-listing effects on firm information environment, 
driven by the adoption of adequate internal controls over financial reporting. Second, we add to 
the literature on the effects of the SOX. Literature shows that cross-listed firms experience a 
decrease in the level of opaqueness after the adoption of the SOX. We add to this literature the 
evidence that the decline in the level of opaqueness depends on cross-sectional differences in 
corporate transparency and hence it is not homogenous across all firms. 
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Introduzione 
 
Nell’ultimo decennio, molti paesi in tutto il mondo hanno compiuto notevoli sforzi per 
migliorare la regolamentazione dei mercati finanziari, della corporate governance e della 
reportistica di bilancio. Molte di queste riforme sono state introdotte in risposta agli scandali 
contabili e alle frodi finanziarie avvenute nei primi anni 2000, con l'obiettivo di migliorare la 
qualità dell'informativa finanziaria e la fiducia degli investitori sul corretto funzionamento dei 
mercati finanziari (Leuz 2011). Inoltre, numerosi paesi hanno adottato i principi contabili 
internazionali (IFRS), in base al presupposto che l'adozione di un unico set di principi contabili, 
orientati ai bisogni conosciti degli investitori finanziari, dovrebbe condurre ad un uniforme 
aumento della comparabilità, della trasparenza societaria, e della qualità della comunicazione 
economico-finanziaria. 
Nonostante questo notevole sforzo, la letteratura di international accounting sostiene che 
differenze nel comportamento di comunicazione delle imprese, e quindi nella qualità 
dell’informativa finanziaria, tra le imprese continueranno a persistere anche se le imprese stesse 
fossero soggette agli stessi principi contabili o agli stessi meccanismi di enforcement. Infatti, la 
letteratura suggerisce come la qualità dell’informativa di bilancio dipenda dal sistema di incentivi 
di ogni impresa a fornire informazioni finanziarie di alta o bassa qualità (Ball et al 2000; Ball et 
al 2003; Leuz et al 2003; Burgsthaler et al. 2006). Pertanto, è improbabile che un cambiamento 
legislativo abbia un effetto diretto sulla qualità della comunicazione economico-finanziaria, 
piuttosto sarà il sistema di incentivi di ogni impresa a determinare gli effetti delle modifiche 
legislative sulla qualità dell'informativa finanziaria (Mahoney 2004; Holthausen 2009). Il sistema 
di incentivi di ogni impresa a fornire informazioni economiche-finanziarie di una data qualità è 
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influenzato da molte forze, quali la legislazione del paese, il sistema di enforcement, l’importanza 
del mercato dei capitali, i principi contabili e altri fattori a livello di impresa (ad esempio la 
qualità del revisore contabile, la struttura proprietaria o il sistema di governance). In tale 
prospettiva, la letteratura di international accounting (Wysocki 2011) ha iniziato a esaminare in 
che modo le differenze tra i paesi, in termini di istituzioni o sistemi giuridici, e la variabilità 
all'interno di ogni paese in termini delle caratteristiche di impresa, influiscano sulla qualità 
dell’informativa contabile, sulle politiche di disclosure, e sulla trasparenza aziendale. Questa 
letteratura sottolinea il ruolo fondamentale di questi incentivi nello spiegare l'eterogeneità nella 
qualità dell’informativa economico-finanziaria e tenta di identificare: (i) quali siano le istituzioni 
ed i fattori, a livello paese ed a livello impresa, che causano le scelte di comunicazione delle 
imprese, (ii) come le istituzioni a livello paese interagiscono tra loro nella determinazione della 
qualità dell’informativa economico-finanziaria, (ii) in che modo i meccanismi a livello impresa 
interagiscono con le istituzioni a livello paese, (iv) quali sono i meccanismi o canali attraverso i 
quali le istituzioni influenzano le pratiche di rendicontazione delle imprese e la trasparenza 
aziendale. Nonostante diversi studi abbiano già contribuito a questo filone di ricerca, la letteratura 
di international accounting non ha ancora fornito evidenze dirette sui fattori specifici che 
determinano la qualità dell’informativa economico-finanziaria (Holthausen et al. 2009). In 
particolare, non è tuttora evidente quali siano gli effetti marginali del sistema di enforcement, 
della regolamentazione dei mercati dei capitali, dei principi contabili, e dei meccanismi di 
monitoraggio a livello di impresa sulla qualità dell'informativa economico-finanziaria. Inoltre, la 
letteratura di international accounting considera ancora le imprese all'interno di un dato paese in 
modo omogeneo, mentre molti autori suggeriscono come questo approccio non sia in realtà molto 
produttivo (Holthausen 2003; Wysocki 2011), nella misura in cui non tiene conto del fatto che 
alcune imprese in un determinato paese possano avere incentivi a segnalare il loro impegno ad 
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raggiungere un livello di trasparenza nella comunicazione verso i mercati superiore a quello 
richiesto dal sistema giuridico e dalle caratteristiche dei mercati dei capitali nel quale operano. 
Senza considerare questa variabilità nel sistema di incentivi di ogni impresa, è improbabile che 
questi studi identifichino correttamente l’effetto marginale di ognuna delle forze che modellano 
la qualità dell’informazione economico-finanziaria, nella misura in cui i risultati di questi studi 
"... will be a weighted average of all firms in the economy..." (Holthausen 2003, p. 282). 
Data l'importanza della qualità dell’informativa economico-finanziaria e della trasparenza 
aziendale per la crescita economica, l'efficiente allocazione delle risorse finanziarie e lo sviluppo 
dei mercati dei capitali (Levine 1998; Rajan e Zingales 2002; Francis et al. 2009) appare 
pertinente e rilevante identificare quale sia l’effetto marginale delle istituzioni di un paese, dei 
principi contabili, e dei fattori a livello di impresa sulle scelte di comunicazione delle imprese per 
spiegare le differenze nella qualità dell’informativa economico-finanziaria osservata. 
La tesi si compone di tre research paper. Il primo capitolo, frutto di un lavoro congiunto con 
Saverio Bozzolan (Università di Padova) indaga l'effetto del legal enforcement sull'uso 
dell’income incresing earnings management  e del downward expectation management al fine di 
battere le stime degli analisti finanziari. Il secondo capitolo, frutto di un lavoro congiunto con 
Antonio Parbonetti (Università di Padova) e Michel Magnan (Concordia University) esamina 
l’effetto congiunto del sistema di governance a livello impresa e delle caratteristiche istituzionali 
a livello paese sulla qualità dell’informativa economico-finanziaria attorno all’adozione dei 
principi contabili internazionali. Il terzo capitolo esamina se i benefici in termini di firm 
information environment  seguenti al cross-listing negli Stati Uniti svaniscano se il sistema di 
controllo interno soffra di material weaknesses secondo la sezione 302 del Sarbanes- Oxley Act.  
Nello specifico, Il primo capitolo si propone di esaminare l'effetto del legal enforcement a 
livello paese sull'uso dell’income incresing earnings management  e del downward expectation 
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management al fine di battere le previsioni degli analisti finanziari. 
La letteratura suggerisce che i manager abbiano forti incentivi a raggiungere o battere le 
stime degli analisti finanziari (Graham et al 2005), in quanto il mercato premia le imprese che 
sono in grado di battere le stime e penalizza le imprese che invece riportano utili inferiori alle 
attese (Bartov et al 2002;. Brown e Caylor 2005). Nella misura in cui i manager riconoscono le 
implicazioni che derivano dal battere le stime degli analisti, la letteratura sostiene che essi 
abbiano forti incentivi  a intraprendere azioni volte ad evitare di riportare utili inferiori alle attese 
del mercato. Se gli utili reali, privatamente osservati dal management, sono inferiori alle attese 
degli analisti, i manager possono manipolare gli utili reali verso l’alto (income increasing 
earnings management: EAR) o guidare verso il basso le previsioni sugli utili degli analisti 
(downward expectation management: EXP). In letteratura queste due azioni sono state 
principalmente esaminate separatamente, assumendo che le imprese le utilizzino semplicemente 
in combinazione (Matsumoto 2002; Athanasakou et al. 2010). Solo di recente, la letteratura ha 
considerato che EAR e EXP possano essere azioni sostitute o complementari in funzione dei 
rispettivi vincoli: le imprese ricorreranno maggiormente al downward expectation management, 
se la capacità di ricorrere all’income increasing earnings management è limitata. Fino ad ora, la 
letteratura ha esaminato se differenze nelle caratteristiche specifiche delle imprese determinino la 
scelta di ricorrere a EAR e EXP. Tuttavia, la letteratura di international accounting rileva come 
le caratteristiche istituzionali di un paese, come la qualità del sistema di enforcement, abbiano un 
effetto sulle decisioni di comunicazione economico finanziaria delle imprese. 
Questo capitolo esamina come EAR e EXP contribuiscano a battere le previsioni degli 
analisti in funzione del livello di enforcement. Utilizzando un campione di 4,934 osservazioni 
anno-impresa da quattordici paesi europei, il presente lavoro documenta che la qualità del sistema 
di enforcement sia associato negativamente a EAR e positivamente a EXP. Inoltre, il presente 
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lavoro fornisce evidenza di un effetto di sostituzione tra EAR e EXP in presenza di una forte 
sistema di enforcement, mentre EAR e EXP risultano essere complementari quando il sistema di 
enforcement è debole. Il mercato dei capitali premia le imprese che battono le stime degli analisti, 
ma penalizza l’uso di EAR e EXP, tuttavia solo la penalità per l’uso di EAR dipende 
positivamente dal sistema di enforcement.  
Il contributo di questo capitolo alla letteratura è duplice. Questo è il primo studio che 
esamina come il livello di enforcement determini la scelta tra EAR e EXP per battere le 
previsioni degli analisti. In secondo luogo, questo studio è il primo ad analizzare se la reazione 
del mercato dei capitali all’uso di EAR e EXP al fine di battere le stime degli analisti dipenda dal 
sistema di enforcement. 
Il secondo capitolo sfrutta la variabilità nelle caratteristiche del sistema di monitoraggio a 
livello impresa per esaminare l’esistenza di eterogeneità nelle conseguenze dell’adozione 
obbligatoria degli IFRS sulla qualità dell’informazione economico-finanziaria. La letteratura ha 
mostrato l’esistenza di notevoli benefici economici derivanti dalla adozione degli IFRS, 
suggerendo come un semplice passaggio dai principi contabili nazionali agli IFRS possa portare 
ad un aumento della comparabilità, della trasparenza, e della qualità della comunicazione 
economico-finanziaria. Tuttavia, risulta essere problematico, sia da un punto di vista teorico che 
empirico, attribuire tali benefici all'adozione degli IFRS. Nella misura in cui l'applicazione dei 
principi contabili preveda una notevole discrezionalità, la ricerca sottolinea come il 
comportamento di reportistica delle imprese, e quindi la qualità osservata nella comunicazione 
economico-finanziaria, sia determinata da fattori istituzionali a livello paese e dagli incentivi a 
livello di impresa, piuttosto che un semplice cambiamento dei principi contabili (Ball et al 2003; 
Leuz et al 2003; Burgsthaler et al 2006). Coerentemente, la maggior parte degli studi precedenti 
(Daske et al 2008; Christensen et al 2012) documenta una sostanziale eterogeneità negli effetti 
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dell’adozione degli IFRS a causa di differenze nelle caratteristiche istituzionali tra i paesi. Tali 
studi spiegano l’eterogeneità negli effetti dell’adozione degli IFRS tra i paesi, ma non analizzano 
l’eterogeneità che può sussistere tra le imprese anche all’interno di un dato paese. 
Questo articolo cerca di colmare questa lacuna nella letteratura analizzando come il sistema 
di governance, a livello impresa, e le caratteristiche istituzionali, a livello paese, determinino 
congiuntamente la qualità dell’informativa economico-finanziaria a seguito dell’adozione degli 
IFRS. Il lavoro utilizza un campione di 3,476 osservazioni provenienti da 14 paesi europei che 
hanno adottato obbligatoriamente gli IFRS nel 2005 (treatment sample) e 29,596 osservazioni 
provenienti da 11 paesi che non hanno adottato gli IFRS (control sample). La qualità 
dell’informativa economico-finanziaria viene misurata considerando l’earnings informativeness, 
accruals management, and real earnings management. 
Al fine di controllare per i confounding effects derivanti da trend generali nella qualità 
dell’informativa economico-finanziaria e per eventi concomitanti ma estranei all’adozione degli 
IFRS, il presente lavoro impiega regressioni panel annuali per le imprese che adottano gli IFRS e 
per il campione di controllo utilizzando effetti fissi per paese-settore ed anno, separati per il 
treatment sample e per il control sample. Dall’analisi emergono tre principali risultati. In primo 
luogo, l'adozione degli IFRS è, in media, associata ad un aumento della qualità dell’informativa 
economico-finanziaria. Tuttavia, vi è una notevole eterogeneità negli effetti, il che suggerisce che 
l'adozione obbligatoria degli IFRS non sia sufficiente, di per sé, a modificare le politiche di 
reporting delle imprese. In secondo luogo, in paesi caratterizzati da un sistema di enforcement 
debole, le imprese che adottano buoni sistemi di governance, migliorano la qualità 
dell’informazione economico-finanziaria, suggerendo l’esistenza di un effetto sostitutivo tra 
sistema di governance a livello impresa e di enforcement a livello paese, quando l’enforcement è 
debole. In terzo luogo, in paesi caratterizzati da un sistema di enforcement forte, le imprese che 
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adottano buoni sistemi di governance migliorano la qualità dell’informativa economico-
finanziaria in misura superiore rispetto alle imprese che adottano deboli sistemi di governance, 
suggerendo l’esistenza di una relazione di complementarietà tra governance a livello impresa ed 
enforcement a livello paese quando quest’ultimo è più forte. 
Il capitolo contribuisce alla letteratura in due modi. In primo luogo, questo è il primo studio 
che analizza se i meccanismi di monitoraggio a livello di impresa influenzino le conseguenze 
derivanti dall’applicazione obbligatoria degli IFRS sulla qualità dell’informazione economico-
finanziaria. In secondo luogo, il capitolo contribuisce alla crescente letteratura sull'interazione tra 
sistemi di governance a livello impresa e caratteristiche istituzionali a livello paese. Il lavoro 
suggerisce l’esistenza di un effetto di sostituzione tra i due, quando il sistema di enforcement è 
debole, e l’esistenza di una relazione di complementarietà quando il sistema di enforcement è più 
efficace. 
Il terzo capitolo esamina se i benefici in termini di firm information environment  
conseguenti al cross-listing negli Stati Uniti svaniscano se il sistema di controllo interno soffra di 
material weaknesses secondo la sezione 302 del Sarbanes- Oxley Act. La letteratura documenta 
un aumento della qualità del firm information environment  a seguito del cross-listing negli Stati 
Uniti e spiega questo risultato con la bonding theory. Infatti, il cross-listing negli Stati Uniti 
risulta essere uno strumento efficace per le imprese avente sede in paesi con un sistema di 
enforcement debole, per segnalare il proprio impegno ad aumentare la trasparenza 
dell’informativa economico-finanziaria, nella misura in cui queste imprese si sottopongono 
volontariamente alla giurisdizione della SEC. Il maggior monitoraggio esercitato dal mercato dei 
capitali statunitense determina un aumento della disponibilità di informazioni di qualità superiore 
e dunque migliora il firm information environment. Questo studio disputa l’idea che il cross-
listing di per sé migliori la qualità del firm information environment. In particolare, questo studio 
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esamina se il cambiamento nella qualità del firm information environment dipenda dall’effettivo 
impegno delle imprese cross-listate ad incrementare il proprio livello di trasparenza contabile. 
Come setting di ricerca, il presente lavoro utilizza la sezione 302 della SOX che richiede di 
comunicare ogni material weaknesses che possa inficiare l’efficacia del sistema di controllo 
interno.  
Al fine di controllare per l’effetto di trend generali o per eventi concomitanti ed estranei 
all’adozione della sezione 302 della SOX sul firm information environment delle imprese cross-
listate, il presente lavoro utilizza come campione di controllo le imprese quotate nei rispettivi 
mercati nazionali ma non cross-listate negli Stati Uniti. Inoltre, utilizziamo un propensity score 
matching al fine di controllare per eventuali differenze sistematiche nelle caratteristiche di 
impresa tra imprese cross-listate e non, nello stimare l’effetto specifico della sezione 302 della 
SOX sul firm information environment. 
I risultati mostrano che le imprese cross-listate che comunicano l’esistenza di material 
weaknesses nel sistema di controllo interno non hanno un firm information environment migliore 
rispetto alle imprese non cross-listate, ma questo solo a seguito dell’adozione della sezione 302 
della SOX. In secondo luogo, il lavoro mostra che le imprese cross-listate migliorano il firm 
information environment se comunicano di aver rimediato a material weaknesses dichiarate in 
precedenza. Infine, si dimostra che questi risultati valgono solo per le imprese con sede in paesi 
con deboli sistemi di enforcement, mentre le imprese cross-listate provenienti da paesi con 
sistemi di enforcement efficaci, non subiscono un cambiamento significativo nella qualità del 
firm information environment a seguito del cross-listing, indipendentemente dalla comunicazione 
di material weaknesses nel sistema di controllo interno. 
Il contributo di questo studio alla letteratura è duplice. In primo luogo, il lavoro dimostra 
l’esistenza di una sostanziale eterogeneità negli effetti del cross-listing, determinati dall'adozione 
xix 
 
di adeguati sistemi di controllo interno. In secondo luogo, il presente lavoro contribuisce alla 
letteratura sugli effetti della SOX. La letteratura in materia mostra come le imprese cross-listate 
negli Stati Uniti aumentino la qualità del firm information environment dopo l'adozione della 
SOX. Il lavoro aggiunge alla letteratura l’evidenza che il miglioramento della qualità del firm 
information environment non è omogeneo per tutte le imprese, ma dipende da differenze nel 
livello di trasparenza tra le imprese cross-listate. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Earnings and Expectation Management to 
Avoid Negative Earnings Surprises under 
Different Levels of Legal Enforcement 
 
1.1. Introduction 
The financial press and the business community put considerable emphasis on firms’ 
ability to report earnings that meet or beat analyst earnings forecasts. Empirical evidence from 
a broad sample of corporate executives suggests that managers are aware of the importance of 
reporting a positive earnings surprise (Graham et al. 2005), while archival studies document 
that the capital market rewards firms that meet analyst forecasts and penalizes firms that do 
not (Bartov et al. 2002; Lopez and Rees 2002; Skinner and Sloan 2002; Brown and Caylor 
2005). When manager observe that pre-managed earnings are below analyst forecasts, 
managers can exert their power over the financial reporting process to increase earnings 
(income-increasing earnings management, or EAR hereafter) or can guide analyst earnings 
forecasts downward (downward expectation management, or EXP hereafter) as a competing 
or substitute action.  
The literature has generally studied EAR and EXP in isolation (Burgstahler and 
Dichev 1997; Degeorge et al. 1999; Bartov et al. 2002; Kaszink and McNichols 2002; Skinner 
and Sloan 2002) under the assumption that these actions are not related but are simply used in 
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conjunction (Matsumoto 2002; Burgstahler and Eames 2006; Athanasakou et al. 2010). Only 
recently the literature has considered that EAR and EXP can be substitutes or complements 
depending on their respective constraints. Brown and Pinello (2007) document that firms 
substitute EAR with EXP in the fourth quarter because of the stricter board and auditor 
scrutiny over the firm’s annual reporting process. Das et al. (2011) find that EAR and EXP 
are complements when the constraints on earnings management are low and that they are 
substitutes when earnings management is bounded as firms rely more on expectations 
management when firms’ capacity for earnings management is constrained. These studies 
focus on single countries and analyze cross-sectional/longitudinal firm-specific constraints as 
drivers of the choice between EAR and EXP. At the same time, existing accounting research 
recognizes that the level of enforcement shapes reporting incentives, generates tradeoffs in 
firms’ reporting decisions, and relates strongly to earnings quality (Leuz et al. 2003; 
Burgstahler et al. 2006; Leuz 2010), to transparency (Ball et al. 2000), and to reporting 
conservatism (Bushman and Piotroski 2006). Therefore, results regarding the choice between 
EAR and EXP, their relationship, and their role in meeting/beating analyst forecasts may not 
be equal under different levels of legal enforcement. 
Using a sample of 4,934 firm-years across fourteen European countries that require 
IFRS reporting, this paper examines whether (i) European firms use EAR and/or EXP to 
meet/beat analyst forecasts, (ii) whether the use of EAR and/or EXP is related to the level of 
legal enforcement, and (iii) whether the capital market rewards firms that meet/beat forecasts 
differently according to the use of EXP or EAR and conditionally on the strength of legal 
enforcement. This international sample is an ideal setting because it permits us to test whether 
firms that operate under the same accounting regime use EAR or EXP as complements or 
substitutes, conditional on the strength of the legal enforcement.  
We start our analyses by exploring the actions that firms use to meet/beat analyst 
forecasts. We use positive discretionary accruals from the modified Jones model (Dechow et 
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al. 1995) as a proxy for EAR and the unexpected analyst earnings forecasts (Matsumoto 2002) 
to identify EXP. We find that European firms use both EAR and EXP to increase the 
likelihood of meeting/beating analyst forecasts. 
Next, we focus on the use of EAR and EXP under different levels of legal 
enforcement. We analyze EAR and EXP separately in relation to the strength of the legal 
enforcement and find that EAR (EXP) is negatively (positively) associated with the strength 
of the legal enforcement, that is, EAR (EXP) is used less (more) under a strong legal 
enforcement regime. Then we analyze the relationship between EAR and EXP directly, 
conditional on the strength of the legal enforcement. We show that this relationship depends 
significantly on the strength of the legal enforcement: under weak enforcement regimes, firms 
tend to use EAR and EXP as complements, while they substitute EAR with EXP under strong 
legal enforcement regimes. 
Finally, we first investigate the market reaction to meeting/beating analyst forecasts, 
without considering the levels of legal enforcement. We show that the capital market rewards 
firms that meet/beat forecasts, after controlling for current-year reported earnings and firm 
performance. Our evidence also shows that such firms experience a significant market penalty 
if they meet/beat analyst forecasts using EAR or EXP. When we condition this market penalty 
on the strength of the legal enforcement, we find that the penalty for the use of EAR increases 
with the strength of the legal enforcement, while the market penalty for the use of EXP is 
unchanged.  
Our study offers several contributions to the literature. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first study that analyzes the use of EAR and EXP to meet/beat analyst forecasts in 
an international setting. Previous literature has studied firms listed in a single market, such as 
those in the NYSE (Matsumoto 2002; Bartov et al. 2002; Burgstahler and Eames 2006; 
Brown and Pinello 2007; Das et al. 2011) or the London Stock Exchange (Athanasakou et al. 
2010). Only one paper looks at the use of EXP (only) to meet/beat analyst forecasts in relation 
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to the level of enforcement (Brown and Higgins 2005). Even if we know from international 
accounting literature that the enforcement environment affects firm’s reporting decisions, no 
study investigates directly whether country level institutional characteristics (i.e. the quality of 
a country’s enforcement environment) shape firm’s choice between EAR and EXP. This study 
adds to the literature direct evidence that the relationship between EAR and EXP varies in an 
international setting. As expected from results on other financial reporting behaviors in an 
international setting, we find direct evidence that the relationship between EAR and EXP 
depends on the strength of the legal enforcement and that the choice between EAR and EXP 
is not driven only by firm-level characteristics. Our evidence directly shows that when the 
legal enforcement is weak, the two actions are used as complements, while firms substitute 
EAR with EXP when the legal enforcement is strong. In this vein, our evidence extends the 
results of Koh et al.  (2011), which show that a change in regulation in a single country (i.e. 
increased enforcement scrutiny following SOX) affects the choice between EAR and EXP.  
In relation to the earnings – expectation management literature, we also add evidence 
on the capital market’s reaction to meeting/beating analyst forecasts and on the market 
penalty for using EAR and EXP under different levels of legal enforcement. We are the first 
to study whether the capital market’s reaction to an earnings surprise is related to the strength 
of the legal enforcement. Conditioning the penalty imposed for using earnings and 
expectation management on the level of legal enforcement, we find that the level of 
enforcement influences how the market penalizes the use of EAR and EXP. The market 
penalty for meeting/beating analyst forecasts through EAR is higher in strong enforcement 
regimes than in weak enforcement regimes, while the use of EXP is not significantly 
associated with the level of enforcement. 
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1.2. Related literature and predictions 
Empirical findings (Brown and Caylor 2005; Dechow et al. 2003) document that 
analyst forecasts have become the most attractive earnings benchmark, substituting for the 
traditional targets of positive earnings and previous year earnings. Beyer (2008) analytically 
demonstrates that the capital market response to an earnings surprise is asymmetric since the 
penalty for a negative earnings surprise is stronger than the reward following a positive 
earnings surprise. Several empirical papers (Kasznik and McNichols 2002; Skinner and Sloan 
2002; Keung et al. 2010; Koh et al. 2011) show that the capital market rewards firms that 
achieve analyst forecasts and penalizes firms that miss them. Kasznik and McNichols (2002) 
provide evidence that firms that consistently meet analyst forecasts experience higher market 
valuations than firms that miss them do. Skinner and Sloan (2002) show that firms with high 
growth prospectus experience a more profound market reaction to a negative earnings surprise 
than they do to a positive or no earnings surprise. Finally, Koh et al.  (2011) document that 
the market premium for meeting/beating analyst forecast is lower in the post-accounting-
scandal world. In their survey on CFOs, Graham et al. (2005) document that managers fully 
recognize the signalling implications of meeting/beating analyst forecasts and take actions to 
avoid a negative earnings news to “build credibility with capital market” by maintaining or 
increasing stock price. When a firm’s realized earnings fall short of analyst forecasts, 
managers seek to avoid a negative earnings surprise by manipulating accruals upward (EAR) 
or analyst expectation downward (EXP) to shelter them from a negative price reaction that 
could hurt their reputation in the capital market or their job security.  
Empirical studies focus on firms listed in the NYSE (Matsumoto 2002; Bartov et al. 
2002; Burgstahler and Eames 2006; Brown and Pinello 2007; Das et al. 2011) or the London 
Stock Exchange (Athanasakou et al. 2010). These studies refer to countries characterized by 
legal enforcement regimes (that foster the development of an efficient capital market) in 
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which the incentives to meet/beat analyst forecasts are similar. As the first step of our 
analysis, we investigate whether the incentive to meet/beat analyst forecasts and the use of 
EAR and/or EXP to meet/beat analyst forecasts depend on the strength of the enforcement, 
which we interpret as a constraint for EAR. Previous research explores whether the 
relationship between EAR and EXP varies according to their constraints (Brown and Pinello 
2007; Das et al. 2011). Brown and Pinello (2007) contend that, because of the independent 
audit and stricter expense recognition rules in the fourth quarter, accrual manipulation is 
likely to be detected more easily in the annual reporting process than in the interim ones. They 
find that EAR is more likely to be used in the interim quarters, whereas EXP is more 
prevalent in the fourth quarter. Das et al.  (2011) model the probability of engaging in EAR 
and EXP as a function of the firm’s constraints and suggest that EAR and EXP are used as 
complementary actions until EAR constraints get stronger, when a firm substitutes EAR with 
EXP. These studies provide evidence that EAR and EXP are part of a unique strategy that 
firms adopt to meet/beat analyst forecasts.  
On the other side, international accounting literature suggests that the level of legal 
enforcement shapes financial reporting incentives (Ball et al. 2000; Leuz et al. 2003; Brown 
and Higgins 2005; Burgstahler et al. 2006; Bushman and Piotroski 2006). Ball et al.  (2000) 
argue that accounting income incorporates losses, making earnings more transparent, in a 
more timely way under strong enforcement regimes than under weak ones. Bushman and 
Piotroski (2006) provide evidence that the level of legal enforcement determines the 
equilibrium level of accounting conservatism. Leuz et al. (2003) document that earnings 
management is less prevalent in countries with developed capital markets, strong investors’ 
rights, and strict legal enforcement. Burgstahler et al. (2006) consider both private and public 
firms to show that capital market pressures and institutional factors shape firms’ incentives to 
report earnings that reflect their true economic performance. Their findings suggest that, as 
the legal enforcement strengthens, earnings management is more constrained. 
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We contend that the level of legal enforcement as a constraint for earnings 
management plays a pivotal role in the strategy used to meet/beat analyst forecasts. We expect 
that the level of legal enforcement interacts with the choice of actions used to meet/beat 
analyst forecasts. As the legal enforcement strengthens, we expect that the probability to 
engage in EAR activity decreases and the probability to engage in EXP activity increases. We 
also expect that the substitution effect between EAR and EXP is stronger when the capital 
market is more demanding in terms of rules and enforcement, resulting in EAR being more 
bounded. 
EAR and EXP are effective when the market is not perfectly aware of how the analyst 
forecast is met and when outside investors are not able to recognize fully selfish practices by 
insiders. When the market is able to detect the extent and effect of EAR on reported earnings 
and the impact of EXP on analyst forecast revisions, two firms with the same forecast error 
and the same positive (negative) earnings surprise should be rewarded (punished) differently 
if one has engaged in EAR or EXP and the other has not. 
Literature shows that EAR and EXP are rationale when the market premium for 
meeting/beating analyst forecasts is higher than the penalty for undertaking EAR and EXP 
(De Fond and Park 2001; Balsam et al. 2002; Rogers and Stocken 2005; Bartov et al. 2002; 
Das et al. 2011; Keung et al. 2010). Beyer (2008) demonstrates that a manager should trade 
off the disutility for missing analyst forecasts with the costs of EAR or EXP and play the 
earnings surprise game when extent that the latter is lower than the former. De Fond and Park 
(2001) and Balsam et al. (2002) provide evidence that the market discounts reported earnings 
if EAR is suspected. Rogers and Stocken (2005) find that EXP is costly, as a downward 
revision of current earnings expectation entails a negative stock reaction at the forecast 
revision date. Bartov et al.  (2002) show that, when analyst forecasts are met through EAR or 
EXP, the market premium is lower, but still exists. Das et al. (2011) confirm the evidence, 
documenting a negative market response to the use of EAR and EXP but a positive net 
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premium to meeting/beating earnings forecasts. Keung et al.  (2010) find that firms that only 
slightly meet/beat analyst forecasts incur a market penalty because investors believe that the 
target has been achieved through EAR/EXP.  
Following this evidence, we expect that firms that meet/beat analyst forecasts enjoy a 
market reward but also that the capital market punishes the use of EAR and EXP. We take 
into consideration the level of legal enforcement and contend that capital markets 
characterized by different levels of legal enforcement react differently to the use of EAR and 
EXP. Therefore, we expect that the penalty for the use of EAR and EXP in meeting/beating 
analyst forecasts is higher in a more demanding capital market in term of rules and 
enforcement than it is in a less demanding financial market.  
 
1.3. Research design 
EAR and EXP metrics 
Consistent with prior research, we use the modified cross-sectional Jones model of 
discretionary accruals described in Dechow et al.  (1995) as a proxy for EAR. Specifically, we 
estimate the model for each year and country and every industry, classified by its two-digit 
SIC code. Thus, we partially control for industry changes in economic conditions that affect 
total accrual while allowing the coefficients to vary across groups (DeFond and Jiambalvo 
1994). Next, we create a binary variable (POSDA) to classify firm-years into firms suspected 
of engaging in EAR. Specifically, POSDA takes the value of one if discretionary accruals (i.e. 
DA) are positive, and zero otherwise.  
We use the Matsumoto model (Matsumoto 2002), adapted for annual data (Brown and 
Higgins 2005; Burgstahler and Eames 2006), to measure EXP. The Matsumoto model 
compares the expected forecast with the current forecast at the time of the earnings 
announcement. The expected forecast is calculated by exploiting the earnings serial 
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correlation and the additional information included into stock prices: if the expected forecast 
is above the effective forecast, then a firm is suspected of having walked down analyst 
earnings forecasts. We compute the expected portion of analyst forecasts by modeling the 
change in earnings as a function of the prior period’s change in earnings and excess returns 
cumulated over the current period:  
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where  
∆EPSijt   = firm i’s earnings per share in year t in two-digit sic code j, less earnings per share 
for the same firm one year prior, 
P
 ijt          = price per share for firm i  in two-digit sic code j  at the end of the year t as 
reported by Compustat Global–Security daily, 
CRETijt   = cumulative daily excess returns for firm i in two-digit sic code j in year t obtained 
from Compustat Global–Security Daily. Returns are cumulated from three days 
after the prior period’s earnings announcement to twenty days before the current 
period’s period earnings announcement. 
 
Given that the analysts’ expected forecasts should be based only on data available to 
analysts when they make their forecasts, we use parameter estimates for the prior firm-year to 
determine the expected changes in EPS (E[∆EPS]). Then we add this value to the earnings per 
share from the prior year to get the expected forecast (E[F]) for the current year: 
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Finally, we subtract the expected forecast from the last consensus analyst forecast 
before the current annual earnings announcement to obtain the unexpected portion of the 
forecast (UEF). If a manager tries to walk-down analyst forecasts to beat or meet analyst 
forecasts, then the actual consensus forecast for the current period will be less than the 
expected forecast for the current period, and UEF is negative. Then we create a binary 
variable (DOWN) that takes the value of one if UEF is negative, and zero otherwise. Firm-
years with DOWN equal to one are classified as having EXP. 
To directly capture the existence of a trade-off between EAR and EXP, we combine 
DA and UEF into one measure. Specifically, we first percentile both rank DA and the 
negative of UEF. Then, we take the difference between the two percentile rank, scaled by 100 
(TRADE_OFF).  
 
How firms meet/beat analyst earnings forecasts  
We start our analysis by investigating the actions firms use to meet/beat analyst 
forecasts. We use a logistic regression (equation 4) to model the probability of 
meeting/beating analyst forecasts at the earnings announcement date as a function of EAR and 
EXP. 
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MBE is a binary variable that equals one if firm-year actual earnings are equal or 
above the last analyst consensus before the current annual earnings announcement. We 
measure the last analyst consensus as the median of the last analyst forecast made by each 
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analyst between the current annual earnings announcement and the prior period earnings 
announcement. LAW is the rule of law variable from Kaufmann et al.  (2011) for the years 
2006-2009. This variable, which considers differences in the legal enforcement across 
countries, is measured at country level since it represents the “perception of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in … the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts” (Kaufmann et al. 2011). In order to capture any changes in the 
regulation, we use the variable LAW calculated for each year. 
Consistent with prior studies, we control for the firm-specific constraints on EAR or 
EXP. Following Barton and Simko (2002), we include the net operating assets at the 
beginning of the fiscal year (NOA) to control for a cross-sectional constraint on EAR. We 
measure NOA as the difference between operating assets and operating liabilities, scaled by 
lagged total assets. The higher the NOA is, the lower the manager’s ability to inflate earnings 
upward is. Following Das et al.  2011), we consider the price sensitivity to earnings news 
(SENS) as a constraint for EXP. We measure SENS as the abnormal return per unit of 
earnings surprise, defined as the three-day cumulative abnormal return around the earnings 
announcement, scaled by the corresponding surprise in the reported earnings. Higher 
sensitivity implies a larger negative price reaction to a downward revision in expected 
earnings, making EXP more costly.  
We include controls that are expected to affect jointly the probability to meet/beat 
analyst forecasts and both EAR and EXP. Given that larger firms are more likely to avoid 
negative earnings news, we control for firm size (SIZE) using the log of the firm market value 
at the end of the year (closing price times the number of shares outstanding). We control for 
the growth prospectus using the percentage change in sales (GROWTH). A manager of a 
high-growth firm has a greater incentive to meet/beat analyst earnings forecasts than a manger 
of a low-growth firm does because the asymmetry in the price reaction to positive vs. negative 
earnings news is higher for low-growth firms (Skinner and Sloan 2002). In addition, growth 
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prospectus is found to influence earnings management (Barth et al. 2008). LEV, which is the 
end-of-year total liabilities divided by the end-of-year book value of equity, takes into account 
debt-contracting motivations for earnings management (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994). A 
higher total debt-to-asset ratio implies a higher likelihood that there are violations of debt 
covenants, which boosts the incentive for EAR. We also control for firm performance using 
the return on assets (ROA), computed as net income over total assets. Beating or meeting 
analyst forecasts is more difficult for firms that are facing more forecasting uncertainty 
(Brown and Pinello 2007). We proxy for forecasting uncertainty using the absolute value of 
the current year’s actual EPS, less the earliest analyst consensus, measured as the median of 
the first forecast each analyst made within ninety days after the earnings announcement of the 
prior period, scaled by the closing price at the end of the year (ABS_FE). The literature 
argues that the managerial incentive to report positive financial news instead of negative news 
is higher for firms that rely on implicit claims with stakeholders. Following Matsumoto 
(2002), we add a binary variable (DUR) that equals one if a firm is in a durable goods 
industry, and zero otherwise. Moreover, we include research and development expenditures 
scaled by total assets (R&D), which serves as a proxy for the extent to which a manager relies 
on implicit claims. Firms in high-risk industries are more likely to meet/beat analyst earnings 
forecasts than are firms in low-risk industries because negative earnings news affects such 
firms more heavily than it does others. We define LIT as a dummy variable that indicates 
membership in a high-risk industry (SICs 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 7370-7374, 3600-3674, 
5200-5961). ESTIMATE, measured as the log of the number of analyst forecasts made during 
the year, controls for the strength of the monitoring carried out by analysts, as well as the 
pressure on managers to make earnings targets (Das et al. 2011). DUAL1 is a dummy variable 
that equals one if a firm is listed on any U.S. exchange, and zero otherwise. We also control 
                                                     
1
 Cross-listing in the US and cross-listing in the UK is considered highly demanding in terms of transparency. In our sample, 
only a few firm-year observations are cross-listed in the UK. In our robustness tests, we split the DUAL variable to take into 
account cross-listing in the UK, considering firms that are cross-listed in both the countries to be cross-listed only in the US. 
Results (not tabulated) remain unchanged. 
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for macroeconomic factors using the log transformed average gross domestic product per 
capita (GDP), taken from the World Bank, over the period 1990-2000. This variable, which 
captures the extent to which a country is developed or developing, is widely used in 
international accounting research (Haw et al. 2004) to deal with the effect of unobserved 
country-specific factors that may be associated with both EAR and EXP. 
Equation (4) is estimated using years and industry fixed effects based on the industry 
classification in Campbell (1996), with robust standard errors clustered by firm.2 We expect 
that mangers of European firms use EAR and EXP to increase the likelihood of 
meeting/beating analyst earnings forecasts. Hence, we predict that β1 and β2 are positive and 
significant in equation (4). 
 
Meeting/beating analyst forecasts using EAR and EXP under different levels of 
legal enforcement 
To test the impact of the level of legal enforcement on the likelihood to use EAR 
and/or EXP to meet/beat analyst forecasts, we estimate three set of equations. Equations (5A-
5B) and (6A-6B) separately model the probability to engage in EAR and EXP as a function of 
the strength of legal enforcement. Specifically, for EAR we estimate the following logistic 
and OLS models: 
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 Petersen (2008), Gow et al. (2010).  
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Similarly for EXP, we estimate the following logistic and OLS models3: 
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All the variables are as previously defined. Equations (5) and (6) are estimated using 
years and industry fixed effects based on the industry classification in Campbell (1996), and 
with robust standard errors clustered by firm. In addition, to the extent that firms that meet or 
slightly beat analyst forecasts are more likely to be engaged in both EAR and EXP than are 
firms that beat or fall short of analyst forecasts by large amounts, we also estimate models 
5A-6A conditioning the estimation sample on firm-years with earnings surprises that do not 
exceed the absolute value of five cents. We expect that the strength of the legal enforcement 
affects the probability to engage in EAR and EXP: specifically, a negative relationship 
between EAR and LAW and a positive relationship between EXP and LAW. Hence, we 
predict β1 will be negative and significant in equations 5A-5B, while β 1 will be positive and 
significant in equations 6A-6B.  
This preliminary analysis allows us to validate LAW as a determinant of EAR, and to 
verify whether EXP is positively related to the determinant of EAR. However, it does not 
shed light on how firms trade-off between these actions in respect to the strength of the legal 
enforcement. To explore this issue further, we model the probability that the firm will engage 
in EAR, considering both POSDA and DA as a function of DOWN, LAW, and the interaction 
between LAW and DOWN. Specifically, we estimate the following logistic and OLS models: 
 
                                                     
3
 For ease of exposition, we multiple UEF for minus one in equation 6B, so that a positive coefficient on LAW implies a 
positive association between EXP and LAW. 
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k CONTROLSLAWDOWNDOWNLAWGPOSDAPROB *()1( 3210  (7A) 
εβββββ +++++= ∑
k
k CONTROLSLAWDOWNDOWNLAWDA *3210      (7B) 
 
All the variables are as previously defined. Equations (7A-7B is estimated using years 
and industry fixed effects based on the industry classification in Campbell (1996), and with 
robust standard errors clustered by firm. We also estimate equation 7A conditioning the  
estimation sample only on firms that report small earnings surprises. By estimating equations 
(7A-7B), we intend to verify whether EAR and EXP are complements or substitutes in respect 
to the strength of the legal enforcement. The interaction between LAW and DOWN measures 
the extent to which the relationship between EAR and EXP varies with the strength of the 
legal enforcement. We contend that EXP is positively related to EAR when LAW is low (i.e., 
complementary actions) and that this relationship becomes negative for high values of LAW 
(i.e., substitute actions). Hence, β2 is expected to be positive and significant, whereas β3 is 
expected to be negative and significant. 
Next, we model directly the trade-off between EAR and EXP, using as dependent 
variable TRADE_OFF which capture the extent to which a firm relies on EAR or EXP to 
meet or beat analyst forecasts. Specifically, we estimate the following OLS model: 
 
εβββ +++= ∑
k
kCONTROLSLAWOFFTRADE 10_          (7C) 
 
All the variables are as previously defined. Equation 7C is estimated using year-
industry fixed effects based on the industry classification in Campbell (1996), and with robust 
standard errors clustered by firm. We also estimate equation 7C conditioning the  estimation 
sample only on firms that report small earnings surprise. Whether firms substitute EAR with 
EXP as the legal enforcement gets stronger, β1 is expected to be negative and significant.  
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In equations 7A-7B, we model EAR as a function of EXP. However, to the extent that 
these two actions are employed to achieve the same goal of meeting/beating analyst forecasts, 
it is likely that they are jointly determined.  To adress this issue, we re-estimate the relation 
between EAR and EXP as a system of equations using two-stage least square (2SLS). 
Following Das et al.  (2011), we use the stock price sensitivity to an earnings news (SENS) as 
an instrument, for EXP while we use litigation risk (LIT) as an instrument for EAR. To assess 
the moderating effect of LAW, we estimate the 2SLS separately by partitioning the sample 
according to the mean of LAW. 
 
Market reaction to EAR and EXP under different levels of legal enforcement 
In the final set of our empirical tests, we examine how the capital market reacts to 
meeting/beating analyst forecasts and to the use of EAR and EXP. Specifically, we estimate 
the following models: 
 
εββ
ββββ
βββ
++
+++++
++=
FEABSLOSS
ROAGROWTHSIZEDOWN
POSDAMBEtCAR
_
_1_
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   (8)
 
εββ
βββ
βββ
βββ
+++
+++
×+×++
++=
FEABSLOSS
ROAGROWTHSIZE
LAWDOWNLAWPOSDADOWN
POSDAMBEtCAR
_
_1_
109
876
543
210
 
  (9)
 
 
 
CAR_1_t is the daily cumulative market-adjusted returns from one day before to t (3, 
5, 10, 20, 30) days after firm i's earnings announcement. All the other variables are as 
previously defined. Models (8) and (9) are estimated using years and industry fixed effects 
based on the industry classification in Campbell (1996) and with robust standard errors 
clustered by firm and year. 
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 Through equation (8), we intend to verify whether capital markets reward firms that 
meet/beat analyst forecasts with an incremental premium. We expect the estimate coefficient 
of MBE (β2) to be positive and significant. Then we explore to what extent the capital market 
is sensible to how analyst forecasts are achieved. When the capital market is able to detect 
EAR and EXP actions fully, investors should be able to separate “good” firms, which beat 
earnings forecasts with their unbiased earnings and expectation, from “bad” firms, which 
achieve analyst forecasts through EAR and/or EXP. In the latter case, the coefficients of 
POSDA and DOWN (β2 and β3) are expected to be negative and significant. In particular, if 
the market is able to detect fully the amount of EAR and EXP, we expect both β1 + β2 (for 
EAR) and β1 + β3 (for EXP) to equal zero. Through equation (9), we explore whether the 
capital market reacts differently to the use of EAR or EXP under different levels of legal 
enforcement. We include the interaction between POSDA and LAW and that between DOWN 
and LAW. If the penalty for the use of EAR or EXP is incremental based on the strength of 
the legal enforcement, the estimated coefficients of both interactions, respectively β4 and β5 
are negative and significant. 
 
1.4. Sample and data 
Our study analyses non-financial firms listed in fourteen European capital markets. 
Unlike prior works on EXP or on the relationship between EAR and EXP that have used 
quarterly data,4 we employ annual data because firms are not mandated to provide financial 
statements on a quarterly basis in all the countries of our sample.5 The majority of UK firms 
provide interim reports only on a semi-annual basis. In addition, interim earnings 
announcements and analyst forecasts are sparsely covered in the I/B/E/S International files, 
                                                     
4
 Brown and Higgins (2005), Bollinger and Kast (2004) and Athanasakou et al. (2010) are exceptions.  
5
 IAS 34 requires firms to provide interim financial reports, but the interim period is defined as a financial reporting period 
shorter than a full financial year. Therefore, a firm can choose to provide financial information on a quarterly or a semi-
annual basis. 
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adding a possible self-selection bias6 (Landsman et al. 2012). 
We obtain accounting and market data from the Compustat Global and analyst 
forecasts and actual earnings from I/B/E/S international (split unadjusted) database.7 First, we 
sample from Compustat Global all firm-years from European countries that require IFRS 
reporting8 from 2005 to 2009. We merge the initial sample with I/B/E/S international, a 
restriction that yields 19,334 firm-year observations. To be included in the sample, firms must 
satisfy three criteria:9 (i) there are at least three individual earnings forecasts made at least 
twenty trading days apart, (ii) the release data of the earliest forecast is at least one trading 
day after the previous period’s earnings release, and (iii) the release date of the latest forecast 
precedes the current period’s earnings release date by at least three days.10 We eliminate firms 
in the financial industry (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) and require at least ten 
observations in each two-digit SIC grouping per year and country as a condition for the 
modified Jones model (for EAR) and the Matsumoto model (for EXP)11.  
 
                                                     
6
 Brown and Pinello (2007) show that the probability of engaging in EAR is lower in the fourth quarter than in the interim 
quarters because of auditor and board scrutiny on the annual reporting process. Since this issue should be less severe in the 
interim quarters, EXP is more prevalent in the fourth quarter and EAR is more prevalent in the interim ones. That firms make 
an inter-temporal substitution between these two actions could introduce a bias in our results by causing  an upward bias in 
EXP and a downward bias in the EAR proxy. To deal with this bias, we perform additional analyses on a quarterly basis and 
find that our results are robust to the use of quarterly instead of annual data.  
7
 Consistent with previous literature (Philbrick and Ricks 1991, Abarbanell and Lehavy 2000), we use the same database 
(I/B/E/S) for both forecast and actual earnings  
8
 The sample encompasses two non-EU-member countries (Norway and Switzerland) that also mandated IFRS adoption 
beginning in 2005.  
9
 Such a sample criterion is consistent with previous studies on expectations management (Bartov et al. 2002, Brown and 
Higgins 2005, Brown and Pinello 2007). 
10
  We follow prior works for the last two criteria such that, if more than one earnings forecast is released, we take the mean.  
11
 To mitigate the undue influence of outliers, we winsorize all variables entered in the modified Jones model and in the 
Matsumoto model at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
European listed non-financial firms-years in 
COMPUSTAT Global 19,433
Less firm-years non covered by I/B/E/S international -100
Intermediate sample 19,334
Less firms-years with not enough data to calculate 
the modified Jones model
(Dechow et al. 1995)
Intermediate sample 10,233
Less firm- years with not  enough data to calculate 
the modified Matsumoto model
(Matsumoto 2002)
Final sample 4,934
Table 1.1
Sample selection
-9,101
-5,299
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The final sample consists of 4,934 firm-year observations, representing 1,844 unique 
firms, from fourteen European countries between 2006 and 2009. Table 1.1 summarizes the 
sample selection. 
Table 1.2 illustrates the sample distribution by country and descriptive statistics on the 
legal enforcement variable (LAW). The legal enforcement variable (LAW) shows both cross-
sectional and time variation. 
 
 
Table 1.3 presents descriptive statistics. The mean of MBE is 0.503, which indicates 
that firms meet/beat analyst forecasts in half of the firm-year observations. The mean of 
POSDA is 0.440, suggesting that approximately 44 percent of the firm-year observations 
engage in EAR. The mean of DOWN is 0.692, which indicates that 69 percent of the 
observations engage in EXP.  
LAW LAW LAW LAW LAW
(2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (Mean)
Belgium 15 27 0.55 1.20 1.30 1.31 1.37 1.28(0)
Denmark 20 54 1.09 1.85 1.96 1.91 1.87 1.90(1)
Finland 40 128 2.59 1.93 1.86 1.86 1.94 1.90(1)
France 242 684 13.86 1.41 1.38 1.43 1.43 1.41(0)
Germany 269 721 14.61 1.69 1.70 1.67 1.63 1.67(1)
Greece 13 28 0.57 0.83 0.80 0.79 0.64 0.76(0)
Ireland 5 5 0.10 1.70 1.73 1.71 1.71 1.71(1)
Italy 89 217 4.40 0.31 0.40 0.38 0.39 0.37(0)
Netherlands 34 86 1.74 1.73 1.74 1.72 1.78 1.74(1)
Norway 105 249 5.05 1.95 1.90 1.94 1.88 1.92(1)
Spain 23 67 1.37 1.06 1.08 1.12 1.13 1.10(0)
Sweden 79 233 4.72 1.82 1.86 1.88 1.93 1.87(1)
Switzerland 98 305 6.18 1.78 1.82 1.79 1.75 1.78(1)
United Kingdom 813 2.13 43.18 1.70 1.66 1.63 1.71 1.67(1)
Total 1,884 4,934 100
Mean 1.51
Std. Dev. 0.46
Table 1.2 reports the sample distribution. The full sample comprises 4.934 firm-year observations representing 1.884 distinct firms from 12 EU countries
plus Norway and Switzerland during the period from 2006 to 2009. See APPENDIX I.A  for variable definitions.
Table 1.2
Distribution of Observations by Country
Country Unique firms Firm-years Firm-years as percent 
of total sample
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Table 1.4 reports the Pearson (Spearman) correlations below (above) the diagonal. 
LAW and GDP are excluded as long as they are measured at the country level and do not vary 
at the firm level.  
 
 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev P5 P25 Median P75 P95
MBE 4,934 0.503 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
DA 4,934 -0.013 0.095 -0.151 -0.047 -0.007 0.027 0.111
UEF 4,934 2.462 25.958 -1.454 0.023 0.343 1.406 7.980
POSDA 4,934 0.441 0.496 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
DOWN 4,934 0.692 0.461 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
SIZE 4,934 5.739 2.058 2.762 4.237 5.477 7.032 9.696
NOA 4,934 0.577 0.352 0.082 0.382 0.510 0.706 1.120
SENS 4,934 0.861 79.552 -71.146 -5.451 0.014 6.328 69.016
GROWTH 4,934 12.507 58.287 -34.727 -7.039 4.964 18.142 65.138
LEV 4,934 2.405 19.095 0.222 0.642 1.253 2.126 4.691
ROA 4,934 0.026 0.150 -0.241 0.013 0.049 0.089 0.184
R&D 4,934 0.041 0.109 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.198
ABS_FE 4,934 0.532 27.258 0.000 0.006 0.019 0.061 0.395
ESTIMATE 4,934 2.865 1.224 1.098 1.791 2.833 3.871 4.852
DUR 4,934 0.313 0.463 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
LIT 4,934 0.352 0.477 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
DUAL 4,934 0.065 0.246 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Table 1.3
Descriptive statistics for variables used in regression analyses
Table 1.3 reports descriptive statistics for the dependent variables and the continuous and binary independent
variables. The full sample comprises 4,934 firm-year observations representing 1,884 distinct firms from 12 EU
countries, plus Norway and Switzerland, during the period from 2006 to 2009. See APPENDIX I.A for variable
definitions.
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MBE POSDA DOWN SIZE SENS NOA GROWTH ABS_FE LEV ROA R&D ESTIMATE DUR LIT DUAL
MBE  0.07**  0.07**  0.07**  0.03** -0.04*  0.05** -0.16**  0.01  0.04*** -0.01  0.06**  0.00 -0.03**  0.02
POSDA  0.07**  0.01 -0.04  0.00 -0.06**  0.03* -0.06** -0.06**  0.08*** -0.02 -0.06**  0.03* -0.03 -0.04**
DOWN  0.06**  0.00  0.23** -0.01  0.13** -0.05 -0.18**  0.08**  0.36*** -0.10**  0.18**  0.00 -0.01**  0.06**
SIZE  0.05** -0.05**  0.24**  0.00  0.19** -0.02 -0.2**  0.46**  0.12*** -0.12**  0.79**  0.06** -0.29**  0.34**
SENS  0.02 -0.01  0.00  0.01 -0.01  0.01  0.00  0.02*  0.00 -0.03**  0.00 -0.02*  0.00 -0.02*
NOA -0.01  0.01  0.02 -0.02  0.00  0.10**  0.05** -0.06**  0.08***  0.01  0.11** -0.07** -0.06**  0.09**
GROWTH  0.00  0.03* -0.13 -0.06**  0.00  0.02** -0.25** -0.02*  0.07*** -0.04** -0.02 -0.07**  0.05** -0.04**
ABS_FE -0.01 -0.01  0.03* -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.03 -0.02 -0.29  0.03** -0.23**  0.01  0.07** -0.11**
LEV -0.02 -0.03*  0.00  0.03*  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00 -0.13 -0.23**  0.28** -0.03 -0.23**  0.1**
ROA  0.05***  0.04***  0.38***  0.26*** -0.01  0.13*** -0.14*** -0.01 -0.02 -0.06** -0.29  0.05*** -0.06**  0.05**
R&D -0.03 -0.02  0.18** -0.24**  0.01  0.03  0.05**  0.00 -0.01 -0.40**  0.04**  0.28**  0.3**  0.14**
ESTIMATE  0.04** -0.07**  0.19**  0.79**  0.01 -0.04** -0.06 -0.02  0.00  0.23*** -0.08**  0.05** -0.12**  0.33**
DUR  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.06** -0.01 -0.03* -0.06 -0.01  0.00  0.05***  0.03  0.05** -0.13**  0.01
LIT -0.03** -0.02*  0.09** -0.26 -0.01  0.00  0.02 -0.01 -0.03* -0.13**  0.30** -0.10** -0.13** -0.03
DUAL  0.01 -0.04**  0.06**  0.42**  0.00 -0.01 -0.04  0.00  0.01  0.05**  0.01  0.36**  0.01 -0.03
See APPENDIX I.A for variable definitions.
** and * denote significance at 1% and 5% levels (two-sided), respectively.
Table 1.4
Correlation matrix
Table 1.4 reports Pearson (Spearman) correlations below (above) the diagonal.
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1.5. Results 
We first analyze the actions to meet or beat analyst forecasts. Table 1.5 presents the 
coefficients and firm clustered adjusted z-statistics (in parentheses) of the logit analysis of the 
probability of meeting/beating analyst forecasts (equation (4)). The dependent variable is the 
probability of meeting/beating analyst forecasts. Columns (1)-(2) include only one action. 
Column (1) shows that the estimate coefficient of DOWN  is positive and highly significant 
(0.229, p < 0.001) so when a firm engages in EAR, the probability of meeting/beating earnings 
forecasts increases, while column (2) shows that the estimate coefficient on POSDA is positive 
and highly significant (0.285, p < 0.001). In column (3), which allows the probability to meet or 
beat analyst forecasts to depend on POSDA and DOWN, the estimate coefficients of POSDA and 
DOWN are still positive and significant (0.228, p < 0.001, 0.285, p < 0.001, respectively). In 
column (4), which includes the interaction between POSDA and DOWN in order to isolate firms 
that contemporaneously manage earnings upward and analyst forecasts downward, the estimate 
coefficients of POSDA and DOWN are still positive and highly significant, while their 
interaction is not significant. This result reveals that the joint use of EAR and EXP does not 
affect the probability of a firm’s meeting/beating analyst forecasts, possibly because only firms 
whose pre-managed earnings are far from analyst consensus use both actions, but given the 
magnitude of this difference, not even the joint use of EAR and EXP makes it possible to obtain a 
positive earnings surprise. In all models, the level of enforcement is positively associated with 
MBE: when the legal enforcement is strong, firms have greater incentive to meet/beat analyst 
forecasts. Among the control variables, the estimate coefficient of NOA is negative and 
statistically significant. Consistent with prior research, the higher NOA is, the more difficult 
accrual manipulation is. 
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(2) (1) (3) (4)
MBE MBE MBE MBE
DOWN 0.229*** - 0.228*** 0.289***
(2.984) (2.962) (2.945)
POSDA - 0.285*** 0.285*** 0.394***
(4.756) (4.743) (3.151)
DOWN*POSDA - - - -0.139
(-0.990)
LAW 0.349** 0.387** 0.373** 0.372**
(2.282) (2.514) (2.438) (2.425)
GDP -1.047*** -1.123*** -1.088*** -1.085***
(-4.261) (-4.542) (-4.411) (-4.398)
SIZE 0.018 0.0270 0.019 0.019
(0.642) (0.969) (0.696) (0.687)
ROA 0.003 0.004** 0.003 0.003
(1.373) (1.999) (1.120) (1.121)
NOA -0.347*** -0.314*** -0.319*** -0.319***
(-3.833) (-3.428) (-3.492) (-3.487)
SENS 0.000 -0.000 0 0
(-1.031) (-1.171) (-1.120) (-1.113)
GROWTH 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.185) (0.802) (1.015) (0.996)
LEV -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(-1.439) (-1.361) (-1.472) (-1.478)
ABS_FE -0.012 -0.011 -0.009 -0.009
(-0.453) (-0.383) (-0.376) (-0.373)
DUR -0.039 -0.023 -0.036 -0.032
(-0.160) (-0.094) (-0.146) (-0.130)
R&D -0.264 -0.251 -0.244 -0.247
(-0.826) (-0.784) (-0.765) (-0.772)
LIT -0.096 -0.101 -0.091 -0.091
(-1.203) (-1.261) (-1.131) (-1.135)
DUAL -0.162 -0.154 -0.147 -0.148
(-1.063) (-1.017) (-0.964) (-0.973)
ESTIMATE 0.082* 0.087** 0.089** 0.089**
(1.924) (2.056) (2.104) (2.096)
CONSTANT 10.116*** 10.759*** 10.315*** 10.234***
(4.247) (4.496) (4.318) (4.285)
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log likelihood -3346.94 -3339.54 -3335.31 -3334.83
Chi- Square 130.12 142.76 151.45 151.65
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.021 0.023 0.024 0.025
Observations 4,934 4,934 4,934 4,934
***, ** and * denote significance at 1% , 5% and 10%  levels (two-sided), respectively.
Table 1.5
Logit analysis of the probability of meeting/beating analyst forecasts
Table 1.5 reports the results from the estimation of model (4). The table reports logistic coefficient estimates and z-statistic (in parentheses)
See APPENDIX I.A for variable definitions.
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Previous analysis does not allow us to disentangle the roles of EAR and EXP one from the 
other. Thus, we explore to what extent the relationship between EAR and EXP varies according 
to the strength of the legal enforcement. Table 1.6 reports the results from a logistic and OLS 
analysis on the effects of the legal enforcement on EAR and EXP (equations (5A-5B) and 
equations (6A-6B)). We use firm clustered adjusted z-statistics (t- statistics depending on the 
model specification) and year-industry fixed effects. Consistent with our predictions, LAW is 
negatively and significantly associated with EAR. In column (1) the coefficient on LAW is 
negative and significant (-0.301, p<0.050), and this negative association still holds when we 
measure income increasing earnings management as a continuous variable (column 2: -0.011, p < 
0.050) or when we restrict the estimation sample only to firms with small earnings surprises 
(column 3: -0.216, p < 0.050). On the other side, LAW is positively associated with EXP 
irrespective from the model specification (column 4: 0.532,  p < 0.050, column 5: 8.553, p < 
0.050, column 6: 0.740, p < 0.050). The strength of the legal enforcement affects the choice 
between EAR and EXP such that, as the legal enforcement gets stronger, a firm is less likely to 
engage in EAR and more likely to engage in EXP. The estimate coefficients of firm-specific 
constraints on EAR and EXP are both significant and in the expected direction. For example, 
looking at column (1) NOA is strongly negatively associated with POSDA (-0.402, p < 0.001), 
while SENS is negatively associated with DOWN in model (4) (-0.003, p < 0.001) but not with 
POSDA. These results are consistent with the evidence Das et al.  (2011) obtained. Table 1.6 
provides evidence that, after controlling for firm-specific constraints on EAR and EXP (i.e., NOA 
and SENS), the legal enforcement has an additional explanatory power in the choice between 
EAR and EXP. This result supports the prediction that the level of legal enforcement determines 
the choice between EAR and EXP, and it provides preliminary evidence of a substitution effect 
between EAR and EXP conditional on the level of legal enforcement. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full sample Full sample Small Earnings 
Surprise
Full sample Full sample Small Earnings 
Surprise
POSDA DA POSDA DOWN UEF DOWN
LAW -0.301** -0.011** -0.216** 0.532** 8.553** 0.740**
(-2.253) (-2.135) (-2.049) (2.237) (2.330) (2.358)
GDP 0.535** 0.008 0.148 -1.156*** -0.004 -1.830***
(2.127) (0.638) (0.509) (-3.525) (-0.898) (-3.244)
SIZE -0.023 0.000 -0.004 0.217*** 2.223*** 0.299***
(-0.771) (0.018) (-0.146) (4.775) (2.579) (4.566)
ROA 0.007*** 0.001*** 0.005* 0.062*** 0.054*** 0.049***
(2.692) (3.216) (1.947) (9.213) (2.884) (7.073)
NOA -0.402*** -0.019*** -0.386*** 0.072 -1.570* 0.149
(-4.192) (-3.549) (-3.989) (0.585) (-1.859) (0.875)
SENS -0.000 0.000 0.000** -0.000** 0.000 -0.000*
(-0.095) (0.622) (2.147) (-2.373) (0.168) (-1.812)
GROWTH 0.001** -0.000 0.001*** -0.003*** -0.000 -0.003**
(2.246) (-0.423) (4.264) (-3.388) (-1.356) (-2.408)
LEV -0.012 -0.000** -0.014*** -0.000 -0.622** 0.001
(-1.533) (-2.097) (-3.117) (-0.095) (-2.147) (0.484)
ABS_FE -0.682*** -0.000*** -0.449 -0.017 0.001 -0.100
(-2.943) (-6.423) (-0.773) (-1.012) (0.486) (-0.600)
DUR -0.055 0.008 -0.145*** 0.192 -0.117 -0.270
(-0.288) (0.906) (-2.728) (0.710) (-0.109) (-0.847)
R_D -0.386 -0.025 -0.576 0.181 -0.122 0.418
(-1.171) (-1.051) (-1.557) (0.297) (-0.059) (0.845)
LIT -0.077 -0.007* 0.150** -0.292*** -1.015 0.166
(-0.951) (-1.793) (2.271) (-2.622) (-0.833) (1.074)
DUAL -0.240 -0.009 0.109 -0.175 -5.061** -0.443
(-1.469) (-1.604) (0.567) (-0.823) (-1.978) (-1.489)
ESTIMATE -0.119*** -0.002 -0.144*** -0.049 -2.481** -0.148
(-2.783) (-1.133) (-2.706) (-0.738) (-2.500) (-1.474)
CONSTANT -4.252* -0.067 -0.381 10.705*** -17.249** 17.188***
(-1.736) (-0.537) (-0.131) (3.383) (-2.325) (3.072)
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log likelihood -3295.07 - -1716.52 -2104.79 - -1061.71
Chi- Square 117.73 - 103.98 359.23 - 209.76
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.026 0.026 0.023 0.198 0.021 0.181
Observations 4,934 4,934 2,564 4,934 4,934 2,564
***, ** and * denote significance at 1% , 5% and 10%  levels (two-sided), respectively.      
Table 1.6
Logit analysis of the effect of the legal enforcement on EAR and EXP
Table 1.6, column 1 reports the results of a logit analysis of the probability to engage in income increasing accrual management as a function of rule of law and
control variables. Column 2 reports the results of an OLS regression of income increasing accrual management as a function of rule of law and control variables.
Column 3 reports the results of a logit analysis of the probability to engage in income increasing accrual management as a function of rule of law and control
variables for a sub-sample of firms with a small earnings surprise. Column 4 reports the results of a logit analysis of the probability to engage in downward
expectation management as a function of rule of law and control variables. Column 5 reports the results of an OLS regression of downward expectation management
as a function of rule of law and control variables. Column 6 reports the results of a logit analysis of the probability to engage in downward expectation management
as a function of rule of law and control variables for a sub-sample of firms with a small earnings surprise Each model includes year and industry fixed effects based
on the classification in Campbell (1996). The table reports coefficient estimates and z-statistic (t-statistics depending on the specifications) based on robust standard
errors that are clustered by firm.
See APPENDIX I.A for variable definitions.
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To clarify how the strength of the legal enforcement affects the relationship between EAR 
and EXP, we perform a logistic and OLS analysis of the trade-off between EAR and EXP, 
conditional on the level of legal enforcement. Specifically, we regress our proxies for the 
likelihood of engaging in EAR on EXP, LAW, and the interaction between EXP and LAW 
(equations (7A-7B)). We use firm clustered adjusted z-statistics (t- statistics depending on the 
model specification) and year-industry fixed effects. Our variables of interest are DOWN, which 
captures EXP without being conditional on the level of enforcement, and its interaction with 
LAW. Including the interaction between DOWN and LAW allows the relationship between EAR 
and EXP to vary with the strength of the legal enforcement. Results are presented in Table 1.7.  
Column (1) shows that the estimate coefficient on DOWN is positive albeit only marginal 
significant (0.051,  p < 0.100), suggesting that EAR and EXP are complements, while the 
coefficient on the interaction between DOWN and LAW is negative and significant (-0.028, p < 
0.05), suggesting that firms substitute EAR with EXP when the level of legal enforcement gets 
stricter. Columns (2-3) provide essentially the same results using DA as dependent variable or by 
restricting the estimation sample only on firms with small earnings surprises. 
In columns (4-5) we estimate directly the trade-off between EAR and EXP, as the dependent 
variable captures the extent to which a firm relies on the former or on the latter to meet/beat an 
analyst forecasts. In column (4) LAW is negatively associated with TRADE_OFF (-0.077, p < 
0.001), meaning that when the legal enforcement is stronger, firms relies more on EXP than on 
EAR. This evidence still holds when we restrict the estimation sample only on firms with small 
earnings surprises.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full sample Full sample Small Earnings 
Surprise
Full sample Small Earnings 
Surprise
POSDA DA POSDA TRADE_OFF TRADE_OFF
LAW -0.313** -0.011** -0.042 -0.077*** -0.107*** - -
(-2.113) (-2.136) (-0.168) (-2.688) (-3.048)
DOWN 0.051* 0.003* 1.304** - - 0.038* -0.021***
(1.694) (1.816) (2.067) (1.891) (-3.143)
LAW*DOW -0.028** -0.001** -0.819** - - - -
(-1.991) (-2.216) (-1.988)
GDP 0.514** 0.006 0.377 -0.035 0.180** -0.038 -0.001
(2.022) (0.456) (0.857) (-0.660) (2.331) (-1.134) (-0.283)
SIZE -0.014 0.001 -0.026 -0.049*** -0.038*** -0.001 -0.047***
(-0.450) (1.095) (-0.542) (-8.421) (-5.091) (-0.051) (-4.951)
ROA 0.006** 0.001*** 0.006* -0.039** -0.039* -0.002 0.002**
(2.282) (2.763) (1.800) (-2.195) (-1.815) (-0.261) (1.987)
NOA -0.389*** -0.022*** -0.460*** -0.000 0.000*** -0.013 -0.059**
(-4.074) (-3.890) (-3.336) (-0.656) (6.814) (-0.311) (-1.982)
SENS 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000*** - -
(-0.093) (0.631) (0.711) (-0.656) (6.814)
GROWTH 0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.832) (-0.428) (0.970) (-0.590) (-1.185) '(0.151) '(0.392)
LEV -0.045** -0.004*** -0.022 -0.001*** -0.006*** 0.003 -0.021
(-2.385) (-3.705) (-0.841) (-5.184) (-4.714) (0.275) (-0.381)
ABS_FE -0.676*** -0.000*** -0.432 -0.000 -0.000 -0.027 -0.000
(-2.911) (-6.820) (-0.905) (-0.960) (-0.546) (0.271) (-0.682)
DUR -0.544 -0.010 -0.179** -0.107*** -0.068* 0.009 0.016
(-0.291) (-1.130) (-2.451) (-2.643) (-1.666) (0.967) (1.061)
R&D -0.384 -0.025 -0.704 -0.115* -0.134** 0.047 0.008
(-1.103) (-1.009) (-1.487) (-1.896) (-2.123) (1.571) (0.080)
LIT -0.086 -0.008** 0.078 0.036** 0.007 0.023 -0.205**
(-1.054) (-2.079) (0.495) (2.176) (0.361) (1.181) (-1.996)
DUAL -0.263 -0.011** 0.086 -0.015 0.019 -0.002 -0.005**
(-1.609) (-2.025) (0.360) (-0.506) (0.553) (-0.891) (-1.985)
ESTIMATE -0.119*** -0.003 -0.124* -0.009 -0.022* -0.010 -0.056***
(-2.760) (-1.431) (-1.779) (-0.951) (-1.873) (-0.924) (-3.771)
CONSTANT -3.984 -0.042 -4.026 0.958* -1.225 0.364 -0.021
(-1.611) (-0.328) (-0.931) (1.793) (-1.594) (0.104) (-0.681)
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -3295.87 - -1684.24 - - - -
Chi- Square 120.79 - 263.85 - - - -
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.026 0.030 0.039 0.132 0.139 - -
Observations 4,934 4,934 2,564 4,934 2,564 1,023 3,911
***, ** and * denote significance at 1% , 5% and 10%  levels (two-sided), respectively.
See APPENDIX I.A for variable definitions.
Table 1.7
Analysis of the trade-off between EAR and EXP conditioned on the legal enforcement
(6)
DA
Table 1.7, column 1 reports the results of a logit analysis of the relationship between income increasing earnings management (POSDA) and downward
expectation management for the full sample of firms. Column 2 reports the results of an OLS regression of the relationship between income increasing
earnings management (DA) and downward expectation management for the full sample of firms. Column 3 reports the results of a logit analysis of the
relationship between income increasing earnings management (POSDA) and downward expectation management for a sub-sample of firms with small earnings
surprises. Columns 4-5 report the results of an OLS t analysis of the trade-off between income increasing earnings management and downward expectation
management for the full sample and for a sub-sample of firms with small earnings surprises.Column 6 reports 2SLS estimation of the relationship between
income increasing earnings management (DA) and downward expectation management for the full sample of firms. The 2SLS estimation is carried out
separately for two sub-group (HIGH_LAW – LOW_LAW), defined according to the mean value of LAW across 2006-2009. Year and industry fixed effects
based on the classification in Campbell (1996) are included. The table reports coefficient estimates, z-statistic (t-statistic) and two-tailed p-value based on
robust standard errors that are clustered by firm. 
2SLS                                          
LOW_LAW            HIGH_LAW                  
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Finally, in column (6) we estimate DA and DOWN jointly trough a 2SLS12. To the extent 
that we are interested in the moderating effect of LAW on the relationship between EAR and 
EXP, we estimate the system of equations separately for sub-groups of LOW_LAW and 
HIGH_LAW. The results confirm prior evidence. DOWN is positively associated with DA when 
the legal enforcement is weak (0.038, p < 0.100), while they are negatively associated when the 
legal enforcement is strong (-0.021, p < 0.001). These findings suggest that firms use EAR and 
EXP as complements when the legal enforcement is weak, but when it is difficult to manage 
accruals because of a strong legal enforcement, firms substitute EAR with EXP. 
  
Market reaction to EAR and EXP under different levels of legal enforcement 
In the final step of our analysis, we investigate how the capital market reacts to the use of 
EAR and EXP. Table 1.8 reports the results of univariate tests. For each specification of the 
cumulative market adjusted returns (CAR_1_t), we report a 2×2 table to separate the mean values 
of CAR_1_t between firms that meet/beat forecasts and those that do not, and within each group 
in relation to the use of EAR and EXP. For all specifications of CAR_1_t, firms that meet/beat 
forecasts experience higher CAR than those that do not. Most importantly, within the subsample 
of firms that meet/beat forecasts, firms experience higher abnormal returns when they do not 
engage in EAR and this difference is statistically significant. 
 
 
 
                                                    
12
 We employ a Durbin-Wu-Hausman χ2  to test the exogeneity of DOWN in equation 7B. The test reject the null that DOWN is 
exogenous in the regression reported in table 7, model 2 (p<0.010). 
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Then we condition the sample on meeting/beating firms and for each different 
specification of CAR by splitting the sample into four sub-groups according to POSDA and 
DOWN. Through this analysis, we measure the difference in the market premium for 
meeting/beating analyst forecasts in relation to the actions used to achieve the target. Table1.9 
 ACTION MBE = 1 MBE =0
POSDA = 1 -0.023 -0.065
POSDA = 0  0.008 -0.072
H0: diff = 0  p=0.004  p=0.600
POSDA = 1 -0.022 -0.066
POSDA = 0  0.008 -0.072
H0: diff = 0  p=0.007  p=0.604
POSDA = 1 -0.022 -0.067
POSDA = 0  0.007 -0.072
H0: diff = 0  p=0.010  p=0.721
POSDA = 1 -0.027 -0.072
POSDA = 0  0.006 -0.077
H0: diff = 0  p=0.003  p=0.713
POSDA = 1 -0.029 -0.077
POSDA = 0  0.008 -0.083
H0: diff = 0  p=0.002  p=0.526
DOWN = 1 -0.008 -0.074
DOWN = 0  0.001 -0.058
H0: diff = 0  p=0.526 p=0.301
DOWN = 1  0.002 -0.074
DOWN = 0 -0.008 -0.059
H0: diff = 0  p=0.477 p=0.327
DOWN = 1 -0.009 -0.073
DOWN = 0  0.002 -0.059
H0: diff = 0  p=0.451 p=0.362
DOWN = 1 -0.011 -0.078
DOWN = 0 -0.006 -0.065
H0: diff = 0  p=0.901 p=0.427
DOWN = 1 -0.011 -0.083
DOWN = 0 -0.006 -0.074
H0: diff = 0  p=0.7706 p=0.587
See APPENDIX A for variable definitions.
Table 1.8 reports mean values of the market adjusted returns (CAR_1_t) cumulated from
1 day before to t ( 3, 5, 10, 20, 30) days after a firm’s i earnings announcement. Returns
are reported separately for firms that meet/beat analyst earnings forecasts (MBE=1) and
those which fail to meet analyst earnings forecasts (MBE=0). 
We report p-values for differences in mean using a t-test with different variance.                                                                                                                                                                         
CAR 1-30
Table 1.8  
Market reactions to EAR and EXP: univariate analysis
CAR 1-3
CAR 1-5
CAR 1-10
CAR 1-20
CAR 1-30
CAR 1-3
CAR 1-5
CAR 1-10
CAR 1-20
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reports the results. Meeting/beating firms that do not engage both in EAR and EXP experience a 
market reward, on average, of 4.21 percent (for CAR 1-3), whereas capital markets do not reward 
meeting/beating firms that use both the actions as the CAR 1-3 when POSDA and DOWN are 
equal to one is -2.55 percent.  
 
 
 
CAR 1 -3
POSDA = 0 POSDA = 1 diff.
DOWN = 0  0.042 -0.043  0.086
DOWN = 1  0.001 -0.018  0.018
diff.  0.042 -0.026  0.067
p-value  0.019  0.093
CAR 1 -5
POSDA = 0 POSDA = 1
DOWN = 0  0.043 -0.0422  0.085
DOWN = 1  0.000 -0.0172  0.016
diff.  0.043 -0.025  0.068
p-value  0.017  0.101
CAR 1 -10
POSDA = 0 POSDA = 1
DOWN = 0  0.041 -0.039  0.080
DOWN = 1 -0.000 -0.018  0.017
diff.  0.042 -0.021  0.068
p-value  0.022  0.141
CAR 1 -20
POSDA = 0 POSDA = 1
DOWN = 0  0.035 -0.054  0.089
DOWN = 1  0.000 -0.021  0.021
diff.  0.035 -0.033  0.068
p-value  0.049  0.059
CAR 1 -30
POSDA = 0 POSDA = 1
DOWN = 0  0.035 -0.050  0.085
DOWN = 1  0.001 -0.024  0.025
diff.  0.034 -0.026  0.060
p-value  0.057  0.114
We report p-values for differences in mean using a t-test with different variance.                                                                                                                                                                         
See APPENDIX I.A for variable definitions.
Table 1.9
Market reactions to EAR and EXP:
univariate analysis conditioned on meeting/beating firms
Table 1.9 reports mean values of the market adjusted returns (CAR_1_t) cumulated from
1 day before to t ( 3, 5, 10, 20, 30) days after a firm’s i earnings announcement for firms
that meet/beat analyst earnings forecasts (MBE =1). POSDA is a binary variable coded
as 1(0) if DA is greater than or equal to (less than) 0.
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Overall, genuine achievers (i.e., firms that use neither EAR or EXP) experience a market 
reward higher by 6.73 percent ( p < 0.010) of that gained by cheating achievers (i.e., firms that 
use both EAR and EXP). 
Table 1.10 presents estimation results of the market reactions to meet/beat analyst 
forecasts, and to the use of EAR and EXP (see equation (8)). In all of the specifications of 
CAR_1_t, firms that meet/beat forecasts enjoy higher cumulative abnormal returns than firms 
that do not. As we move from the short window (one to three days) to the long window (one to 
thirty days), the magnitude of the estimate coefficient of MBE increases slightly and remains 
strongly significant. On the other side, the estimate coefficients of POSDA and DOWN are 
negative and statistically significant in all models, as the capital market imposes a significant 
penalty on the use of EAR and EXP. The presence of such a penalty suggests that, to a certain 
extent, investors react to earnings surprises rationally to the extent that they are able to separate 
“managing” from “non-managing” firms. However, the market premium for meeting/beating 
analyst forecasts is still significantly positive, after that, the penalties for EAR and EXP are taken 
into account. Indeed, firms that meet/beat analyst forecasts using EAR experience a positive 
market reward that averages 0.027 (p < 0.050, column 3), and firms that meet/beat forecasts 
using EXP enjoy a market reward of 0.021 percent (p < 0.100, column 3). On the other side, 
achievers that engage both in EAR and EXP receive no market reward, as the coefficient of 
MBE, when both POSDA and DOWN are equal to one, is negative but not significant. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CAR_1-3 CAR_1-5 CAR_1-10 CAR_1-20 CAR_1-30
MBE 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.053*** 0.059***
(6.082) (6.003) (6.081) (6.020) (6.576)
POSDA -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.028*** -0.028***
(-2.910) (2.793) (-2.872) (-3.210) (-3.192)
DOWN -0.030** -0.031** -0.032** -0.031** -0.032**
(-2.410) (2.452) (2.516) (-2.321) (-2.335)
SIZE -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.331***
(-3.042) (-2.845) (-2.891) (-2.692) (-2.356)
GROWTH 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-0.210) (-0.054) (-0.120) (-0.332) (-0.026)
ROA 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(4.785) (4.745) (4.868) (5.131) (5.120)
LOSS -0.036* -0.038* -0.038* -0.030 -0.033
(-1.792) (-1.887) (-1.843) (-1.426) (-1.531)
ABS_FE 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***    0.002***       0.0022***
(12.624) (12.273) (11.751) (19.247) (12.701)
CONSTANT 0.069 0.058 0.055 0.021 0.0099
(1.291) (1.109) (1.070) (0.373) (0.180)
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.101 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.101
Observations 4,897 4,897 4,897 4,897 4,897
Test of coefficients
0.026** 0.027** 0.027** 0.025** 0.030**
(2.261) (2.301) (2.276) (2.010) (2.395)
0.020 0.019 0.021* 0.022* 0.027*
(1.531) (1.502) (1.780) (1.851) (1.910)
-0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.002
(-0.230) (-0.229) (-0.292) (-0.350) (-0.101)
***, ** and * denote significance at 1% , 5% and 10%  levels (two-sided), respectively.
Table 1.10 reports the results of regressions of market adjusted returns (CAR_1_t) cumulated from 1 day before to t (3, 5,
10, 20, 30) days after a firm’s i earnings announcement. Year, country and industry fixed effects based on the classification
in Campbell '(1996) are included. 
See APPENDIX I.A for variable definitions.
Table 1.10
Market reactions to EAR and EXP 
β1  + β2=0
β1  + β3=0
β1  + β2 + β3=0
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Table 1.11 reports the results of the regression models on the market reactions to EAR 
and EXP conditional on the strength of the legal enforcement (equation (9)). In these regressions, 
we condition POSDA and DOWN on LAW by including the interactions between POSDA and 
LAW and between DOWN and LAW.  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CAR_1-3 CAR_1-5 CAR_1-10 CAR_1-20 CAR_1-30
MBE 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.055*** 0.061***
(6.351) (6.282) (6.349) (6.321) (6.841)
POSDA -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.011 -0.008
(0.610) (-0.656) (-0.536) (-0.912) (-0.687)
DOWN -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.040*** -0.038*** -0.041***
(-2.719) (-2.701) (-2.850) (-2.591) (-2.733)
POSDA*LAW -0.044* -0.042* -0.048** -0.046* -0.053**
(-1.893) (-1.750) (-1.998) (-1.896) (-2.179)
DOWN*LAW 0.009 0.008 0.012 0.007 0.011
(0.532) (0.481) (0.681) (0.412) (0.583)
SIZE -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005** -0.004
(-2.671) (-2.548) (-2.556) (-2.131) (-1.513)
GROWTH 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-0.495) (-0.313) (-0.414) (-0.667) (-0.353)
ROA 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(4.901) (4.871) (4.993) (5.301) (5.330)
LOSS -0.033* -0.036* -0.036* -0.027 -0.029
(-1.671) (-1.772) (-1.745) (-1.281) (-1.351)
ABS_FE 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(13.961) (13.071) (12.651) (16.350) (19.447)
CONSTANT 0.042 0.036 0.028 0.010 -0.007
(1.470) (1.291) (0.990) (0.321) (-0.240)
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.092 0.092
Observations 4,897 4,897 4,897 4,897 4,897
Table 1.11
Market reactions to EAR and EXP conditioned on the legal enforcement
Table 1.11 reports the results of regressions of market adjusted returns (CAR_1_t) cumulated from 1 day before to t (3,
5, 10, 20, 30) days after a firm’s i earnings announcement. Year, country and industry fixed effects based on the
classification in Campbell (1996) are included. 
See APPENDIX A for variable definitions.
***, ** and * denote significance at 1% , 5% and 10%  levels (two-sided), respectively.
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The estimate coefficient of MBE is positive and statistically significant across all of the 
CAR specifications. The coefficient of DOWN is negative and significant, while the interaction 
between DOWN and LAW is not statistically different from zero. This finding suggests that the 
penalty for EXP is not affected by the level of legal enforcement. On the other hand, the estimate 
coefficient of POSDA is negative, even if not significant, while the coefficient of the interaction 
between POSDA and LAW is negative and significant. This finding indicates that only the 
penalty for EAR increases with the strength of legal enforcement.  
 
1.6. Robustness checks13 
Alternative proxies for EAR and EXP 
The literature has developed several proxies with which to capture EXP, as it is not 
directly observable. To validate our measures and verify that our findings are robust to alternative 
measures, we replicate our analyses using two proxies (Brown and Pinello 2007; Das et al. 2011). 
According to Bartov et al. (2002), EXP is suspected when a firm that meets or beats analyst 
forecasts has a negative forecast error. Hence, we define EXP as a binary variable that takes the 
value of one if a firm-year has a negative forecast error and MBE is equal to one, and zero 
otherwise. The second proxy (WLKDN) measures the size of the “walk-down” of analyst 
earnings forecasts as the difference between the first and last consensus analyst forecasts. A firm 
is suspected of engaging in EXP if WLKDN is positive.14  
Next, we test whether our results are robust to the use of two alternative measures of 
discretionary accruals. First, we use working capital accruals instead of total accruals (De Fond 
                                                    
13
 All the results of robustness checks are available from the authors upon request.  
14
 Given that EXP is conditioned on the firms’ ability to meet/beat analyst earnings forecasts, we cannot include such a proxy in 
equation (1). When EXP is equals to one, it predicts perfectly MBE equals to one, given that it is conditioned on that value. 
Therefore, we use only WLKDN for equation (1), while we use EXP and WLKDN for the others. 
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and Park 2001). Second, we estimate normal accruals controlling for the lagged return on assets 
(Kothari et al. 2005). The results of these sensitivity checks (not tabulated) shows that our main 
findings are robust to alternative measures EXP and EAR.   
 
Alternative Proxies for the Level of Legal Enforcement 
We use the variable “rule of law” proposed by Kaufmann et al.’s (2011) as a proxy for the 
strength of the legal enforcement. While this variable is widely used in international accounting 
studies (Daske et al. 2008;  Li 2010; Byard et al. 2011), we test the robustness of our results by 
employing other proxies to capture the difference in the level of legal enforcement: (i) following 
Byard et al.  (2011), we use the “governance score” and the “regulatory quality” for 2005 from 
Kaufman et al.  (2007), (ii) following Leuz et al. (2003), we take the average score of the 
efficiency of the juridical system, rule of law, and corruption from La Porta et al.  (1998), and 
(iii) following Preiato et al.  (2010), we use the “audit and enforcement score.” Results (not 
tabulated) are qualitatively unchanged from those reported in the paper. 
 
 Quarterly instead of Annual Data 
We also test whether our results are robust to the use of quarterly data instead of annual 
data. Given data limitations, we are not able to compute the research and development intensity 
(RandD) in this robustness check. Following Brown and Spina Pinello (2007), we add a fourth-
quarter dummy variable (FOURTH QUARTER). Because Compustat Global does not provide 
the gross value of the property, plan, and equipment on a quarterly basis, we use only the 
working capital accrual model to measure EAR. We exclude the UK and Ireland, as firms in 
these countries provide quarterly financial statements only on a voluntary basis. The results 
confirm the evidence we acquired using annual data.  
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Additional Robustness Tests 
In the main analyses, we control for macroeconomic factors using the log-transformed 
average gross domestic product per capita (GDP) over the period 1990-2000. This variable, 
which captures the extent to which a country is developed or developing, is widely used in 
international accounting research (Haw et al. 2004) to deal with the effect of unobserved country-
specific factors that could be associated with both EAR and EXP. However, we also control for 
the level of a country’s financial development using the stock market capitalization divided by 
GDP (World Bank). Finally, we test to determine whether the main analyses (based on annual 
data) are robust to the exclusion of the UK, which represents 44 percent of the sample. Results 
(not tabulated) are consistent with those obtained in the main analyses.  
 
1.7. Conclusisions 
Research on EAR and EXP has focused on the use of one of these actions alone without 
considering that these two actions might be jointly determined and that a firm can choose to use 
one and not the other. Only a few papers explore the relationship between EXP and EAR directly 
as a function of their respective firm-specific constraints (Brown and Pinello 2007; Das et al. 
2011). Even if we know from international accounting literature that the enforcement 
environment affects a firm’s reporting decisions, no study investigates directly and in detail 
whether country level institutional characteristics (i.e. the quality of a country’s enforcement 
environment) shape firms’ choice between EAR and EXP. We extend this literature by obtaining 
direct empirical evidence that the relationship between EAR and EXP varies in an international 
setting. We find direct evidence that the relationship between EAR and EXP depends on the 
strength of the legal enforcement and that the choice between EAR and EXP is not driven only by 
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firm-level characteristics. We directly document that, after controlling for the traditional firm-
specific constraints on EAR and EXP, the strength of the legal enforcement has an additional 
explanatory power in a firm’s choice between EAR and EXP. Specifically, firms exploit EAR 
and EXP as complementary or substitute actions based on whether the legal enforcement is weak 
or strong, respectively.  
Using a sample of European firms in the post-mandatory-IFRS-adoption period, we show that 
firms use both EAR and EXP to increase the likelihood of meeting/beating analyst forecasts. We 
provide evidence of a substitution effect between EAR and EXP as a function of the legal 
enforcement, which extends beyond the traditional firm-specific constraints. We find that, when 
the legal enforcement is weak, firms use EAR and EXP as complements, and when the legal 
enforcement is strong, firms substitute EAR with EXP. In this vein, our evidence extends the 
results of Koh et al (2011), which shows that a change in regulation in a single country (i.e. the 
enforcement of the SOX) affects the choice between EAR and EXP. 
We also document that the capital market rewards firms that meet/beat analyst forecasts 
and penalizes the use of EAR and EXP. Despite such penalties, the market premium for 
meeting/beating analyst forecasts is still positive if firms use only one of the actions. However, 
the premium disappears if firms use EAR and EXP contemporaneously. Finally, we document 
that the market penalty for the use of EAR increases as the strength of the legal enforcement 
increases, while the penalty for the use of EXP is not strongly affected by the level of the legal 
enforcement.  
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Appendix I.A: Variable definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
MBE Binary variable equals to one if a firm-year’s actual earnings 
meet/beat the last consensus analyst forecast made before the 
current annual’s earnings announcement, zero otherwise. 
DA Discretionary accruals derived from the modified Jones model 
(Dechow 1995). 
UEF Modeled measure of unexpected earnings forecast according to 
the Matsumoto model (2002) time minus one. 
POSDA Binary variable  equals  to one if DA is greater than or equal to 
zero, zero otherwise.  
DOWN Binary variable equal to one if the modeled measure of 
unexpected earnings forecast from the Matsumoto model (2002) is 
negative, zero otherwise. 
TRADE_OFF Difference between the percentile rank of  DA and UEF, scaled by 
100. 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the year. 
LAW Rule of law variable from Kaufmann et al.  2011) for the years 
2006-2009. 
NOA Net operating assets at the beginning of the year, computed as the 
difference between operating assets and operating liabilities scaled 
by lagged total assets. 
SENS Price sensitivity to earnings news as the abnormal return per unit 
of earnings surprise, defined as the three-day cumulative abnormal 
return around the earnings announcement in period t, scaled by the 
corresponding surprise in the reported earnings. 
GROWTH Annual percentage change in sales. 
LEV End of the year total liabilities divided by end of the year  equity 
book value. 
ROA Net income over the mean value of total assets D is research and 
development expenditures scaled by total assets. 
R&D Research and development expenditures scaled by total assets. 
ABS_FE Earnings surprise, defined as the difference between the actual 
earnings per share and the analyst consensus earnings forecast 
before the earnings announcement, scaled the closing price at the 
fiscal year end. 
ESTIMATE Logarithm of the number of analyst earnings forecasts made 
during the year. 
DUR Binary variable equal to one if a firm is member of durable goods 
industry (SICs 1500-1790, 1450, 2500-2590, 2830, 3010, 3240-
3990), zero otherwise. 
 
 
39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIT Binary variable indicating membership in high-risk industry (SICs 
2833-2836, 3570-3577, 7370-7374, 3600-3674, 5200-5961). 
DUAL Binary variable equals to one if the firm is listed on any US stock 
exchange, zero otherwise. 
CAR_1_t Daily cumulative market-adjusted returns from one day before to t 
(3, 5, 10, 20, 30) days after firm i's earnings announcement. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Influence of Country- and Firm-Level 
Governance on Financial Reporting 
Quality:  
Evidence from IFRS Mandatory Adoption 
 
2.1   Introduction 
This paper explores how country and firm-level governance mechanisms interplay and 
dovetail one another in influencing the quality of reported earnings. While there is extensive 
research on the mapping between a firm’s governance mechanisms and financial reporting 
quality as well as on the impact of country-level institutions and financial reporting quality, there 
is scant evidence as to how these two levels of governance jointly affect the quality of financial 
reporting.  
In that regard, the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) provides 
an interesting setting to assess the relative influence of each governance level. It is one of the 
most fundamental change in accounting regulation and, not surprisingly, has been studied broadly 
(see Soderstrom and Sun 2007; Barth 2008; Hail et al. 2010 for an overview). However, evidence 
regarding the economic benefits stemming from IFRS mandatory adoption is rather mixed. On 
one hand, it appears that the switch from local generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) 
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to IFRS leads to an increase in comparability, transparency, and financial reporting quality. On 
the other hand, it is challenging, conceptually and empirically, to attribute such benefits to IFRS 
reporting per se, with some evidence suggesting that most of the perceived benefits from IFRS 
adoption actually result from concurrent changes in the regulatory and enforcement environments 
(Christensen et al. 2012). To the extent that the application of accounting standards provides 
insiders with substantial discretion, research highlights that firms’ reporting behavior, and hence 
the observed financial reporting quality, is likely to be shaped by institutional factors and firm-
level characteristics, rather than by a simple change in accounting standards (Ball et al. 2003; 
Leuz et al. 2003; Burgsthaler et al. 2006). Consistently, many previous studies (Daske et al. 
2008) suggest that there is a substantial heterogeneity in the effects of IFRS adoption due to 
differences in the legal enforcement. This literature emphasizes the importance of the 
enforcement regime as the key driver of observed heterogeneity in financial reporting quality. In 
this vein, previous studies point toward an increase in financial reporting quality around IFRS 
adoption only in countries with strong legal enforcement (Daske et al. 2008; Byard et al. 2011; 
Landsman et al. 2012), thus amplifying the divergence among countries: firms incorporated in 
countries with stricter enforcement rules benefit from IFRS adoption while all others do not.  
Those studies explain the heterogeneous effects of IFRS adoption across countries but miss 
to examine heterogeneity within similar legal environment leaving several relevant questions 
unanswered. For example, does financial reporting quality remain uniformly unchanged around 
IFRS adoption for all firms located in weak legal enforcement countries, and do firms in strong 
legal enforcement uniformly increase financial reporting quality? Moreover do firms located in 
weak enforcement countries sustain the costs of IFRS adoption without the benefits? In other 
words, is there any possibility for a firm located in a weak enforcement country to overcome the 
effect of legal enforcement and to benefit from IFRS adoption?   
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This paper tries to fill this gap in the literature by analyzing the joint effects of board-based 
monitoring mechanisms with country legal enforcement. To do so, using a panel dataset with an 
extensive fixed effects structure, we test whether board-based monitoring mechanisms substitute 
or complement legal enforcement in shaping the effects of IFRS on financial reporting quality. 
We operationalize financial reporting quality considering earnings informativeness (Landsman et 
al. 2012), accrual-based and real earnings management. Our sample consists of 3,476 IFRS firm-
year observations from 14 European countries (treatment sample) and 29,596 firm-year 
observations from 11 non-IFRS adoption countries (control sample). Following Landsman et al. 
(2012), we measure earnings informativeness using abnormal return variability and abnormal 
trading volume. We measure accrual-based earnings management using the modified Jones 
model (Dechow et al. 1995). We estimate real earnings management considering the abnormal 
level of cash flow from operations, production costs and discretionary expenses (advertising, 
R&D and SG&A). In line with previous research (Cohen et al. 2008), we combine the three 
measures of real earnings management into two aggregate metrics of real earnings management.  
The most compelling challenge to our analysis is that the mandatory IFRS adoption occurs 
at the same time for all publicly listed companies in European countries. To ascertain that general 
trends in financial reporting quality or concurrent events unrelated to IFRS adoption do not drive 
the results, we estimate annual panel regressions for IFRS adopter firms and non-IFRS adopter 
firms using industry-country and separate year fixed effects for the treatment and the control 
sample. In this way, we allow time-trend effects to vary within the treatment and control group as 
well as account for yearly shocks in financial reporting quality unreleated to IFRS mandatory 
adoption (Christensen et al. 2012). 
We perform four steps of analysis: 1) an examination of the average effect of the IFRS 
adoption per se; 2) an examination of the effect of the mandatory IFRS adoption considering 
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board-based monitoring mechanisms; 3) an examination of the effect of the mandatory IFRS 
adoption considering the country-level of legal enforcement and board-based monitoring 
mechanisms; 4) an examination of the effect of the mandatory IFRS adoption considering board-
based monitoring mechanisms, cross-sectional differences in the the country-level of legal 
enforcement and changes in the country-level of legal enforcement over financial reporting. 
In the first analysis, using firm-year data from 2002 to 2008, we examine the change in 
earnings informativeness metrics, accrual and real-based earnings management in the treatment 
sample (mandatory IFRS adopters) to the change for the control sample (non-IFRS adopters) 
around the time of mandatory IFRS adoption. Specifically, we regress our proxies for financial 
reporting quality on an indicator variable marking IFRS adopters in the post-IFRS mandatory 
adoption period, a set of control variables, country-industry and separate year fixed effects. 
Next, still using firm-year data from 2002 to 2008, we test whether the effects of mandatory 
IFRS adoption on earnings informativeness, accrual and real-based earnings management are 
different with respect to cross-sectional variation in the board monitoring level, as represented by 
various board attributes. To summarize the underlying latent construction of board monitoring, 
we create a standardized level of strict board monitoring intensity based on the principal 
component factor analysis of the board and directors characteristics. Specifically, in the second 
test we replace the single IFRS indicator with two non-overlapping indicator variables marking 
IFRS adopters with strong board-based monitoring mechanisms and IFRS adopters with weak 
board-based monitoring mechanisms. We further relax the assumption that board monitoring 
does not vary over time, by exploiting time-changes in the firm-level corporate governance 
attributes to examine whether firms that experience an increase in the monitoring effectiveness 
carried out by board of directors are associated with an higher increase in financial reporting 
quality once IFRS become mandate. 
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In the third test, we investigate the joint effect of board-based monitoring level and the 
strength of legal enforcement on earnings informativeness, accrual, and real-based earnings 
management around the mandatory IFRS adoption. The idea is to analyze whether different 
board-monitoring levels interplay with the legal enforcement regimes in determining the effects 
of mandatory IFRS adoption. Finally, we try to account for concurrent changes in the level of 
enforcement by partitioning strong legal enforcement countries with respect to the introduction or 
not of stricter enforcement procedure aroud IFRS mandatory adoption (Christensen et al. 2012). 
This test allows us to estimate differential IFRS effects on financial reporting quality for strong 
versus weak governance in countries with weak legal institutions, strong legal institutions and 
countries that experience an increase in the level of enforcement over financial reporting. 
We find evidence that the mandatory switch to IFRS is, on average, associated with an 
increase in financial reporting quality. However, there is considerable heterogeneity in financial 
reporting quality changes, suggesting that IFRS mandatory adoption is not sufficient, per se, to 
change firms’ reporting practices. Indeed, we find that firm-level monitoring mechanisms have 
an effective role in shaping firms’ reporting quality after a change in accounting standards. 
Indeed, we document an increase in financial reporting quality only for firms which have strong 
board-based monitoring mechanisms irrespective of the country of incorporation. Despite 
country-specific institutional characteristics, firm-level monitoring mechanisms, i.e. board 
composition, are a substantial determinant of financial reporting quality around IFRS mandatory 
adoption. When we employ both the country-level and firm-level partitioning variables, we find 
an increase in financial reporting quality for strong monitoring firms in weak legal enforcement 
countries and a negligible increase for weak monitoring firms in a strong legal environment. 
However, the latter effect is much larger for strong monitoring firms in the strong legal 
environment. Thereby, if firm-level monitoring mechanisms are a substitute for the legal system 
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when it is weak, firm- and country-level monitoring mechanisms turn to be complements as the 
latter gets stronger. Finally, when we take into accout also time-changes in the level of 
enforcement over financial reporting, we find only a marginal and not significant difference in 
financial reporting changes for strong versus weak monitoring firms in countries that experience 
an increase in the level of enforcement.  
We also test whether firm-level corporate governance is just the observable outcome of firm-
level reporting incentives to provide financial information of higher quality, with no additional 
explanatory power, by allowing separate IFRS effects for strong and weak monitoring firms and 
within these two groups between firms with strong and weak reporting incentives. We find that 
board monitoring intensity has an additional and different role in explaining financial reporting 
changes around IFRS mandatory adoption. Our results are robust to the use of firm fixed effects, 
alternative ways to measure firm-level corporate governance mechanisms and financial reporting 
quality metrics, and to the use of voluntary adopters as control sample. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, to the best of our knowledge, this 
is the first paper that provides evidence of the role of board-based monitoring mechanisms into 
the consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption. Using the board monitoring level as partitioning 
variable, we capture firm-level heterogeneity in financial reporting quality around IFRS 
mandatory adoption. So far, research has explored the average impact of IFRS adoption or has 
focused on cross-country differences. Firm level heterogeneity is not so well explored. Only a 
few papers try to explore this point (Byard et al. 2011; Daske et al. forthcoming), but they focus 
only on firm level reporting incentives. Our results show that, despite the country of 
incorporation and after controlling for firm-specific reporting incentives, firms can take 
advantage from IFRS adoption to the extent they adopt strong board-based monitoring 
mechanisms. In doing so, we add to the literature on IFRS adoption that considers reporting 
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quality stemming from the country-level legal institutional framework (Daske et al. 2008; Byard 
et al. 2011; Landsman et al. 2012). 
Second, the paper contributes to the growing literature on the interplay between firm-level 
governance and country institutional characteristics. The findings point toward a substitution 
effects between firm-level monitoring mechanisms and country-level enforcement mechanisms 
when the legal system is lax, while board monitoring and legal enforcement complement each 
other when the legal system gets stricter. In a sense, our findings may help bridge the contrasting 
evidence provided by Durnev and Kim (2005) and Doidge et al. (2007) and suggest that 
complementarity or substitution in firm- and country-level governance is contextual.   
 
2.2 Related literature and predictions 
Related literature 
 Extant research documents substantial economic benefits around mandatory IFRS 
adoption. Among other things, there are positive market reactions to events associated with 
mandatory IFRS adoption (Armstrong et al. 2010), an increase in market liquidity and a decline 
in the cost of capital (Daske et al. 2008; Li 2010), higher information content of earnings 
(Landsman et al. 2012), an increase in stock price informativeness (Beuselinck et al. 2009; 
DeFond et al. 2011), an improvement in analyst information environment (Byard et al. 2011; Tan 
et al. 2011), and higher foreign investments (Bruggeman et al. 2009; Beneish et al 2010). While 
the evidence consistently points towards positive capital market effects around  IFRS adoption, 
results on the impact of IFRS on financial reporting quality are mixed and rather controversial. 
Barth et al. (2008) find evidence of an increase in earnings quality while Ahmed et al. 
(forthcoming) suggest that because of the principle-based nature of IFRS and the lack of 
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implementation guidance, earnings quality decreased after the mandatory adoption of IFRS. 
However, theoretically, accounting flexibility could be used to increase accounting numbers 
quality as well as to decrease financial reporting quality.  
Moreover, it is challenging to attribute capital market or financial reporting quality effects 
to the IFRS adoption per se. To the extent that the application of any set of accounting standards 
provides insiders with substantial discretion, research stresses that firms’ reporting behaviors, and 
hence the observed financial reporting quality, is likely to depend on countries’ institutional 
frameworks, market pressures and firm-level characteristics rather than to a change in accounting 
standards (Ball et al. 2000; Leuz et al. 2003; Burgstahler et al. 2006; Wysocki 2011). In this vein, 
Christensen et al. (2012) argue that the aforementioned benefits are not fully ascribable to IFRS 
mandatory reporting. Rather, to the extent that some European Union (EU) countries have started 
to make financial reporting enforcement mechanisms tighter around 2005, the documented 
capital-market benefits may be caused by both an IFRS effect or by a change in enforcement 
effect. Although it is a very difficult task to disentangle them, they find an increase in market 
liquidity around IFRS mandatory adoption only in five European countries that adopt stricter 
accounting enforcement mechanisms concurrent with IFRS mandatory adoption. This evidence 
suggests that care is needed in interpreting capital-market or financial reporting effects around 
IFRS mandatory adoption.  
To sum up, extant literature agrees that, by itself, a change in accounting standards, even 
toward a supposedly higher quality set, does not matter much for a change in firms’ reporting 
practices. Wysocki (2011) underscores the importance of country-level factors and firms specific 
characteristics in shaping the effects of a change of accounting standards. Therefore, the 
application of a common set of accounting standards is unlikely to generate similar outcomes in 
term of financial reporting quality across different countries and firms. So far, researches have 
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focused only on the role of country-level institutions, while how and whether firm-level 
characteristics and the interplay among country and firm characteristics shape financial reporting 
outcomes have been rarely analyzed. Daske et al. (forthcoming) find that only firms that 
experience a substantial change in their reporting incentives are perceived to derive significant 
capital market benefits while other firms that switch to IFRS under a “tick-box” mentality do not 
experience capital market benefits. These results are interpreted as evidence that: (i) IFRS 
mandatory adoption per se has little effect on firms reporting practices; (ii) country-level 
infrastructures do not to account for all firm-level heterogeneity in firm reporting quality.  
However, there is considerable evidence supporting the hypothesis that monitoring-oriented 
boards increase financial reporting quality by, for example, constraining earnings management 
(Dechow et al. 1996; Klein et al. 2002; Peasnell et al. 2005; Faleye et al. 2011). Therefore the 
board of directors and its monitoring intensity could drive the change in financial reporting 
quality around IFRS mandatory adoption. Although there is widespread consensus about the role 
of governance monitoring mechanisms on financial reporting quality, firm-level corporate 
governance has received little attention15 in previous research on mandatory IFRS adoption. This 
paper tries to fill this gap in the literature analyzing the role of corporate governance on financial 
reporting quality after the mandatory IFRS adoption. 
 
Predictions: Monitoring role of board of directors and IFRS adoption  
The idea underlying this paper is to exploit cross-sectional variation in board-based 
monitoring intensity to examine heterogeneity in financial reporting quality changes around IFRS 
mandatory adoption. So far, research shows substantial cross-sectional heterogeneity in the 
                                                    
15
 Verriest et al. (2012) is an exception. Verriest et al. (2012), focusing on a small sample of European firms, document a positive 
association between the strength of firm-level corporate governance and firms compliance with the first-time IFRS adoption 
requirements, providing early evidence on the crucial role played by firm-level monitoring mechanisms, at least in the degree of 
compliance at the first-time IFRS adoption. 
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consequences of IFRS mandatory adoption. Evidence of changes of financial reporting quality is 
mixed and controversial with several studies pointing toward an increase in accounting quality 
(Barth et al. 2008, 2012; Gordon et al. 2009) while other papers suggest a decrease in accounting 
quality (Ahmed et al. forthcoming; Atwood et al. 2011). Indeed, managers can use accounting 
flexibility either to convey critical information or to lower accounting quality. On the one hand, 
Barth et al. (2008) purports that IFRS can improve accounting quality because principles-based 
accounting standards are more difficult to be circumvented. On the other hand, their principles-
based nature and the lack of implementation guidance provide significant flexibility that can be 
used to reduce accounting information quality.  
In this context, governance monitoring mechanisms can play a pivotal role in shaping 
reporting quality. Firms under the scrutiny of sound boards and managers may use the inherent 
flexibility of accounting regulation to convey information of higher quality more than to increase 
information asymmetries (Beyer et al. 2010). According to agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 
1976), board independence, the independence of the audit committee and the financial expertise 
of independent audit committee members reduce managerial leeway thus increasing transparency 
and financial reporting quality. There is considerable evidence supporting the hypothesis that 
monitoring-oriented boards constrain earnings management, thus increasing financial reporting 
quality (Dechow et al. 1996; Klein et al. 2002; Peasnell et al. 2005; Song et al. 2010; Faleye et al.  
2011). For example, Peasnell et al. (2005) show a negative effect of board independence on 
earnings management. In a consistent manner, Song et al. (2010) show that board independence 
reduces the concern over the reliability of fair value information.  
More recently, there is evidence that points out how the degree of financial expertise of 
board members plays the major role in determining financial reporting quality, most likely by 
making the board of directors more effective in carrying out its monitoring duties (DeFond et al. 
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2005, Krishnan et al. 2011). De Fond et al. (2005) show that markets react positively to the 
appointment of a financial expert on the audit committee. Moreover, Carcello et al. (2006) show 
the importance of accounting expertise on financial reporting quality, thus corroborating the idea 
that independence is not the only variable which affects accounting quality. Overall, prior 
research links firm-level corporate governance with financial reporting quality. Hence, we posit 
our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: On average, firms with strong board-based monitoring enjoy a larger increase in 
financial reporting quality around IFRS mandatory adoption than firms with weak board-
based monitoring. 
 
According to the new institutional accounting theory (Wysocki 2011), the outcomes of a 
change in accounting standards are shaped both by country-level institutions and firm-level 
characteristics, like the structure of board of directors, ownership structure or auditor quality. 
According to Wysocki (2011), financial reporting outcomes are likely to depend both on  macro-
institutions (e.g., capital markets’ regulation, corporate law prescriptions and the legal 
enforcement) and micro-institutions (e.g., corporate governance). So far, literature highlights the 
importance of countries’ legal frameworks for reporting incentives by comparing across-
countries differences in the consequences of IFRS adoption with respect to a given outcome 
variable while firm-level governance has not been examined. 
However, how firm-level corporate governance and country-level legal institutions interact 
is still controversial. On the one hand, in countries where investors rights are stronger and better 
enforced, capital markets are more developed, firms practice better governance and are valued 
higher than in less investor friendly countries (La Porta et al. 1997). A country institutional 
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system frames firm-level corporate governance attributes that a firm decides to adopt (Doidge et 
al. 2007), through its effect on the cost of implementing governance practices. In contrast, in 
weak investor protection countries, it could be overly expensive for a firm to adopt strong 
corporate governance mechanisms, as the pay-off could be negligible. In stronger investor 
protection countries, firms may expect more benefits from adopting strong governance 
mechanisms as effective legal infrastructures make it economically feasible to bond to good 
governance. As a consequence, we may expect that governance and the strength of legal 
enforcement complement each other in countries with strong regulatory oversight while there are  
negligible effects in weak enforcement countries.  
On the other hand, stronger and well-disciplined corporate governance mechanisms should 
be more valuable and important in mitigating the negative effects of an ineffective legal system 
where the regulation is lax and investor rights are weak and badly enforced (Durnev and Kim 
2005, Chen et al. 2009). In such countries, indeed, investors cannot rely on the legal system to 
monitor insiders’ behaviors. In this vein, we may expect that governance complements the legal 
system where the legal system is strong and substitute country-level enforcement where it is lax.  
However, the literature on the relation between country-level legal/institutional factors and 
firm-level corporate governance mechanisms is still tentative and provides mixed evidence. 
Hence, it remains an empirical question as to how firm-level monitoring mechanism and country 
level institutional factors jointly shape the consequences of IFRS mandatory adoption on 
financial reporting quality. Our second hypothesis, stated in the null form, is: 
 
H2: The strength of country-level legal enforcement does not moderate the effect of board-
based monitoring mechanisms on financial reporting quality after IFRS mandatory 
adoption. 
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2.3. Data and research design 
Sample selection 
We start the sample selection procedure by identifing from Compustat Global all public 
companies domiciled in Europe from 2002 to 2008. We obtain accounting and market data from 
Compustat Global, while analyst forecast and earnings annoucement data from the I/B/E/S 
international (split unadjusted) database. We eliminate firms in banking and financial industry 
(SIC codes between 6000-6500), firms cross-listed in the U.S or following U.S. GAAP, and 
require at least eight observations in each two-digit SIC grouping per year and country to 
estimate accrual-based and real earnings management metrics. We combine accounting and 
market data with analyst forecast and earnings annoucement information from I/B/E/S used to 
measure return and volume metrics. To be included in the sample, we require each firm to have 
data available for at least one period before and one period after the mandatory adoption deadline 
(i.e. fiscal years beginning on or after the January 1, 2005). Finally, we require that each firm-
year observation have data necessary to calculate the variables used in the analysis.Next, we 
identify mandatory IFRS adopters by retrieving information on a firm’s accounting standards 
followed from Compustat Global. We define mandatory adopters those firms that do not adopt 
IFRS until it becomes mandatory16 (i.e. fiscal-years beginning on or after 01/01/2005). These 
restrictions yield a final treatment sample of 3,476 mandatory IFRS adopters firm-year 
observations from 14 European countries from 2002 to 2008. 
Then, we augmented the treatment sample with a control sample of local GAAP firms from 
countries that do not require IFRS reporting during the test period for which we have the 
necessesary data to calculate the variables used in our analysis. This yields a final control sample 
                                                    
16
 A firm is classified as mandatory IFRS adopters if the data item “astd” in Compustat global does not equal “DI” prior to fiscal 
year beginning on or after January 1, 2005. If a firm adopts IFRS after 2005, we drop it from the sample. 
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of 29,596 firm-year observations from 11 non IFRS adopters countries from 2002 to 2008.   
 
 
 
Finally, for each firm-year in the treatment sample, we manually identify the composition 
of the board from the annual reports, and extract information about each director role, 
Adoption of 
Mandatory IFRS 
reporting
Rule of Law Proactive Review
IFRS adoption countries
Austria     3 12/31/2005 1.8 (1) (0)
Belgium    50 12/31/2005 1.4 (0) (0)
Switzerland    70 12/31/2005 2.0 (1) (0)
Germany   278 12/31/2005 1.7 (1) (1)
Denmark    56 12/31/2005 1.9 (1) (0)
Spain    95 12/31/2005 1.1 (0) (0)
Finland   152 12/31/2005 1.9 (1) (1)
France   662 12/31/2005 1.3 (0) (0)
United Kingdom 1,435 12/31/2005 1.6 (1) (1)
Greece    22 12/31/2005 0.7 (0) (0)
Italy  222 12/31/2005 0.5 (0) (0)
Netherlands   87 12/31/2005 1.7 (1) (1)
Norway  123 12/31/2005 1.9 (1) (1)
Sweden  221 12/31/2005 1.8 (1) (0)
Total          3,476
Non-IFRS adoption countries
Canada 2,592
Chile     77
China 2,289
India   194
Indoneia 1,469
Japan         17,273
Korea 2,386
Mexico   149
Malaysia  1195
Thailand   659
Taiwan 1,313
Total         29,596
Institutional Variables
Table 1 reports the sample distribution. The treatment sample comprises 3,476 firm-year observations from 12 EU countries plus
Norway and Switzerland during the period from 2002 to 2008. The control sample comprises 29,596 firm-year observation from 11
countries that do not require IFRS reporting over the entire test period.
Table 2.1
Distribution of Observations by Country
Country Firms-years
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independence status, service on board audit committee, and work experiences. Information about 
directors’ primary occupation in these filings is often missing or incomplete. Hence, we collect 
additional information from other sources (i.e. BoardEx, Thomson One, LexisNexis). Data on the 
ownership structure comes from Amadeus - Bureau van Dyck database.  
Table 2.1 illustrates the sample distribution by country. The number of observations varies 
widely across countries: Austria has the lowest number of observations (3), and the UK has the 
highest (1,435). In the fourth column we report the values of the legal enforcement variable 
(Kaufman et al. 2007), which documents a substantial variation in the legal enforcement across 
the sample countries: Italy has the lowest value (0.50), and Switzerland has the largest (2.0). In 
the last column we report whether an IFRS adoption country has changed the level of 
enforcement over financial reporting around IFRS mandatory adoption (Christensen et al. 2012). 
 
Financial reporting quality metrics 
Following Landsman et al. (2012), we capture market-based financial reporting quality 
using the information content of earnings announcements operationalized with abnormal stock 
return volatility and abnormal trading volume. We compute abnormal stock return volatility at 
the earnings announcement dates as the ratio between the event window return volatility and the 
non-event window return volatility. To estimate the market model, we employ a non-event 
window of t – 60 to t – 10 and t + 10 to t + 60, while the event window runs from  t–1 to t+1,  
where t is the earnings announcement date. 
 
itmtiiit RR εβα ++=
           (1) 
 
Where Rit is the stock return of firm i for day t, and Rmt is the equal-weighted return for all 
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within country firms in the sample for day t (DeFond et al., 2007), and αi  and βt  are firm i’s  
market model estimates, each of which is calculated during the non-event period. The estimated 
coefficients of the market model are used to estimate daily abnormal returns using the equation: 
 
)( mtiiitit RRAR
∧∧
+−= βα
         
(2) 
 
Abnormal stock return volatility (AVAR) is the ratio between the mean of the squared 
market model abnormal returns (E[AR2it]), and the variance of a firm’s i market model residuals 
during the non-event window (σ2i). To reduce the skewness, we take the natural logarithm (i.e. 
AVAR = log(E[u2it]/ σ2i)).  
We measure the abnormal trading volume (AVOL) as the ratio between the mean of the 
event window volume (Vit) and the mean of the non-event window trading volume (E[Vi]). Daily 
volume around earnings announcement date, Vit, is number of shares of firm i traded during day t 
divided by share outstanding of firm i at day t-1, t =0 and t+1, where t is the earnings 
announcement day; Vi is the average daily trading volume for firm i for days t-60 to t-10 and 
t+10 to t+60 relative to the I/B/E/S earnings announcement date. As for AVAR, this ratio is 
highly skewed, hence our measure of abnormal trading volume is the natural logarithm of this 
ratio (i.e., AVAL = log(E[Vit]/ E[Vi])). For AVAR and AVOL, higher values represent a higher 
information content of earnings announcements and hence a higher financial reporting quality. 
We use a cross-sectional model of discretionary accruals, where for each year and country 
we estimate the model for every industry classified by its two-digit SIC code. In this way, we 
partially control for industry changes in economic conditions that affect total accrual while 
allowing the coefficient to vary across groups (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994). We estimate the 
57 
 
modified cross-sectional Jones model (Jones 1991) as described in Dechow et al. (1995): 
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Where TAijt is a firm’s i total accruals in year t and two-digit sic code j, measured as net 
income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations minus operating cash flow; 
Assetsijt is a firm’s i total assets in year t-1 and two-digit sic code j; ∆REVijt  is the  change in 
revenues from the preceding year for firm i in two-digit sic code j ; PPEijt is the gross property 
plan and equipment for firm i in two-digit sic code j in year t .17 The coefficient estimates from 
equation (3) are used to estimate firm-specific normal accruals (NA) for the sample firms:  
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where ∆ARijt is the change in account receivable  from the preceding year for firm i in two-
digit sic code j. Our measure of discretionary accruals is the difference between total accruals and 
the predicted normal accruals from equation (4), defined as DA
 ijt = (TA/Assetijt-1) - NA ijt. To the 
extent that we do not predict any given direction for accrual-based earnings management, we 
compute the absolute value of discretionary accruals and refer to it as ABS_DA. 
Following Roychowdhury (2006), we use the abnormal level of cash flow from operation 
(R_FCFO), the abnormal level of production costs (R_PROD) and the abnormal level of 
discretionary expenses to capture the manipulation of real activities (R_DISC). We model the 
                                                    
17
 To mitigate the undue influence of outliers, we winsorize all variables entering in the modified Jones model at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. 
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normal level of cash flow from operations as a linear function of sales and change in sales. 
Consistent with prior works, we estimate the following model  for each country-year and industry 
defined by its two-digit SIC code.  
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Where CFO
 ijt is cash flow from operations for firm’s i in year t and two-digit sic code j;  
SALES
 ijt is the net sales for firm’s i in year t and two-digit sic code j;  ∆SALES ijt is the change 
in net sales from the preceding year for firm i in two-digit sic code j. Firms that engage in real 
earnings management have a lower level of abnormal cash flow than do other firms. Hence, we 
multiple the abnormal level of cash flow by minus one, so that higher values represent higher 
value of manipulation. 
 To estimate the normal level of production cost, first we model normal cost of goods sold 
(COGS) and inventory growth (∆INV) using the following linear functions: 
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Using equations (6) and (7), we estimate the normal level of production cost for each 
country, year, and industry as follows: 
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Where PROD
 ijt is defined as the sum of the cost of goods sold (COGS ijt) and the change in 
inventory (∆INV
 ijt) for firm’s i in year t and two-digit sic code j;  SALES ijt is the net sales for 
firm’s i in year t and two-digit sic code j;  ∆SALES
 ijt is the change in net sales from the 
preceding year for firm i in two-digit sic code j; The abnormal level of production costs 
(R_PROD) is defined as the residuals from equation (8). The higher the residuals, the higher the 
inventory overproduction, and the larger is the increase in the earnings by reducing the cost of 
goods sold. 
The normal level of discretionary expenses is modeled as 
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Where DISCX
 ijt is a firm’s i discretionary in year t and two-digit sic code j , and it is 
computed as the sum of advertising expenses, R&D expenses, and Selling, General and 
Administrative expenses. Abnormal discretionary expenditures (R_DISC) is defined as the 
residuals from equation (9). We multiply the residuals by minus one, such that higher values 
indicate greater amounts of discretionary expenditures cutting to inflate earnings upward. Finally, 
we aggregate the three real earning management proxies into two aggregate measures by taking 
their sum. We compute REAL_1 as the sum between abnormal production cost and abnormal 
discretionary expenses, and REAL_2 as the sum between abnormal discretionary expenses and 
abnormal cash flow from operations. Higher values of both these proxies suggest a higher level 
of real earnings management. 
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Corporate governance score 
We capture the strength of board-based monitoring mechanisms for each IFRS reporting 
sample firm by combing six governance attributes into a binary variable through a factor analysis 
(Larcker et al. 2007; Song et al. 2010). To the extent that strong governance on manifold facets 
reveals a stronger governance environment, our proxy should better summarize the overall 
strength of a firm governance mechanisms than a single measure (Bushman et al. 2004; DeFond 
et al. 2005). The six governance attributes include (1) board independence (INDEPENDENT), as 
the number of independent directors divided by board size; (2) a dummy variable (AUDIT) for 
the presence of an audit committee; (3) audit committee size (AUDIT_SIZE); (4) audit 
committee independence (INDEPENDENT_AUDIT), as the number of independent board 
members serving on the audit committee over audit committee size; (5) audit committee financial 
expertise (FINANCIAL_EXPERT_AUDIT), as the number of audit committee members with 
financial expertise divided by the size of the audit committee; (6) total percent shares held by 
institutional investors (INST_OWN).18 Such measures depict several attributes of a firm 
corporate governance strength that we employ to measure board-based monitoring intensity.  
Independent directors are believed to be willing to stand up to the insiders and more 
effective than non--independent directors in mitigating agency problems between insiders and 
outside investors (Fama 1980). The audit committee’s main duty is to oversee the financial 
reporting process to guarantee the integrity and the credibility of financial reports. We first 
consider: (1) the presence of an audit committee (Peasnell et al. 2005), (2) the audit committee 
size (DeFond et al. 2005), (3) its degree of independence (Klein 2002). Next, we consider the 
financial expertise of its members (DeFond et al. 2005). As recognized by the US Congress and 
                                                    
18
 We do not include board size as a determinant of the governance factor score for several reasons. Literature provides mixed 
evidence on the effect of board size on monitoring effectiveness. In addition, board size is highly correlated with firm size and, in 
a cross-country sample it is subjected to the different national legislations. However, we do compute the factor score also 
including board size. The results remain unchanged. 
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the SEC, financial expertise is a necessary condition to ensure that the audit committee fulfils its 
monitoring duties (SEC 2003b). To construct this variable, we follow the DeFond et al. (2005) 
and the SOX Section 407 definition of financial expertise in both the first version proposed and 
in the last implemented by the SEC (SEC 2002, SEC 2003a, 2003b, ). We read each board 
member biographical sketch to classify each independent director into one of the following 
categories: (1) SOX financial experts as all directors who have financial expertise as defined in 
the last version of SOX; (2) Nonfinancial expert as all directors who do not meet the definition of 
a SOX financial expert. Even if this coding requires some judgment, we strictly follow the 
guidelines provided in the proposed and final SEC rules. We label a director as a financial expert 
if she has experiences as public accountant, auditor, CFO, controller, chief accounting officer 
(these are inferred from the proposed rules by the SEC) or has experience as CEO of executives 
of a for-profit organization (these are drawn from the final version of SOX implemented by the 
SEC). Audit committee members with financial expertise should be more familiar with the ways 
that earnings can be managed. On the contrary, an audit committee without financial expert 
members may be largely ceremonial. Finally, we consider the percentage of shares held by 
institutional investors as they improve a firm corporate governance environment by constraining 
insiders’ behaviour (Nesbitt 1994). 
Table 2.2, panel A provides descriptive statistics for governance attributes. Next, we apply 
a principal component factor analysis to the six governance attributes (Larcker et al.  2007; Song 
et al. 2010). The first and primary factor exhibits the expected loadings (Table 2, panel B). The 
factor analysis generates an eigenvalue of 3.46319, which accounts for about 57.97% of the total 
variance in the original variables. Table 2, panel B, second column reports the Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin measure of sampling adequacy. Each variable is associated with a value greater than 0.6, 
                                                    
19
 The second factor is associated with an eigenvalue of 0.9372. For this reason it is not retained. 
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and the mean KMO value is about 0.759, indicating that the GOVSCORE is able to capture well 
the underlying common factor of the six individual variables. Panel C reports the descriptive 
statistics for GOVSCORE. Due to the standardization, such a variable has mean 0 and standard 
deviation of 1. Next, we take the firm-specific mean of GOVSCORE across the sample years, 
and we create a binary variable (GOOD_GOV) based on the sample median of the firm-specific 
mean of GOVSCORE20. Specifically, we classify firms with above sample median value of the 
firm-specific mean of GOVSCORE as strong board-based monitoring firms (GOOD_GOV 
equals to one). 
 
                                                    
20
 In this way we do not assume that board monitoring intensity does not vary over time. Instead ,we assume that the cross-
sectional difference in board monitoring intensity across firms does not.  We relax this assumption later and obtain similar results.  
Note, however, that less than 6% of the firms in our sample went from being classified as weak (strong) board-based monitoring 
firms in the pre mandatory adoption period to being classified as strong (weak) board-based monitoring firms in the post 
mandatory adoption period. Overall, board composition and thus monitoring intensity seems to be quite stable over time. 
N Mean Std. Dev P5 P25 Median P75 P95
INDEPENDENT 3,724 0.347 0.216 0.000 0.200 0.333 0.500 0.714
AUDIT 3,724 0.635 0.482 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
AUDIT_SIZE 3,724 2.101 1.877 0.000 0.000 3.000 3.000 5.000
INDEPENDENT_AUDIT 3,724 0.412 0.382 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.750 1.000
FINANCIAL EXPERT_AUDIT 3,724 0.306 0.328 0.000 0.000 0.310 0.600 1.000
INST_OWN 3,724 0.556 0.497 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
INDEPENDENT
AUDIT
AUDIT_SIZE
INDEPENDENT_AUDIT
FINANCIAL EXPERT_AUDIT
INST_OWN
Variation Explained
Eigenvalue
N Mean Std. Dev P5 P25 Median P75 P95
GOVSCORE 3,724 0.000 1.000 -1.221 -1.149 0.215 0.877 1.466
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
0.861 0.795
0.944 0.738
Panel B: Governance factor score and sample adequacy
Factor Loading Coefficients Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of SamplingAdequacy
0.444 0.687
Table 2, panel A reports descriptive statistics for the corporate governance variables for firms from IFRS adoption countries. Panel B
presents the results of the principal component factor analysis. Panel C of the corporate governance factor score.
See APPENDIX II.B for variable definitions
Table 2.2
Descriptive Statistics for Governance Attributes  
3.478
Panel C: Descriptive statistics of governance factor score 
0.877 0.806
0.251 0.859
57.97% Mean KMO = 0.759
0.911 0.725
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Identification strategy 
We investigate the impact of firm-level board monitoring intensity and the interactive effect 
of firm-level board monitoring intensity and country-level legal enforcement on financial 
reporting quality around IFRS mandatory adoption by employing a panel dataset with an 
extensive fixed effects structure. Our identification strategy encompasses four steps. First, we use 
a treatment sample of mandatory IFRS firm-year observations and a control sample of non-IFRS 
firm-year observations. Specifically, our final sample consists of observations from European 
Union countries that require IFRS reporting from 2005, and countries that do not mandate IFRS 
reporting over the entire test period. The use of this benchmark group allows us to take into 
account global time-trends in financial reporting quality metrics. Moreover, this approach allows 
us to exploit both cross-sectional and time variation in IFRS reporting to identify the change in 
financial reporting quality metric in the pre- versus post-mandatory adoption period for 
mandatory adopters relative to the change for the benchmark firms, thus taking into account 
unobserved heterogeneity across firms or time-invariant selection bias. This issue may be 
particularly severe in corporate governance research, to the extent that board composition is 
endogenous. In our setting, there may be many reasons for board composition and financial 
reporting quality to be jointly determined by some unobserved firm characteristics. If these 
unobserved firm characteristics are time invariant, then a design which exploits IFRS mandatory 
adoption as an exogenous shock addresses simultaneous determination problems.  
Second, we classify IFRS adopters firms with respect to the strength of board-based 
monitoring mechanisms, by using the factor score from a principal component factor analysis of a 
comprehensive set of board and directors characteristics21. This should alleviate concerns about 
                                                    
21
 Note that we do not collect data and thus do not partitioning the control sample with respect to strengh of firm-level corporate 
governance, to the extent that our identification strategy does not require to split the control according to the partitioning variables 
used for the treatment sample (Christensen et al. 2012). 
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random measurement error of single corporate governance metric as well as better identify the 
overall strength of a firm governance mechanisms (Baik et al. 2009). In the main analysis, we 
focus on board monitoring levels, by taking the firm-specific average of the factor across the 
years. We further relax the assumption that cross-sectional differences in board monitoring 
remain constant over time by allowing the board-based monitoring mechanism metric to vary.  
Third, we distinguish IFRS adopter countries according to both the historical strength of the 
legal enforcement and changes in financial reporting enforcement concurrent to IFRS mandatory 
adoption (Christensen et al. 2012). Following previous studies (Daske et al. 2008; Byard et al. 
2011) we first consider a cross-sectional measure to capture differences in the quality of legal 
enforcement. We use the Rule of Law (RULE_LAW) variable for 2005 developed by Kaufmann 
et al. (2007). Higher values represent countries with stricter enforcement regimes. We next 
transform this measure (RULE_LAW) into a binary variable (HIGH_LAW) based on whether a 
country specific value is above or below the treatment sample country median. Then, to explicity 
account for changes in accounting enforcement mechanisms aroud IFRS adoption, we follow 
Christensen et al. (2012) and code up a binary variable (PROACTIVE) marking countries that 
have increased the strength of financial reporting mechanisms around IFRS mandatory, through 
the introduction of the proactive review over financial statements (i.e. United Kingdom, 
Germany, Finland, Netherlands and Norway).  
The last element of the identification strategy consists of an extensive fixed-effects 
structure. We include country, industry and separate year fixed effects for the treatment sample 
and the control sample. This fixed effect structure allows to control for general trends or shocks 
common to firms in the control and treatment sample in a given year while focusing only on time 
variation in term of IFRS adoption within each group. We further check the stability of our 
results replacing the countries and industry fixed effects with firm-fixed effects.  We thus propose 
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the following estimation model (without firm and time subscripts): 
 
 = 	 + 	
 + ∑ 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where FRQ (i.e. financial reporting quality) stands for the abnormal return variability, 
abnormal trading volume, and the earnings management metrics (accrual-based and real earnings 
management). IFRS is a binary variable that takes the value of one for firms that apply IFRS only 
when it becomes mandatory in 2005 for fiscal-years beginning on or after 01/01/2005, and zero 
otherwise. CONTROLS denotes the set of control variables that differ according to the particular 
dependent variable used, while FIXED EFFECTS represents country-industry and separate year 
fixed effects. In equation (10) we do not include indicator variables for the strength of board-
based monitoring mechanisms, legal enforcement or the increase in the level of accounting 
enforcement. Rather, in the empirical analysis we add to equation (10) a set of non-overlapping 
binary variables to estimate separate IFRS effects on financial reporting quality conditional on 
board-based monitoring mechanisms, the legal enforcement (and the changes) and the interaction 
between the two.  
When we exploit cross-sectional variation in the level of board-based monitoring to 
examine the marginal effect of firm-specific monitoring intensity on financial reporting quality 
around IFRS mandatory adoption, we propose the following model (without firm and time 
subscripts): 
 
 =  + 	
_ + 
 _ +!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	+ 
∑ 
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 +           (11) 
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In this model, we replace the single IFRS indicator from equation (10) with two non-
overlapping indicator variables for (i) firms in the IFRS treatment sample with strong board-
based monitoring mechanisms (i.e. IFRSHIGH_GOV), (ii) firms in the IFRS treatment sample with 
weak board-based monitoring mechanisms (i.e. IFRSLOW_GOV). 
When we explore the interplay between country-level institutional characteristics and firm-
level board-based monitoring intensity, we instead replace the the single IFRS indicator variable 
from equation (10) with four binary variables marking: (i) firms from IFRS countries with strong 
enforcement institutions and strong board-based monitoring mechanisms (i.e. 
IFRSHIGH_LAW_HIGH_GOV), (ii) firms from IFRS countries with strong enforcement institutions and 
weak board-based monitoring mechanisms (i.e. IFRSHIGH_LAW_LOW_GOV), (iii) firms from IFRS 
countries with weak enforcement institutions and strong board-based monitoring mechanisms 
(i.e. IFRSLOW_LAW_HIGH_GOV), (iv) firms from IFRS countries with strong enforcement institutions 
and weak board-based monitoring mechanisms (i.e. IFRSLOW_LAW_LOW_GOV). 
 
 = 	 + 	
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_" __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            (12) 
Control variables 
All the models include country-industry (using the Campbell (1996) industry classification)  
and separate fixed effects and heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors, adjusted at firm-level 
clustering (Gow et al. 2010). According to the financial reporting quality metrics used, we 
include a set of controls variables. In the AVAR and AVOL regressions, we control for firm size 
(SIZE) using the log of a firm total asset to control for the effect of firms’ size on financial 
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reporting quality. We also consider firm leverage (LEV) using the ratio between the end-of-year 
total liabilities and the end-of-year book value of equity. As long as negative earnings are less 
informative than positive earnings (Hayn, 1995), we control for loss reporting firms by including 
a binary variable equals to one if the reported earnings per share per I/B/E/S is less than zero 
(LOSS). We include also: the difference between the actual earnings per share and the analyst 
consensus earnings forecast before the earnings announcement, scaled by the closing price at the 
fiscal year end to capture the uncertainty in the analyst information environment (AFE); the 
standard deviation of analyst forecasts prior to the earnings announcement, scaled by the closing 
price as the end of the year (DISPERSION); and the logarithm of the number of days between the 
firm’s fiscal year end to the earnings announcement (REP_LAG). We include the log of the 
number of analyst forecasts made during the year to account for the strength of the monitoring 
carried out by analysts (FOLLOWING). Finally, we account for macroeconomic factors using the 
log of the annual change in the ratio of stock market capitalization and gross domestic product 
per capita (∆CAP/GDP), taken from the World Bank. This variable is used in international 
research (Haw et al. 2004) to deal with unobserved country-specific factors that may be 
associated with financial reporting quality.  
In the accrual-based and real earnings management regressions, we control for several 
factors that are associated with financial reporting quality. We control for firm size (SIZE). We 
control for performance using return on assets (ROA), as net income over the end of the year 
total assets and LOSS. We include growth prospects, as the percentage change in sales 
(GROWTH) as there is evidence that it influences earnings management (Barth et al. 2008). We 
take into account debt-contracting motivations for earnings management (DeFond and Jiambalvo 
1994) using the end-of-year total liabilities divided by the end-of-year book value of equity 
(LEV), the percentage change in total liabilities (DISSUE), and the percentage change in totoal 
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equity (EISSUE). Turnover is computed as sales divided by end of the year total assets (TURN). 
We control for innate factors relating to the firm’s operating environment that are likely to be 
associated with financial reporting quality (Hribar and Nichols 2007). We include the variability 
in operating cash flows [σ(FCFO)], variability in sales [σ(SALES)], both measured as a rolling 
standards deviation over the past five years, and the length of the operating cycle 
(OPER_CYCLE). Finally, we account for macroeconomic factors using ∆CAP/GDP. 
 
2.4. Results 
Table 2.3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression analyses. 
The mean (median) of AVAR is 0.040 (0.065), while the mean (median) of AVOL is 0.412 
(0.356). The mean (median) of the absolute discretionary accruals is 0.059 (0.035), while the 
average (median) for the aggregate real earnings management variables are -0.045 (-0.029) for 
REAL_1 and -0.067 (-0.038) for REAL_2.  
We start our empirical analyses by exploring the average change in financial reporting 
quality, operationalized as the information content of annual earnings announcements, around 
IFRS mandatory adoption. Table 2.4, columns (1)-(2) reports the estimate coefficients and (in 
parentheses) t-statistics from the estimation of equation (10) using AVAR and AVOL as 
dependent variables. Consistenly with Landsman et al. (2012), we find a significant increase in 
both AVAR and AVOL. The control variables behave as expected. Collectively, thes findings 
corroborate extant evidence on the change in earnings informativeness around IFRS adoption.  
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Next, we examine the effectiveness of the board of directors monitoring intensity in 
determining financial reporting quality around IFRS mandatory adoption. We claim that stronger 
board monitoring is likely to enhance the credibility and integrity of firms’ financial reports. As a 
result, we expect that, irrespective from the country of incorporation, firms which bond 
themselves under the scrutiny of a more monitoring-oriented board should be associated with an 
increase in financial reporting quality relative to firms for which the boards are less monitoring 
oriented. To do this, we replace the IFRS indicator with two non-overlapping indicator variables. 
One for firms in the IFRS treatment sample with strong board-based monitoring mechanisms (i.e. 
IFRSHIGH_GOV), and one for firms in the IFRS treatment sample with weak board-based 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev P5 P25 Median P75 P95
AVAR 33,320 0.040 1.014 -1.588 -0.529 0.065 0.641 1.570
AVOL 33,320 0.412 0.823 -0.785 -0.083 0.356 0.851 1.815
ABS_DA 33,320 0.059 0.086 0.003 0.015 0.035 0.072 0.197
REAL 1 33,320 -0.045 0.187 -0.359 -0.121 -0.029 0.048 0.213
REAL 2 33,320 -0.067 0.299 -0.566 -0.172 -0.038 0.073 0.319
SIZE 33,320 5.904 1.670 3.446 4.760 5.730 6.886 9.023
LEV 33,320 1.678 22.615 0.182 0.555 1.096 1.967 5.136
LOSS 33,320 0.168 0.374 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
AFE 33,320 0.387 8.054 0.002 0.026 0.090 0.156 0.823
DISPERSION 33,320 3.419 321.508 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.011 0.364
REP_LAG 33,320 3.975 0.379 3.332 3.784 3.912 4.127 4.710
FOLLOWING 33,320 0.000 26.447 -26.764 -14.237 -4.976 6.375 44.801
ROA 33,320 3.593 11.047 -8.585 0.986 3.446 7.243 16.801
GROWTH 33,320 25.280 316.464 -18.615 0.137 11.469 25.327 68.248
DISSUE 33,320 20.247 84.230 -26.484 -4.925 6.928 23.980 92.975
EISSUE 33,320 2,515.759 44,9194.500 -11.430 1.036 6.100 13.555 61.982
OPER_CYCLE 33,320 172.360 3500.141 30.754 73.571 114.972 159.039 254.427
TURN 33,320 1.071 0.624 0.296 0.664 0.946 1.331 2.297
σ(CFO) 33,320 66.212 249.591 1.550 4.885 12.424 37.383 252.647
σ (SALES) 33,320 329.902 1,340.159 5.123 18.895 53.203 171.914 1,298.545
See APPENDIX II.A for variable definitions
Descriptive statistics for Variables Used in Regression Analyses
Table 2.3
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the dependent variables and the continuous and binary independent variables. The treatment
sample comprises 3,476 firm-year observations from 12 EU countries plus Norway and Switzerland during the period from 2002 to 2008. The
control sample comprises 29,596 firm-year observation from 11 countries that do not require IFRS reporting over the entire test period. See
APPENDIX A  for variable definitions.
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monitoring mechanisms (i.e. IFRSLOW_GOV). Table 2.4, columns (3)-(4) report the estimated 
coefficients and firm-level clustered adjusted t-statistics from the estimation of equation (11), 
using AVAR and AVOL as dependent variables. In both the models, we find that only mandatory 
IFRS adopters with strong board-based monitoring mechanisms experience an increase in 
financial reporting quality once IFRS became mandated (0.201, p < 0.001; 0.282, p < 0.001, 
respectively), while firms for which board of directors are poor monitors do not experience a 
significant change in financial reporting practices around IFRS mandatory adoption. Overall, our 
results show that, by itself, IFRS adoption has little effect on firms’ reporting behavior. By 
contrast, we find that board-based monitoring mechanisms have an effective role in shaping 
firms’ reporting quality after a change in accounting standards.  
In the last two columns of table 2.4, we relax the assumption that firm-level corporate 
governance monitoring intensity is costant over time, by allowing our firm-level corporate 
governance indicator to vary over time. Specifically, we add to equation (10) a variable that takes 
the value of zero in the pre-IFRS mandatory adoption period, and the values of GOVSCORE in 
the post-IFRS mandatory adoption period. We also replace the country-industry fixed effects with 
firm fixed effects to better account for time invariant unobservable heterogeneity across firms. By 
this analysis, we intend to test whether IFRS adopters firms that make board-based monitoring 
mechanisms stricter yield an higher increases in financial reporting quality than firms that do not 
experience such change. Irrespective from the dependent variable we employ, we document an 
higher increase in financial reporting quality for firms that experience an increase in board-based 
monitoring intensity.  
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However, partitioning the sample only with respect to firm-level corporate governance 
mechanisms does not account for cross-sectional differences in the legal frameworks within EU 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AVAR AVOL AVAR AVOL AVAR AVOL
IFRS 0.154*** 0.198** - - 0.129 0.367***
(5.257) (2.248) (0.798) (3.770)
IFRSHIGH_GOV - - 0.210*** 0.282*** - -
(4.091) (3.160)
IFRSLOW_GOV - - 0.078 0.117 - -
(1.536) (1.297)
IFRSGOODGOV - - - - 0.081** 0.071***
(2.455) (2.865)
F-Test (p-values)
IFRSHIGH_GOV  = IFRSLOW_GOV - - 0.019 0.000 - -
IFRS = IFRSGOODGOV - - - - 0.076 0.000
SIZE 0.059*** -0.041*** 0.055*** -0.042*** 0.109*** -0.053**
(4.468) (-12.814) (4.336) (-13.029) (4.148) (-2.487)
LEV 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.341) (-1.040) (-0.268) (-0.938) (-0.281) (-1.416)
LOSS -0.086*** -0.017 -0.093*** -0.019 -0.110*** -0.082***
(-3.855) (-1.182) (-3.357) (-1.334) (-4.420) (-4.075)
AFE 0.000 0.001* -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001*
(0.072) (1.757) (-0.692) (1.569) (-0.723) (1.907)
DISPERSION -0.000*** -0.000 0.055 0.025 0.000 -0.000
(-3.503) (-1.161) (1.297) (1.117) (1.115) (-1.635)
REP_LAG -0.023 -0.199*** -0.023 -0.198*** 0.029 -0.152***
(-0.374) (-15.859) (-0.376) (-15.743) (0.813) (-5.113)
FOLLOWING 0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.001** -0.001 -0.001
(0.099) (-2.113) (-0.223) (-2.441) (-1.300) (-1.496)
ΔGDP/CAP 0.370*** 0.149*** 0.376*** 0.143*** 0.442*** 0.082**
(3.745) (8.452) (3.803) (8.014) (8.854) (2.236)
COSTANT 0.162 1.611*** 0.244 1.589*** -0.603*** 1.418***
(0.607) (10.216) (0.885) (10.298) (-2.837) (8.074)
Country fe Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Industry fe Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Firm fe No No No No Yes Yes
Year fe Global & EU Global & EU Global & EU Global & EU Global & EU Global & EU
Observations 33,072 33,072 33,072 33,072 33,072 33,072
R-squared 0.032 0.036 0.033 0.037 0.292 0.344
See APPENDIX II.A for variable definitions. In parentheses are reported t-statics based on robust standard errors that are clustered at firm 
level.
***, ** and * denote significance at 1% , 5% and 10%  levels (two-tailed), respectively.
Table 2.4
OLS regressions on AVAR and AVOL conditional on firm-level board monitoring intensity
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member states. This variation is likely to shape the impact of a change in accounting standards on 
financial reporting quality, beyond firm-level characteristics. To the extent that existing research 
stresses the importance of a country legal enforcement for reporting incentives, we now replace 
the IFRS indicator with two non-overlapping binary variables marking: firms in the treatment 
IFRS sample from countries with a strong legal enforcement (i.e. IFRSHIGH_LAw),  and firms in 
the treatment IFRS sample from countries with a weak legal enforcement (i.e. IFRSLOW_LAw). 
This approach allows us a benchmark with prior studies. Indeed, if IFRS mandatory adoption has 
different effects across countries in function of the legal enforcement, we should observe an 
increase in the information content of annual earnings announcements only in strong legal 
enforcement countries. Table 2.5, columns (1)-(2) reports the coefficients and firm-level 
clustered adjusted t-statistics. For both AVAR and AVOL the coefficient on IFRSLOW_LAw is not 
significant, while the estimated coefficient on IFRSHIGH_LAw is in the positive and significant 
(0.167, p < 0.001; 0.220, p < 0.050, respectevely). 
We now examine the interplay between country-level and firm-level board monitoring 
intensity. So far, we show that strong board-based monitoring mechanisms can substitute for lax 
legal enforcement. Nevertheless, we cannot derive fully correct inferences about the effectiveness 
of board monitoring as a substitute of the legal system from prior analyses. First, almost 67 per 
cent of the strong-monitoring firms come from strong enforcement countries, thus the results 
from the estimation of prior models could be driven only by strong-monitoring firms which also 
come from these countries. Most importantly, we have to test whether, holding constant the legal 
environment, strong monitoring firms behave in a different fashion from weak monitoring firms 
to assess that firm-level monitoring mechanisms substitute for country-level monitoring 
mechanisms. Still using our panel fixed effects stucture to disentangle the effect of concurrent 
events around IFRS adoption, we now present the results from the estimation of model (12) to 
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compare the changes in financial reporting quality among four groups of firms: (i) strong 
monitoring firms in a strong legal enforcement; (ii) weak monitoring firms in a strong legal 
enforcement; (iii) strong monitoring firms in a weak legal enforcement; (iv) weak monitoring 
firms in a weak legal enforcement. 
Table 2.5, columns (3)-(4) reports the estimation results. Consistent with the substitution 
effect between firm-level and country-level monitoring mechanisms, we find an increase in the 
AVAR and AVOL for strong monitoring firms in weak legal enforcement countries (0.245, p < 
0.001; 0.209, p < 0.050, respectively), while no significant change for weak monitoring firms in 
the weak legal enforcement countries. Most importantly, keeping fixed the the legal enforcement, 
i.e. comparing the changes in financial reporting quality for firms that are forced to switch to 
IFRS in the same weak legal environment between strong versus weak monitoring firms, we find 
that the difference between the changes of the two groups is significant for both AVAR and 
AVOL (p < 0.001; p < 0.100, respectively). In other words, strong monitoring firms are able to 
separate themselves from weak monitoring firms in a weak legal environment, and are thus able 
to enhance reporting quality further once IFRS are mandated. Turning to strong legal 
environment countries, we document an improvement in financial reporting quality for strong 
monitoring firms for both AVAR and AVOL (0.201, p < 0.001; 0.301, p < 0.001, respectively), 
while for weak monitoring firms the increase in AVAR and AVOL is just slightly above the 
conventional level of significance. However, the difference between the changes of these two 
groups is significance only for AVOL (p < 0.100). 
Finally, we split strong legal enforcement countries in two groups to account for time-
variant differences in the level of enforcement on financial reporting (Christensen et al. 2012).  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AVAR AVOL AVAR AVOL AVAR AVOL
IFRSHIGH_LAW 0.1667*** 0.220** - - - -
(4.965) (2.473)
IFRSLOW_LAW 0.109 0.149 - - - -
(1.584) (1.517)
IFRSHIGH_GOV_HIGH_LAW - - 0.201*** 0.301*** - -
(5.035) (3.305)
IFRSLOW_GOV_HIGH_LAW - - 0.109 0.116 - -
(1.585) (1.253)
IFRSHIGH_GOV_LOW_LAW - - 0.245*** 0.209** 0.236*** 0.210**
(3.313) (2.135) (3.217) (2.151)
IFRSLOW_GOV_LOW_LAW - - 0.035 0.120 0.026 0.121
(0.531) (1.246) (0.402) (1.266)
IFRSHIGH_GOV_HIGH_LAW_proactive - - - - 0.203*** 0.305***
(5.287) (3.332)
IFRSLOW_GOV_HIGH_LAW_proactive - - - - 0.198*** 0.148
(2.802) (1.573)
IFRSHIGH_GOV_LOW_LAW_non_proactive - - - - 0.157** 0.278**
(2.104) (2.266)
IFRSLOW_GOV_LOW_LAW_non_proactive - - - - -0.264** 0.012
(-2.599) (0.117)
F-Test (p-values)
IFRSHIGH_LAW  = IFRSLOW_LAW 0.342 0.073 - - - -
IFRSHIGH_GOV_HIGH_LAW = IFRSLOW_GOV_HIGH_LAW - - 0.401 0.079 - -
IFRSHIGH_GOV_LOW_LAW = IFRSLOW_GOV_LOW_LAW - - 0.000 0.084 0.000 0.084
IFRSHIGH_GOV_HIGH_LAW_proactive = IFRSLOW_GOV_HIGH_LAW_proactive - - - - 0.931 0.200
IFRSHIGH_GOV_HIGH_LAW_non_proactive = IFRSLOW_GOV_HIGH_LAW_non_proactive - - - - 0.000 0.009
SIZE 0.055*** -0.040*** 0.055*** -0.041*** 0.055*** -0.041***
(4.402) (-12.761) (4.378) (-12.929) (4.342) (-12.938)
LEV -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.295) (-1.028) (-0.295) (-0.985) (-0.289) (-0.984)
LOSS -0.092*** -0.019 -0.087*** -0.016 -0.086*** -0.016
(-3.291) (-1.343) (-3.939) (-1.137) (-3.882) (-1.131)
AFE -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001* 0.000 0.001*
(-0.687) (1.570) (0.062) (1.760) (0.061) (1.758)
DISPERSION 0.055 0.025 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000
(1.276) (1.126) (-3.490) (-1.169) (-3.489) (-1.169)
REP_LAG -0.024 -0.198*** -0.022 -0.198*** -0.023 -0.199***
(-0.391) (-15.700) (-0.355) (-15.801) (-0.374) (-15.832)
FOLLOWING -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000**
(-0.068) (-2.247) (-0.068) (-2.301) (-0.098) (-2.248)
ΔGDP/CAP 0.373*** 0.147*** 0.373*** 0.139*** 0.377*** 0.142***
(3.747) (8.207) (3.799) (7.802) (3.856) (7.882)
COSTANT 0.158 1.591*** 0.199 1.584*** 0.563* 1.575***
(0.577) (10.015) (0.716) (10.201) (1.924) (10.107)
Country fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fe Global & EU Global & EU Global & EU Global & EU Global & EU Global & EU
Observations 33,072 33,072 33,072 33,072 33,072 33,072
R-squared 0.032 0.036 0.033 0.037 0.033 0.037
Table 2.5
OLS regressions on AVAR and AVOL conditional on firm-level board monitoring intensity and country-level legal enforcement
See APPENDIX II.A for variable definitions. In parentheses are reported t-statics based on robust standard errors that are clustered at firm level.
***, ** and * denote significance at 1% , 5% and 10%  levels (two-tailed), respectively.
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We thus replace the IFRS indicator variable in model (10) with six binary variables 
marking: (i) weak monitoring firms in a weak legal enforcement; (ii) strong monitoring firms in a 
weak legal enforcement; (iii) weak monitoring firms in a strong legal enforcement countries 
without a change in the level of enforcement; (iv) strong monitoring firms in a strong legal 
enforcement countries without a change in the level of enforcement; (v) weak monitoring firms in 
a strong legal enforcement countries with a change in the level of enforcement; (iv) strong 
monitoring firms in a strong legal enforcement countries with a change in the level of 
enforcement. Table 2.5, columns (5)-(6) reports the estimation results. Of course, the estimated 
coefficients for firms in weak legal enforcement countries remain stable as long as the 
composition of the groups identified by these indicator variables does not change. Looking at 
firms in strong legal enforcement countries without a change in the level of enforcement over 
financial reporting, we find an increase in both AVAR and AVOL only for strong monitoring 
firms. On the contrary, for firms incorporated in strong legal enforcement countries with an 
increase in the level of enforcement aroud IFRS mandatory reporting, the difference in change 
between strong and weak board-based monitoring firms is not significant for both the dependent 
variables (p = 931; p = 0.200, respectively). These finding suggests that the effectiveness of firm-
level governance in shaping the effect of a change in accounting standards decrease in the level 
of enforcement. 
So far, we have explored the effect of firm-level monitoring mechanisms around IFRS 
mandatory adoption on the information content of annual earnings announcements to test whether 
board monitoring affects the investors’ assessment of the reliability of the outcomes of firms’ 
financial reporting process. As noted by DeFond et al. (2007), the information content of annual 
earnings announcements is an earnings attribute strongly affected by the reliability of accounting 
information. Since earnings for firms that engage less in earnings management are more reliable, 
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in the sense that such earnings are more likely to depict firms’ underling performances (DeFond 
et al. 2007; Bamber et al. 2011), we should observe a decrease in abnormal accruals after IFRS 
mandatory adoption only for strong board-based monitoring firms, irrespective from the country 
of incorporation. In addition, to the extent that a firm may substitute accrual based earnings 
management with real earnings management, we also examine the impact of IFRS mandatory 
adoption on real based earnings management. 
Table 2.6, presents the results from the estimation of equation (10) using ABS_DA, 
REAL_1 and REAL_2 as dependent variables Columns (1)-(3) report results without 
distinguishing firms on the basis of legal enforcement or board monitoring intensity. Overall, it 
appears that the advent of mandatory IFRS (coefficient on IFRS) has a negligible effect on 
ABS_DA (-0.014, p < 0.100) and do not translate into more real earnings management, as 
proxied by higher REAL_1 and REAL_2. To investigate the issue further, we now partition IFRS 
mandatory adopters on the basis of board monitoring intensity (Columns (4)-(6)). The coefficient 
on IFRSLOW_GOV is not statistically significant for ABS_DA, REAL_1 and REAL_2. In contrast, 
the coefficient for IFRSHIGH_GOV is negative for ABS_DA (-0.015, p < 0.050) and positive for 
both REAL_1 and REAL_2 (0.043, p < 0.001; 0.036, p < 0.001, respectively). Hence, there 
seems to be a trade-off between accrual management (less) and real earnings management (more) 
in firms with strong board monitoring following the advent of IFRS.  
 Overall, results from table 2.6 show that, by itself, IFRS mandatory adoption has little if no 
effect on firms’ reporting behavior. By contrast, we find that board monitoring mechanisms have 
an effective role in shaping firms’ reporting quality after a change in accounting standards. The 
next analysis investigates this issue further.  
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Table 2.7, columns (1)-(3) present the estimation results using the strength of the legal 
enforcement as partitioning variable (HIGH_LAW). It appears that most of the IFRS effect 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
ABS_DA REAL_1 REAL_2 ABS_DA REAL_1 REAL_2 ABS_DA REAL_1 REAL_2
IFRS -0.014* 0.035 0.025 - - - -0.013 0.059** 0.038
(-1.912) (1.044) (0.814) (-1.558) (2.025) (1.427)
IFRSHIGH_GOV - - - -0.015** 0.043*** 0.036** - - -
(-2.117) (5.372) (2.616)
IFRSLOW_GOV - - - -0.012 0.020 0.005 - - -
(-1.492) (1.559) (0.380)
IFRSGOODGOV - - - - - - -0.001 0.022*** 0.031***
(-0.423) (2.937) (3.955)
F-Test (p-values)
IFRSHIGH_GOV  = IFRSLOW_GOV - - - 0.208 0.067 0.030 - - -
IFRS = IFRSGOODGOV - - - - - - 0.092 0.006 0.015
SIZE -0.008*** 0.007*** 0.013*** -0.009*** 0.0071 0.013* -0.025*** 0.034*** 0.041***
(-16.114) (4.939) (5.350) (-16.089) (1.639) (1.859) (-6.073) (5.084) (4.299)
ROA -0.001*** -0.001** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.0009 -0.000 -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(-4.379) (-2.438) (-0.244) (-4.380) (-0.870) (-0.068) (-2.922) (-7.190) (-4.781)
GROWTH 0.000* -0.000* -0.000 0.000* -0.0000* -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(1.934) (-1.822) (-1.120) (1.934) (-1.955) (-1.639) (1.427) (-1.266) (-1.069)
LEV -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.0001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(-0.539) (1.275) (1.289) (-0.544) (1.311) (1.481) (-0.735) (1.610) (1.212)
DISSUE 0.000*** -0.001** -0.000 0.000*** -0.0001*** -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 0.000
(6.033) (-2.466) (-0.681) (6.033) (-4.894) (-0.560) (3.588) (-0.366) (0.070)
EISSUE -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.0000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(-5.148) (-15.653) (-0.261) (-5.117) (-9.626) (-0.172) (-4.681) (-2.875) (-3.699)
OPER_CYCLE 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.0000*** 0.000*** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(1.333) (4.625) (4.765) (1.333) (6.223) (3.952) (1.277) (-1.453) (-0.532)
TURN 0.006*** 0.084*** 0.119*** 0.006*** 0.0839*** 0.119*** 0.014*** 0.002 -0.008
(4.770) (18.019) (15.017) (4.765) (13.805) (5.892) (2.959) (0.342) (-0.713)
LOSS 0.019*** 0.033*** 0.025*** 0.019*** 0.0326*** 0.025 0.016*** 0.005* 0.000
(8.859) (8.152) (3.781) (8.863) (3.101) (1.265) (8.507) (1.709) (0.069)
σ (SALES) -0.000 0.000** 0.000* -0.000 0.0000* 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000**
(-1.619) (2.573) (1.707) (-1.605) (1.808) (1.703) (0.687) (1.699) (2.480)
σ(CFO) 0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.0001*** -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(7.295) (-5.933) (-5.590) (7.289) (-3.717) (-4.942) (4.850) (-3.606) (-2.877)
∆GDP/CAP -0.002 0.017*** 0.075*** -0.002 0.0172 0.076 0.001 -0.013** 0.031***
(-0.869) (3.249) (7.626) (-0.907) (1.242) (1.564) (0.373) (-2.108) (3.007)
COSTANT 0.106*** -0.442*** -0.368*** 0.105*** -0.4313*** -0.356*** 0.184*** -0.251*** -0.286***
(7.235) (-8.172) (-6.873) (7.056) (-8.852) (-4.331) (6.813) (-6.089) (-4.928)
Country fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
Industry fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
firm fe No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year fe Global & EU Global & EU Global & EU Global & EU Global & EU Global & EU Global & EU Global & EU Global & EU
Observations 33,072 33,072 33,072 33,072 33,072 33,072 33,072 33,072 33,072
R-squared 0.229 0.111 0.090 0.229 0.111 0.090 0.559 0.780 0.847
Table 2.6
OLS regressions on accrual and real earnings management conditional on firm-level board monitoring intensity
See APPENDIX II.A for variable definitions. In parentheses are reported t-statics based on robust standard errors that are clustered at firm 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1% , 5% and 10%  levels (two-tailed), respectively.
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derives from firms subject to stricter legal enforcement, as none of the coefficients for 
IFRSLOW_LAw are statistically significant at conventional levels (such coefficient would capture 
the effect for firms under weak legal enforcement). In contrast, the coefficient for IFRSHIGH_LAw  
is negative for ABS_DA (-0.015, p < 0.050) and positive for both REAL_1 and REAL_2 (0.058, 
p < 0.001; 0.052, p < 0.01, respectively). Hence, there seems to be a trade-off between accrual 
management (less) and real earnings management (more) in firms under strong legal enforcement 
following the advent of IFRS. Finally, we examine the interplay between country-level 
enforcement and firm-level monitoring mechanisms around IFRS mandatory adoption also for 
accrual-based and real earnings management metrics. Table 2.7, columns (4)-(6) presents the 
results from the estimation of equation (12) using ABS_DA, REAL_1 and REAL_2 as dependent 
variables, We find a decrease  in ABS_DA for strong monitoring firms in weak legal 
enforcement countries (-0.026, p-value<0.001). Keeping fixed the strength of the legal 
enforcement, i.e. comparing the changes in ABS_DA for firms forced to switch to IFRS in the 
same legal environment between strong versus weak monitoring firms, we still find a significant 
difference (p < 0.100). We also document a decrease in ABS_DA for mandated adopters with 
strong monitoring in strong legal enforcement countries, while the decrease is lower for weak 
monitoring firms in the same legal environment and the difference between the changes is not 
significant. For the real earnings management metrics, we find an increase in both REAL_1 and 
REAL_2 only for strong board-based monitoring firms in strong legal enforcement countries. To 
sum up, if firm-level corporate governance is a substitute for the legal system when it is weak, 
firm and country-level monitoring mechanisms turn to be complements as the latter gets stronger. 
Firm-level monitoring mechanisms seems to matter most when they are scarce, that is in weak 
legal enforcement countries as long as the improvement in financial reporting quality for strong 
monitoring firms relative to weak monitoring firms is larger in lax legal environment.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
ABS_DA REAL_1 REAL_2 ABS_DA REAL_1 REAL_2 ABS_DA REAL_1 REAL_2
IFRSHIGH_LAW -0.014** 0.044*** 0.039** - - - - - -
(-2.019) (5.587) (2.382)
IFRSLOW_LAW -0.012 -0.000 -0.024 - - - - - -
(-1.545) (-0.014) (-1.259)
IFRSHIGH_GOV_HIGH_LAW - - - -0.015** 0.058*** 0.052*** - - -
(-2.042) (6.501) (3.782)
IFRSLOW_GOV_HIGH_LAW - - - -0.015* 0.013 0.009 - - -
(-1.917) (1.003) (0.638)
IFRSHIGH_GOV_LOW_LAW - - - -0.026*** -0.022 -0.032 -0.026*** -0.021 -0.033
(-3.345) (-1.248) (-1.349) (-3.323) (-1.245) (-1.421)
IFRSLOW_GOV_LOW_LAW - - - -0.019 0.010 -0.023 -0.019 0.011 -0.024
(-1.320) (0.660) (-1.222) (-1.292) (0.710) (-1.315)
IFRSHIGH_GOV_HIGH_LAW_proactive - - - - - - -0.015** 0.057*** 0.054***
(-2.105) (6.451) (3.825)
IFRSLOW_GOV_HIGH_LAW_proactive - - - - - - -0.011 0.014 0.009
(-1.278) (0.981) (0.518)
IFRSHIGH_GOV_LOW_LAW_non_proactive - - - - - - -0.029*** 0.071*** 0.015
(-3.298) (2.800) (0.566)
IFRSLOW_GOV_LOW_LAW_non_proactive - - - - - - -0.008 0.014 0.000
(-0.965) (0.311) (0.008)
F-Test (p-values)
IFRSHIGH_LAW  = IFRSLOW_LAW 0.561 0.002 0.007 - - - - - -
IFRSHIGH_GOV_HIGH_LAW = IFRSLOW_GOV_HIGH_LAW - - - 0.906 0.000 0.003 - - -
IFRSHIGH_GOV_LOW_LAW = IFRSLOW_GOV_LOW_LAW - - - 0.087 0.011 0.535 0.087 0.011 0.535
IFRSHIGH_GOV_HIGH_LAW_proactive = IFRSLOW_GOV_HIGH_LAW_proactive - - - - - - 0.315 0.000 0.001
IFRSHIGH_GOV_HIGH_LAW_non_proactive = IFRSLOW_GOV_HIGH_LAW_non_proactive - - - - - - 0.002 0.031 0.055
SIZE -0.009*** 0.007 0.013* -0.010*** 0.007 0.013* -0.010*** 0.007 0.0131*
(-16.115) (1.643) (1.866) (-17.756) (1.638) (1.859) (-17.742) (1.635) (1.858)
ROA -0.001*** -0.001 -0.002 -0.000*** -0.001 -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001 -0.0001
(-4.376) (-0.879) (-0.075) (-3.869) (-0.874) (-0.071) (-3.873) (-0.875) (-0.071)
GROWTH 0.000* -0.000* -0.000 0.000** -0.000* -0.000 0.000** -0.000* -0.0000
(1.934) (-1.959) (-1.647) (1.986) (-1.957) (-1.642) (1.986) (-1.957) (-1.642)
LEV -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.0001
(-0.540) (1.265) (1.432) (-0.697) (1.174) (1.403) (-0.702) (1.173) (1.405)
DISSUE 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.0000
(6.033) (-4.910) (-0.563) (6.555) (-4.900) (-0.563) (6.553) (-4.905) (-0.562)
EISSUE -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.0000
(-5.145) (-9.592) (-0.162) (-4.790) (-9.596) (-0.183) (-4.800) (-9.591) (-0.189)
OPER_CYCLE 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000*** 0.0000***
(1.333) (6.216) (3.954) (1.881) (6.215) (3.955) (1.880) (6.216) (3.958)
TURN 0.006*** 0.084*** 0.119*** 0.003** 0.084*** 0.119*** 0.003** 0.084*** 0.1187***
(4.769) (13.810) (5.886) (2.346) (13.767) (5.880) (2.322) (13.754) (5.885)
LOSS 0.019*** 0.033*** 0.024 0.019*** 0.033*** 0.025 0.019*** 0.033*** 0.0248
(8.858) (3.100) (1.266) (8.645) (3.101) (1.265) (8.646) (3.100) (1.266)
σ (SALES) -0.000 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.0000*
(-1.623) (1.816) (1.737) (0.172) (1.817) (1.725) (0.181) (1.821) (1.715)
σ(CFO) 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.0001***
(7.296) (-3.703) (-4.918) (6.006) (-3.705) (-4.927) (6.006) (-3.700) (-4.910)
∆GDP/CAP -0.002 0.018 0.076 0.004** 0.019 0.078 0.004** 0.019 0.0781
(-0.890) (1.271) (1.572) (2.249) (1.388) (1.589) (2.382) (1.372) (1.592)
COSTANT 0.106*** -0.449*** -0.379*** 0.132*** -0.428*** -0.361*** 0.131*** -0.428*** -0.3535***
(7.269) (-9.537) (-4.718) (9.438) (-8.951) (-4.413) (9.407) (-7.008) (-3.767)
Country fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fe Global & EU Global & EU Global & EU Global & EU Global & EU Global & EU Global & EU Global & EU Global & EU
Observations 33,072 33,072 33,072 33,072 33,072 33,072 33,072 33,072 33,072
R-squared 0.229 0.111 0.090 0.202 0.112 0.090 0.202 0.112 0.090
See APPENDIX II.A for variable definitions. In parentheses are reported t-statics based on robust standard errors that are clustered at firm level.
***, ** and * denote significance at 1% , 5% and 10%  levels (two-tailed), respectively.
Table 2.7
OLS regressions on accrual and real earnings management conditional on firm-level board monitoring intensity and country-level legal enforcement
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2.5. Additional analysis 
Monitoring versus reporting incentives hypothesis 
This paper exploits cross-sectional variation in the board-based monitoring intensity to 
examine heterogeneity in IFRS mandatory adoption consequences on financial reporting quality. 
We rely on agency theory to partition the sample according to board monitoring intensity, under 
the assumption that board structured to be effective watchdogs of insiders’ behaviors are more 
likely to provide financial information of higher quality to reduce agency costs. We examine 
neither why firms should adopt strong monitoring mechanisms, nor whether the decision to adopt 
such mechanisms is the observable outcome of firm reporting incentives. Indeed, a firm decision 
to bond itself to the scrutiny of strong board-based monitoring mechanisms may follow from a 
particular set of reporting incentives. More profitable firms with greater needs for external 
financing and higher growth opportunities should have strong incentives to provide more reliable 
financial information to providers of finance. A firm may try to adopt bonding mechanisms, for 
example corporate governance ones, to credibly commit not to expropriate investors, especially if 
the comes from a lax legal system. If this argument holds, we should observe an improvement in 
financial reporting quality after IFRS mandatory adoption for firms with strong reporting 
incentives, despite the presence of strong board-based monitoring mechanisms. In this case, 
corporate governance is just an observable outcome, with no additional explanatory power. To 
explore this issue, we replicate our main analyses by augmenting the models with a reporting 
incentives partitioning variable. Specifically, considering only the IFRS treatment sample, we 
apply a factor analysis to the following variables: SIZE, LEV, ROA, GROWTH. The first factor 
(out of two which are retained) exhibits the expected loadings and we use it as our “reporting 
incentives” variable. Following Daske et al. (forthcoming), we calculate the reporting incentives 
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variable as a rolling average over the previous three years (i.e., years t, t-1, t-2). Next, we subtract 
for each firm the rolling average in year t-1 from the rolling average in year t+3 relative to the 
year t of IFRS adoption. Finally, we create a binary variable (REP_INCENTIVES) based on the 
sample distributions of the changes around IFRS adoption. Firms with above sample median 
value of “reporting incentives” are classified as strong reporting incentives firms 
(REP_INCENTIVES equals to one). Table 2.8, panel A presents the estimation results. For sake 
of brevity we report only the coefficients on the variable of interests even if the estimation results 
stem from the full model with the set of control variables. We find that only strong board-based 
monitoring firms exhibit an increase in AVAR and AVOL, and a decline in ABS_DA, 
irrespective of the reporting incentives although the improvement in all three measures is stronger 
for those firms that hold also strong reporting incentives.  
Most importantly, we do not find a decline in ABS_DA and an increase in AVAR and 
AVOL for firms that have strong reporting incentives but do not adopt strong board-based 
monitoring mechanisms. Together, these results suggest that our proxy for board monitoring 
intensity it is not just the observable outcome of a given set of reporting incentives. Rather, it has 
an additional and different role in explaining financial reporting changes around IFRS mandatory 
adoption. Interestingly, when we examine real earnings management, we document an increase in 
REAL_1 and REAL_2 only for strong board-based monitoring firms with low reporting 
incentives. 
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2.6. Robustness checks 
In this section, we present the results of a battery of robustness tests. All the results of the 
robustness checks are untabulated but are available from the authors upon request. 
1. To the extent that 2005 is the year of the mandatory switch to IFRS, we replicate all the 
analyses after excluding the transition year. Results are unchanged. 
2. United Kingdom firms represent almost 34 percent of the sample. We replicate all the 
analyses after excluding United Kingdom. Results are consistent with those reported. 
3. We test whether the results are robust to the use of alternative measures of accrual-based 
and real earnings management. We measure the abnormal working capital accruals as in 
DeFond and Park (2001) and inferences are unchanged. In addition, we use the abnormal 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AVAR AVOL ABS_DA REAL_1 REAL_2
IFRSHIGH_GOV_HIGH_HIGH_REP_INC 0.185*** 0.295*** -0.016** 0.030 0.026
(4.400) (3.052) (-2.291) (0.893) (0.836)
IFRSLOW_GOV_HIGH_HIGH_REP_INC 0.023 0.087 -0.009 0.023 0.023
(0.614) (0.933) (-1.255) (0.582) (0.632)
IFRSHIGH_GOV_LOW_LOW_REP_INC 0.179** 0.269*** -0.015** 0.063* 0.052*
(2.732) (2.981) (-2.094) (1.750) (1.665)
IFRSLOW_GOV_LOW_LOW_REP_INC 0.098* 0.152 -0.013* 0.073** 0.074**
(1.934) (1.607) (-1.853) (1.976) (2.157)
F-Test (p-values)
IFRSHIGH_GOV_HIGH_REP_INC  = IFRSLOW_GOV_HIGH_REP_INC 0.061 0.001 0.811 0.727 0.885
IFRSHIGH_GOV_LOW_REP_INC = IFRSLOW_GOV_LOW_REP_INC 0.526 0.031 0.371 0.613 0.296
Constant 0.328 1.599*** 0.124*** -0.129*** -0.202***
(0.868) (10.366) (9.992) (-2.660) (-4.183)
Country fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fe Global & EU Global & EU Global & EU Global & EU Global & EU
Observations 33,072 33,072 33,072 33,072 33,072
R-squared 0.021 0.037 0.206 0.092 0.069
Table 2.8
Monitoring versus reporting incentives
See APPENDIX II.A for variable definitions. In parentheses are reported t-statics based on robust standard errors that are clustered at firm level.
***, ** and * denote significance at 1% , 5% and 10%  levels (two-tailed), respectively.
83 
 
accruals adjusted for firm performances (Kothary et al. 2005), results are qualitatively 
unchanged. We also use alternative proxies for real earnings management following 
Cohen et al. (2012) who adjust real earnings management models by controlling for 
firms’ performances and the results are consistent with those reported in the paper.  
4. We use the earnings response coefficient as an alternative proxy for the earnings 
informativeness. Inferences are unchanged.  
5. We replace the industry-country fixed effects structure with firm-fixed effects to better 
absorb time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity across firms. Results are unchanged. 
6. The empirical results of this paper rely on the ability of the board monitoring proxy (i.e. 
GOOD_GOV) to partition the sample into strong board-based monitoring firms and weak 
board-based monitoring firms. If the approach used to classify observations fails to 
properly capture the strength of firm-level monitoring mechanisms, reported findings may 
be misleading. As a result, we replicate all the analyses employing  alternative 
identification schemes: 
i. the extent firm level governance may be affected by a given country corporate law 
and securities legislation. Hence, we first split the sample into four groups 
according to a country legal origin  (i.e. French, Anglo-Saxon, German, 
Scandinavian). Then, for each of these groups, we take firms in the upper 20 
percent of the firm-specific mean of GOVSCORE and set them as strong board-
based monitoring firms. Results are unchanged. We replicate all the analyses using 
GOVSCORE instead of GOOD_GOV and the results are consistent with those 
reported;  
ii. firm-level corporate governance may change over time, but it evolves slowly. 
Therefore, we do not focus on board monitoring changes but, rather, on board 
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monitoring levels, under the assumption that cross-sectional differences in terms of 
board monitoring remain constant over time while firm-specific board monitoring 
intensity may vary. Indeed, less than 6 percent of firms in the sample went from 
being classified as weak (strong) board-based monitoring firm  in the pre 
mandatory adoption period (i.e. 2004) to being classified as strong (weak) board-
based monitoring firms in the post mandatory adoption period (i.e. 2006). 
However, we replicate all the analyses after taking into account the fact that some 
firms may be misclassified between the pre and post IFRS adoption. Specifically, 
we do two separate factor analysis for the year 2004 and 2006 with the same 
variables used to define GOVSCORE. Then, we re-define GOOD_GOV equals to 
one if a firm is above the sample median in both 2004 and 2006, zero if it is below 
the median in both the years. In the other cases, firms are excluded from the 
sample. Results are consistent with those reported in the paper. 
 
2.7. Conclusions 
This paper revisits the joint effect of country-level legal enforcement and firm-level 
governance on the quality of financial reporting. Using a large sample of firms adopting IFRS, 
we find that firms evolving in weak legal enforcement countries enhance their earnings quality by 
building up their board-level governance monitoring. This suggests that in weak enforcement 
countries, firm-level board monitoring and country-level legal enforcement are substitute 
governance mechanisms. In contrast, in countries with strong legal enforcement, firms with weak 
board monitoring may still see an improvement in earnings quality but it is smaller than for firms 
with strong board monitoring. This finding suggests that in strong enforcement countries, firm-
85 
 
level board monitoring is actually a complementary governance mechanism to country-level 
institutions. Overall, our findings suggest that IFRS adoption by itself does not much affect 
earnings quality and that any such effect is conditional upon firm- and country-level governance.  
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Appendix II.A: Variable definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
GOOD_GOV Binary variable equals to one for firm in the IFRS-treatment 
sample if the firm-specific mean of the factor score of the 
governance attributes is above the sample median, zero 
otherwise. 
HIGH_LAW Binary variable equals to one if the “Rule of Law” variable for 
the year 2005 (Kaufmann et al., 2007) is above the sample 
median of the treatment sample, zero otherwise. 
PROACTIVE Binary variable equals to one if a treatment sample country that 
introduce the proactive review process of financial statements 
around 2005, zero otherwise. 
IFRS Binary variable equals to one for firms that apply IFRS only 
when it becomes mandatory in 2005 for fiscal-years beginning 
on or after 01/01/2005, and zero otherwise. 
IFRSHIGH_GOV Binary variable equals to one for firms with IFRS reporting with 
strong corporate governance (i.e. GOOD_GOV equals to one)  
only when it becomes mandatory in 2005 for fiscal-years 
beginning on or after 01/01/2005, and 0 otherwise. 
IFRSLOW_GOV Binary variable equals to one for firms with IFRS reporting with 
weak corporate governance (i.e. GOOD_GOV equals to zero)  
only when it becomes mandatory in 2005 for fiscal-years 
beginning on or after 01/01/2005, and 0 otherwise. 
IFRSHIGH_LAW_HIGH_GOV Binary variable equals to one for firms with IFRS reporting with 
strong corporate governance (i.e. GOOD_GOV equals to one) in 
countries with strong legal enforcement (i.e. HIGH_LAW 
equals to one) only when it becomes mandatory in 2005 for 
fiscal-years beginning on or after 01/01/2005, and 0 otherwise. 
IFRSHIGH_LAW_LOW_GOV Binary variable equals to one for firms with IFRS reporting with 
weak corporate governance (i.e. GOOD_GOV equals to zero)  
in countries with strong legal enforcement (i.e. HIGH_LAW 
equals to one) only when it becomes mandatory in 2005 for 
fiscal-years beginning on or after 01/01/2005, and 0 otherwise. 
IFRSLOW_LAW_HIGH_GOV Binary variable equals to one for firms with IFRS reporting with 
strong corporate governance (i.e. GOOD_GOV equals to one)  
in countries with weak legal enforcement (i.e. HIGH_LAW 
equals to zero) only when it becomes mandatory in 2005 for 
fiscal-years beginning on or after 01/01/2005, and 0 otherwise. 
IFRSLOW_LAW_LOW_GOV Binary variable equals to one for firms with IFRS reporting with 
weak corporate governance (i.e. GOOD_GOV equals to zero)  
in countries with weak legal enforcement (i.e. HIGH_LAW 
equals to zero),  only when it becomes mandatory in 2005 for 
fiscal-years beginning on or after 01/01/2005, and 0 otherwise. 
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IFRSHIGH_ LAW Binary variable equals to one for firms with IFRS in countries 
with strong legal enforcement (i.e. HIGH_LAW equals to one) 
only when it becomes mandatory in 2005 for fiscal-years 
beginning on or after 01/01/2005, and 0 otherwise. 
IFRSLOW_ LAW Binary variable equals to one for firms with IFRS reporting in 
countries with weak legal enforcement (i.e. HIGH_LAW equals 
to zero) only when it becomes mandatory in 2005 for fiscal-
years beginning on or after 01/01/2005, and 0 otherwise. 
IFRSHIGH_LAW_HIGH_GOV_proactive Binary variable equals to one for firms with IFRS reporting with 
strong corporate governance (i.e. GOOD_GOV equals to one) in 
countries with strong legal enforcement (i.e. HIGH_LAW 
equals to one) and introduce the proactive review process of 
financial statements around 2005 (i.e. PROACTIVE equals to 
one) only when it becomes mandatory in 2005 for fiscal-years 
beginning on or after 01/01/2005, and 0 otherwise. 
IFRSHIGH_LAW_LOW_GOV_proactive Binary variable equals to one for firms with IFRS reporting with 
weak corporate governance (i.e. GOOD_GOV equals to zero)  
in countries with strong legal enforcement (i.e. HIGH_LAW 
equals to one) and introduce the proactive review process of 
financial statements around 2005 (i.e. PROACTIVE equals to 
one)  only when it becomes mandatory in 2005 for fiscal-years 
beginning on or after 01/01/2005, and 0 otherwise. 
IFRSLOW_LAW_HIGH_GOV_non_proactive Binary variable equals to one for firms with IFRS reporting with 
strong corporate governance (i.e. GOOD_GOV equals to one) in 
countries with strong legal enforcement (i.e. HIGH_LAW 
equals to one)  and do not introduce the proactive review 
process of financial statements around 2005 (i.e. PROACTIVE 
equals to zero) only when it becomes mandatory in 2005 for 
fiscal-years beginning on or after 01/01/2005, and 0 otherwise. 
IFRSLOW_LAW_HIGH_GO_non_proactive Binary variable equals to one for firms with IFRS reporting with 
weak corporate governance (i.e. GOOD_GOV equals to zero)  
in countries with strong legal enforcement (i.e. HIGH_LAW 
equals to one)  and does not introduce the proactive review 
process of financial statements around 2005 (i.e. PROACTIVE 
equals to zero) only when it becomes mandatory in 2005 for 
fiscal-years beginning on or after 01/01/2005, and 0 otherwise. 
AVAR Abnormal return variability computed as in Landsman et al. 
(2012). 
AVOL Abnormal trading volume computed as in Landsman et al. 
(2012). 
ABS_DA Absolute value of discretionary accruals computed as in 
Dechow et al. (1995). 
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REAL_1 Sum of the abnormal level of production and the abnormal level 
of discretionary expenses (time minus one), both computed as in 
Roychowdhury (2006). 
REAL_2 Sum of Abnormal level of discretionary expenses (time minus 
one) and the abnormal level of cash flow (time minus one), both 
computed as in Roychowdhury (2006). 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the year. 
LEV End of the year total liabilities divided by end of the year  equity 
book value. 
LOSS Dummy variable equals to one if the actual earnings per share is 
less than zero, zero otherwise. 
AFE Earnings surprise, defined as the difference between the actual 
earnings per share and the analyst consensus earnings forecast 
before the earnings announcement, scaled the closing price at 
the fiscal year end. 
DISPERSION Standard deviation of analyst earnings forecasts prior to the 
earnings announcement, scaled by the closing price as the end 
of the year. 
REP_LAG Logarithm of the number of days between the firm’s fiscal year 
end to the earnings announcement. 
FOLLOWING The logarithm of the number of analyst that follow a fir during 
the year of the earnings announcement. 
ROA Net income before extraordinary items divided by the end of the 
year total assets. 
GROWTH Percentage change in sales. 
DISSUE Percentage change in total liabilities divided by end of the year 
equity book value. 
TURN Sales divided by end of year total assets. 
σ(CFO) Standard deviation of the operating cash flow, measured over 
the previous 5 year. 
σ (SALES) Standard deviation of the sales, measured over the previous 5 
year. 
OPER_CYCLE The operating cycle in days. 
∆CAP/GDP Logarithm of the annual change in the ratio of stock market 
capitalization and gross domestic product per capita. 
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Appendix II.B: Governance attributes definitions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Definition 
BOARD SIZE Number of board members. 
INDEPENDENT Number of independent directors over number of board 
members. 
OUTSIDERS Number of outsiders directors over number of board members. 
INSIDERS Number of insiders directors over number of board members. 
FINANCIAL EXPERT Number of financial expert independent directors over number 
of board members. 
ACCOUNTING Number of accounting expert independent directors over 
number of board members. 
AUDIT Dummy equals to 1 if the board has set up an audit committee, 0 
otherwise. 
AUDIT_SIZE Number of board members serving on the audit committee. 
INDEPENDENT_AUDIT Number of independent directors serving on the audit committee 
over number of board members serving on the audit committee. 
OUTSIDERS_AUDIT Number of outsiders directors serving on the audit committee 
over number of board members serving on the audit committee. 
INSIDERS_AUDIT Number of insiders directors serving on the audit committee 
over number of board members serving on the audit committee. 
FINANCIAL EXPERT_AUDIT Number of independent directors financial expert serving on the 
audit committee over number of board members serving on the 
audit committee. 
ACCOUNTING_AUDIT Number of independent directors accounting expert serving on 
the audit committee over number of board members serving on 
the audit committee. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Cross-listing and Firm Information 
Environment: Does SOX Section 302 Have 
any Material Effect? 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Previous literature suggests that by cross-listing in the U.S. firms are bonding 
themselves to more extensive disclosure requirements, SEC scrutiny and a tighter threat of 
litigation that jointly foster corporate transparency and the quality of the firm information 
environment. This paper examines whether cross-listing benefits on the firm information 
environment vanish if the financial reporting process suffers by internal control deficiencies 
according to the Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX302, hereafter). By using the 
properties of analyst forecasts as a proxy for the firm information environment (Lang et al. 
2003a; Arping and Saunter forthcoming), we show that cross-listed firms disclosing internal 
control deficiencies do not have a better information environment and do not differentiate 
themselves from their home-country peers, but only after the first disclosure on internal 
control deficiencies according to SOX302. Second, we document that cross-listed firms 
experience an improvement in the information environment if they remediate to previously 
disclosed internal control deficiencies. Finally, we show that these results hold only for firms 
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domiciled in countries with weak legal institutions, while cross-listed firms from countries 
with strong legal institutions do not experience a significant change in the quality of the 
information environment once they became cross-listed, irrespective from the disclosure of an 
internal control deficiency. Our results are robust to adjustments to potential endogeneity of 
cross-listing decision and to unobservable factors related to the disclosure of internal control 
deficiencies. Overall, our findings support the hypothesis that the quality of the firm 
information environment increases following cross-listing only if cross-listed firms effectively 
commit themselves to higher levels of corporate transparency, and not merely in name just 
mimicking the adoption of stricter rules (Siegel 2005). 
Previous literature shows an enhancement of information environment following cross-
listing in the U.S. (Lang et al. 2003a), suggesting that by cross-listing a firm credibly commits 
to achieve a higher level of corporate transparency. Cross-listing is associated with an 
improvement in firm corporate governance because it bonds the firm to a greater transparency, 
which should reduce the potential diversion of firm cash flow to managers and controlling 
shareholders (Coffee, 1999). Lombardo and Pagano (2002) argue that cross-listing adds value 
because the greater transparency increases the willingness of both international and local 
investors to commit capital and Lang et al. (2003a) show that firms cross-listed in U.S. 
markets are bonding themselves to an increased level of disclosure and scrutiny. However, a 
growing literature suggests that cross-listed firms do not behave in the same fashion once they 
became cross-listed, and hence do not get the same pay-off from cross-listing to the extent that 
reporting incentives of cross-listed firms are still shaped by institutional characteristics of their 
home countries (Licht et al. 2003; Siegel 2005; Leuz 2006). 
Since 2002, firms listed in U.S. markets are subjected to SOX, which strengthens the 
credibility of listings in the U.S. as a bonding mechanism (Piotroski and Srinisavan 2008). 
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According to SOX302 firms have to disclose any discovered deficiencies in internal control 
systems over financial reporting. Through this disclosure, firms reveal the quality of their 
financial information, allowing capital markets to directly infer the reliability of financial 
reporting. The disclosure of internal control deficiencies is a signal that the financial reporting 
process is scanty, making financial information of lower quality (Kim et al. 2009). Literature 
suggests that SOX302 is useful for investors to better evaluate cost of capital and earnings 
quality (Beneish et al. 2006; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009; Doyle 
et al. 2007a).  
Using a sample of 913 cross-listed firm-year observations, this paper exploits internal 
control deficiency disclosures under SOX302 to explore the existence of heterogeneity in the 
information environment benefits stemming from cross-listing. The most compelling 
challenge of our research design is that the adoption of SOX302 occurs at the same time for all 
firms listed in U.S. stock markets. To ascertain that general trends or concurrent factors 
unrelated to SOX302 disclosures affect the firm information environment of cross-listed firms, 
we employ as benchmark group all firms listed in their home market but not in the U.S. In 
addition, we employ propensity-score matching models (Francis et al. 2010; Lawrence et al. 
2011) to take into account differences in firm-characteristics between cross-listed and non-
cross-listed firms while estimating SOX302 disclosure treatment effect. Our analyses 
encompasses both changes and cross-sectional association tests.   
In the first step of the empirical analysis we examine the effect of the first disclosure of 
internal control deficiency according to SOX302 using a difference-in-difference design. We 
classify cross-listed firms with respect to the content of the first disclosure on internal control 
deficiencies and then we compare the change in firm information environment metrics for 
cross-listed firms that will not disclose internal control deficiencies and for cross-listed firms 
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that will disclose internal control deficiencies with the change for the control sample of non 
cross-listed firms around the time of the first SOX302 disclosure.  
Next, we exploit data from 2002 to 2006, to examine the average effect of the 
disclosure of internal control deficiency according to SOX302 on the information environment 
of cross-listed firms relative to the full control sample of non cross-listed firms and to the 
propensity score matched sample. 
In the third step of the empirical analysis, we examine the change in the information 
environment of cross-listed firms after the disclosure of a remediation  of an internal control 
deficiencies according to SOX302, using as benchmark the sample of non cross-listed firms 
and cross-listed firms that never disclose intern al control deficiencies. Finally, we examine 
the effect of the disclosure of internal control deficiency according to SOX302 on the 
information environment of cross-listed firms conditional on the legal and enforcement 
characteristics of their home countries. 
Our study contributes to the literature on cross-listing. Extant research outlines that 
firms that cross-list in the U.S. experience several benefits in terms of cost of capital (Hail and 
Leuz 2008, 2009) share price informativeness (Fernandes and Ferreira 2008), higher valuation 
(Doidge et al. 2004), and information environment (Lang et al. 2003a). In this paper, we 
analyse the information environment effects stemming from cross-listing in relation with the 
ability to properly adopt more stringent laws. We directly test the bonding hypothesis used to 
explain cross-listing benefits and find evidence that the benefits in terms of firm information 
environment are not homogeneous across all cross-listed firms. The magnitude of these 
benefits depends on the adoption of adequate internal controls over financial reporting: firms 
that only mimic the adoption of stricter rules lose information benefits, being not different 
from their home-country peers. 
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Our paper contributes also to the literature on the effects of SOX. Cohen et al. (2008) 
show an increase of earnings quality after SOX and Iliev (2010) find evidence supporting less 
aggressive earnings practices. Begley et al. (2009) show a temporary increase of the accuracy 
of analyst forecast once SOX came into force. Kim et al. (2009) investigate the effect of SOX 
Section 404 disclosures for U.S. firms. They find that firms disclosing internal control 
deficiencies have a poor analysts information environment, consistently with the notion that 
effective control systems enhance the quality of analyst forecast. A concurrent paper by 
Arping and Saunter (forthcoming) studies the impact of SOX on cross-listed firm’s reporting 
transparency. They adopt a research design similar to that used in this paper and find that, over 
time, cross-listed firms experience a decrease in the level of opaqueness larger than for not 
cross-listed firms. This implies that, relative to control firms, cross-listed firms became more 
transparent. However, they do not exploit the information on internal control deficiencies to 
examine heterogeneity in the information environment effects stemming from cross-listing. 
We add to this literature the evidence that the decline in the level of opaqueness depends on 
financial reporting quality and hence it is not homogenous across all firms.  
 
3.2 Related literature and predictions 
Cross-listing 
Extant research shows that cross-listing in the U.S. fosters capital market scrutiny, 
increases the availability of information of higher quality and, consequently, enhances the firm 
information environment. Baker et al. (2002) find that around the time of cross-listing firms 
have more visibility, as measured by analyst and media coverage. Lang et al. (2003a) 
document an increase in analyst forecast accuracy and in analyst coverage following cross-
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listing. Lang et al. (2003b) show that earnings quality is higher for cross-listed than for not 
cross-listed firms. Bayley et al. (2006) explain the greater volatility and trading activity around 
earnings announcements following cross-listing with a substantial change in the firm 
information environment. Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) show that share prices of cross-listed 
firms incorporate firm-specific information in a more accurately and timely manner than not 
cross-listed peers, while Goto et al. (2009) find that the time-series properties of share returns 
change when a firm cross-list and experiences a large change in disclosure. Hope et al. (2012) 
find that voluntary disclosures of cross-listed firms are positively associated with analyst 
forecast accuracy. This suggests that cross-listing makes voluntary disclosure a viable 
mechanism for improving the firm information environment. All these findings support the 
idea that, by cross-listing, foreign firms increase corporate transparency and experience an 
enhancement in the information environment.  
 
SOX disclosure 
Since 29 August 2002, all SEC filers, and foreign firms that trade by way of ADR 
levels II-III, have to comply with SOX302. SOX302 requires management (i) to evaluate the 
effectiveness of firm internal controls over financial reporting, (ii) to certify the accuracy of 
the outcomes of the financial reporting process, (iii) to disclose any discovered internal control 
deficiency22 in the internal controls (SEC, 2002)23. Through SOX302 disclosures, financial 
market can directly infer the reliability of financial reporting on a regular basis (Beneish et al. 
2006). Research shows that the presence of internal control deficiencies is associated with 
                                                    
22
 Internal control deficiencies are categorized into three groups according to the degree of severity: “material weakness”, 
“significant deficiency”, or “deficiency” 
23
 SOX Section 404 (SOX404) is related to SOX302 is. It requires that the management should certify the effectiveness of the 
internal control systems in the annual SEC filings (302), and that the external auditor confirms the management assessment of 
internal control effectiveness (404). For foreign firms accelerated filers (cross-listed on Level-II and Level-III ADRs) 
SOX404 became effective for fiscal years ending on or after July 15, 2006. 
97 
 
lower earnings quality (Doyle et al. 2007b; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008) and a higher cost of 
capital (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009). Kim et al. (2009) find that the quality of internal 
controls is positively associated with forecast accuracy and analyst following, while Begley et 
al. (2007) show a temporary increase in the precision of the public information after the 
adoption of SOX. These findings suggest that SOX302 allows investors to discriminate across 
firms with respect to the reliability of financial information while, before its adoption, 
investors could rely only on private information or indirect measures as abnormal accruals 
(Doyle et al. 2007a). To sum up, extent research provides evidence that SOX302 disclosures 
help to directly assess the quality of financial reporting and affects a firm information 
environment.  
 
SOX disclosure and cross-listing 
Research on SOX disclosures for cross-listed firms is still germinal. These studies 
examine whether SOX adoption is beneficial for cross-listed firms with respect to their home 
country peers and U.S. listed firms. Gong et al. (2011) show that SOX302 disclosures 
provided by cross-listed firms have less power in predict earnings quality than disclosures 
provided by U.S. firms. This result implies that SOX302 is less useful for cross-listed than for 
U.S. firms to separate high quality earnings firms from low quality firms. The same authors 
(Gong et al. forthcoming) also argue that cross-listed firms are less likely to report an internal 
control deficiency than U.S. firms. Arping and Sautner (forthcoming) document that cross-
listed firms became less opaque than their home country firms once SOX404 came into force. 
Berger et al. (2011) document an incremental legal bonding benefit following the adoption of 
SOX for cross-listed firms. 
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Cross-listing effects on firm information environment are explained with the bonding 
theory (Coffee 1999, 2002; Stultz 1999): cross-listing in the U.S. provides an effective means 
for firms domiciled in weak investor protection countries to credibly commit to increase 
corporate transparency as they voluntary subject themselves to U.S. security law and SEC 
enforcement. The stronger capital market and enforcement scrutiny triggers an increase in the 
availability of information of higher quality and enhances firm information environment. 
According to the bonding theory, these benefits follow as a mechanic legal consequence that a 
firm experiences just for renting the U.S. legislation. In this vein, studies about SOX effects on 
cross-listed firms are based on the underlying premise that the consequences of SOX 
disclosures are homogenously distributed across all cross-listed firms. These studies do not 
take into account that cross-listed firms might be characterized by effective or ineffective 
internal controls, and hence similar levels of corporate transparency. SOX302 disclosures 
make information on the  adequacy of internal control system common knowledge, allowing 
investors to discriminate across firms with respect to the reliability of the financial reporting. 
As a result, extant research misses to examine whether cross-listed firms have achieved the 
same level of transparency and hence the same quality in firm information environment once 
the became cross-listed. 
Indeed, it is unlikely that all cross-listed firms behave in the same fashion once became 
cross-listed and hence get the same pay-off from it as long as the legal framework is only one 
factor that shape firms’ behaviors (Holthausen 2009). Leuz (2006) provides preliminary 
evidence that cross-listed firms with different ownership concentration differ in term of 
financial reporting quality. Siegel (2005) documents variation in the likelihood of extracting 
private benefits within the population of Mexican cross-listed firms. This literature suggest 
that the outcomes of firms’ financial reporting process is shaped by several factors like 
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managers’ incentives, auditor quality, regulation, market pressure and legal enforcement. As a 
result, there is predictable heterogeneity even in the behaviors of cross-listed firms and hence 
in the information environment benefits stemming for cross-listing. Research does not explore 
this issue even if the adoption of SOX302 (and SOX404) provides an ideal setting as it allows 
investors to discriminate cross-listed firms between those that effectively commit themselves 
to higher level of transparency and those that just mimic the adoption of stricter rules.  
 
H1: Cross-listed firms lose the information environment benefits stemming from cross-
listing when they disclose internal control deficiencies under SOX302. 
Previous studies on SOX302 investigate whether the successful remediation of internal 
control deficiencies has positive effects in terms of earnings quality, cost of capital and firm 
information environment. Beneish et al. (2008) show that capital market does not react to the 
remediation of a previously disclosed internal control deficiency of U.S. firms, even if 
earnings quality increases (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008) and the cost of equity decrease after a 
successful remediation (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009). Kim et al. (2009) find that a successful 
remediation strategy bears to an increase in analyst following and to a decrease in both 
forecast error and dispersion. Considering these results, we examine whether the remediation 
of previously disclosed internal control deficiencies allows cross-listed firms to plug the 
transparency and credibility gap with other cross-listed and to separate themselves from their 
home country firms by gaining cross-listing benefits. 
 
H2: Cross-listed firms that remediate to a previously disclosed internal control 
deficiency claw back information environment benefits stemming from cross-listing. 
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Previous literature suggests that cross-listing benefits follow from a change in the 
regulatory and enforcement environment that each firm is willing to experience to signal its 
commitment to transparency. Firms from countries with a weak disclosure regulation and a 
feeble capital market scrutiny have more to get from cross-listing as they experience a larger 
increase in market scrutiny and legal enforcement than firms from countries where the latter 
are already high. Several empirical findings corroborate this intuition: Hail and Leuz (2009) 
finds that cross-listed firms from weak legal enforcement countries experience a larger decline 
in the cost of equity capital than cross-listed firms from strong legal enforcement countries. In 
this vein, the analysis of the effects of SOX302 on information environment of cross-listed 
firms should take into account the characteristics of the country in which the cross-listed firms 
is domiciled. On the one side, firms from countries with a strong disclosure regulation and 
capital market scrutiny exhibit negligible cross-listing benefits, but have less to lose whether 
an internal control deficiency is disclosed. On the other side, cross-listed firms from countries 
with a weak disclosure regulation and enforcement get the higher pay-off from cross-listed, as 
they experience a larger regulatory change. At the same time, they are likely to lose more 
whether they disclose an internal control deficiency. 
 
H3: The difference in the information environment benefits between cross-listed 
disclosing and not disclosing internal control deficiencies under SOX302 is greater 
when the firm is domiciled in a weak legal environment country. 
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3.3.  Data and research design  
Sample selection 
Our analysis focuses on firms cross-listed in the three major U.S. stock exchanges 
(NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ) at some point in time over the period August 2002 – July 
2006. As long as cross-listed firms that trade by way of OTC listings (Level-I ADRs) and Rule 
144a private placement offerings (Level-IV ADRs) have not to comply with SOX provisions, 
we focus on Level-II and Level III ADRs.  
Our sample selection procedure is as follows. We first identify from the Compustat 
Global database all cross-listed firms on Level-II and Level-III ADRs, but Canadian-based 
firms24, by relying on Compustat incorporation code, FIC, and cross-check with other data 
sources such as SEC filings and Audit Analytics. This procedure yields 2,292 cross-listed 
firm-year observations, from 702 unique firms. Next, we merge this sample of cross-listed 
firms from the Compustat Global database with the I/B/E/S International database (split 
unadjusted)25 necessary to calculate the properties of the firm information environment. We 
these restrictions we have a sample of 913 cross-listed firms-year observations that represent 
379 unique firms, from 48 countries, subjected to SOX302 between August 2002 and July 
2006. We obtain data on SOX302 disclosures from the Audit Analytics’ Disclosure Controls 
database. It encompasses all SEC registrants who have to disclose since August 2002 
management certification of internal controls in periodic SEC filings.  
Our control sample includes all the listed firms from the 48 countries with at least a 
                                                    
24
 Following prior research, Canadian firms are excluded because they can directly list their shares on U.S. exchanges without 
using depository receipts. Moreover, Canadian firms are exempted from certain U.S. reporting requirements under the Multi- 
Jurisdictional Disclosure System (Hail and Leuz 2009). However, inference is unchanged if we keep Canadian cross-listed 
firms in the sample. 
25
 We use split unadjusted data from the I/B/E/S international database for both cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms to 
avoid rounding problem with the earnings per share data (Payne and Thomas 2003). All firm-level data are converted in U.S. 
dollars for ease of analysis. 
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cross-listed firms in our final cross-listed sample, covered by I/B/E/S from August 2002 to 
July 2006, which are not cross-listed in the U.S. under the four different cross-listing 
alternative (Level-II and Level-III ADRs, or by way of OTC listings and Rule 144a private 
placement offerings). After the merge with Compustat Global to compute the variables used in 
the regression analysis, we come up with a control sample of 9,909 firm-year observations of 
non-cross-listed firms. Overall, our main analyses are carried out using a sample of 10,822 
firm-year observations. Table 3.1 presents the sample selection procedure. 
 
 
 
Cross-listed firms
Cross-listed firms in the U.S. between 2002 and 
2006 covered by COMPUSTAT and audit 
analytics databases
2,292
Minus
Observations not covered by I/B/E/S database 1,341
Missing observations for analyst information 
environment metrics
28
Final sample of cross-listed firm-years 913
Final sample of unique cross-listed firms 379
Not Cross-listed firms
Non cross-listed firms domiciled in the country 
where there is at least a cross-listed firm in the 
final sample country firms between 2002 and 
2006 covered by COMPUSTAT GLOBAL
72,786
Observations not covered by I/B/E/S database 49,802
Missing observations for analyst information 
environment metrics 13,075
Not cross-listed firm-years 9,909
Unique not cross-listed firms 4,034
Total sample 10,822
Minus
Sample selection criteria
Table 3.1
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Research design and empirical models 
We first examine the change in cross-listed firms information environment after the 
first disclosure of internal control deficiencies according to SOX302 relative to the change for 
the control sample of non cross-listed firms. By employing this difference-in-difference 
design, we can take into account the effects of potentially confounding events around the first 
SOX302 disclosure as well as concerns about unobserved heterogeneity across firms or time-
invariant selection bias. We regress firm information environment metrics on binary variables 
marking cross-listed firms on the basis of the first disclosure on internal control deficiencies, 
the time period and interaction terms: 
 

% = & + &	'_()*+,% +	&-._()*+,% 	+ &/#%	 
 +	&	'_()*+,% × /_302% + &-._()*+,% × /_302% + ∑ &4%44 + ε% 
            (1) 
where FIE stands for firm information environment metrics. GOOD_first takes the value 
of one if a cross-listed firm does not disclose an internal control deficiency at the time of the 
first SOX302 disclosure, zero otherwise. BAD_first takes the value of one if a cross-listed 
firm disclose an internal control deficiency at the time of the first SOX302 disclosure, zero 
otherwise. POST_302 takes the value of zero in the year before the analyst knowledge of the 
first SOX302 disclosure (i.e. fiscal year ending from 08/31/2002 to 07/31/2003), zero in the 
year after the analyst knowledge of the first SOX302 disclosure (i.e. fiscal year ending from 
08/31/2003 to 07/31/2004). The interaction between GOOD_first (BAD_first) and POST_302 
captures the change in firm information environment metrics around the first SOX302 
disclosure. We expect to find no difference between cross-listed firms before the first 
disclosure on SOX302 internal control deficiencies, and significant differences between cross-
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listed firms and the control sample. On the other side, we expect to find a decrease in the 
quality of firm information environment only for cross-listed firm disclosing internal control 
deficiencies. 
Next, we examine the association between the quality of internal controls over 
financial reporting and the firm information environment. Since the knowledge about the 
quality of internal controls over financial reporting of period t precedes the earnings forecast 
in year t+1, we regress the proxies for the quality of the firm information environment in year 
t+1 on the information disclosed under SOX302 in year t. We code up two binary variables 
that identify cross-listed firms according to the information disclosed under SOX302. GOOD 
is the binary variable equal to one if a cross-listed firm does not disclose internal control 
deficiencies in year t, zero otherwise. BAD is the binary variable equal to one if a cross-listed 
firm discloses internal control deficiencies in year t, zero otherwise. Hence, we estimate the 
following regression model: 
 

%6	 = & + &	'% +	&-.% 	+	∑ &4%44 + ε%     (2) 
 
By estimating the intercept and the two coefficients on GOOD and BAD we compare 
three groups of firms: cross-listed firms not disclosing internal control deficiencies (α1) to not 
cross-listed firms (α0), cross-listed firms disclosing internal control deficiencies to not cross-
listed firms (α2), and “GOOD” cross-listed firms (α1) to “BAD” cross-listed firms (α2). We 
expect that (i) cross-listed firms not disclosing internal control deficiencies (GOOD) are 
associated with a higher quality in the firm information environment than not cross-listed 
firms (α1 > 0); (ii) cross-listed firms not disclosing internal control deficiencies are associated 
with a higher quality in the analyst information environment than cross-listed firms disclosing 
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internal control deficiencies (α1 > α2); and (iii) cross-listed firms disclosing internal control 
deficiencies (BAD) have a quality in the analyst information environment worse or not 
different from not cross-listed firms, i.e. they lose the benefits stemming from cross-listing 
(α2=0 or α2<0). We employ to alternative benchmark: the full sample of non cross-listed firms 
and a propensity score matched sample to control for differences in firm characteristics 
between cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms while estimating SOX302 disclosure treatment 
effect on firm information environment. Propensity-score matching models (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin 1983) match observations with respect to the probability of be treated, which in our 
setting is the likelihood of being a cross-listed firm26. Using data between 2000 and 2002, that 
is before the first SOX302 disclosure, we thus model the probability to be a cross-listed firm 
using a logit model (Lawrence et al. 2011). To the extent that matching models do not require 
exclusion restrictions, we include a comprehensive set of firm characteristics that prior 
research found to be associated with the probability of cross-listing in the U.S. We consider 
firm size (logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the year), financial leverage (total 
liabilities over total assets), return on assets (net income over total assets), growth 
opportunities (annual change in sales), and needs for financing (change in total liabilities and 
change in common stock), as well as country and industry fixed effects. Next  we match, 
without replacement, each cross-listed firm with a non cross-listed firm using the closet 
predicted value from the propensity score matching regression.  
In the third set of empirical analyses we examine whether cross-listed firms 
                                                    
26
 Propensity score matching models seem to be particular suitable in our setting. First, this approach creates samples in which 
cross-listed and not cross-listed firms are similar, providing a good framework to assess  how SOX302 disclosures shape 
cross-listing effects on firm information environment. Second, selection or treatment effect models (Heckman 1979) used in 
cross-listing literature (Lang et al. 2003) rely on a specific functional form to provide an indirect estimate of cross-listing 
effect. Matching models do not rely on a specific functional form. In addition, selection models in cross-listing literature 
might estimate biased treatment effects to the extent that is difficult to identify instrument that affect the likelihood to cross-
list and not the effect of cross-listing (Lennox et al. 2012). However, this approach does not take into account unobservable 
heterogeneity across firms in estimating treatment effects. 
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information environment  change after a remediation of an internal control deficiency. By this 
change analysis, we can overcome issues stemming from correlated omitted variables, and 
better disentangle the marginal effect of a remediation of a previously disclosed internal 
control deficiency on financial information environment properties from firm-level time 
invariant factors (Wooldridge 2003).  We code up a dummy variable marking cross-listed 
firms that remediate to a previously disclosed internal control deficiency. UP is a binary 
variable equals to one if a firm has disclosed an internal control deficiency in period t-1 and no 
internal control deficiencies in period t27. We thus propose the following model: 
 
∆
%6	;% = & + &	9/% +	∑ &4∆%44 + ε%      (3) 
 
where ∆FIE stands for the change in the firm information environment proxy between the 
period t and t+1. In model (3), we also control for firm-specific time varying factors that 
might affect the change in firm information environment as well as the likelihood to remediate 
to a previously disclosed internal control deficiency. For instance, a large change in reported 
earnings from one period to the other might affect analyst uncertainty and the likelihood to 
disclose an internal control deficiency (Duru and Reeb 2002; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007). 
Following prior literature (Kim et al., 2009; Wooldridge, 2003) we thus include in model (3) 
each control variable used in model (1) in the first-order difference form, that is the we 
difference each control variable between period t and t-1. We test our hypothesis two with two 
control samples: cross-listed firms that never disclose internal control deficiencies and all non-
cross-listed firms. The intercept (α0) captures the change from year t and year t+1 in the 
                                                    
27
 It could have been of interest to study the association between a decrease of the quality of internal controls over financial 
reporting and the firm information environment by defining a variable DOWN as a dummy equals to 1 if company i has 
disclosed no internal control deficiencies in period t-1 ('%:	 = 1) and internal control deficiencies in period t (-.% =
1). We were not able to perform this analysis because only 8 firm-year observations have DOWN = 1.  
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properties of the firm information environment for the control sample. The coefficient on UP 
(α1) captures the difference in the change in the properties of the firm information 
environment between cross-listed firms that remediate to an internal control deficiency and 
control firms. If the remediation of the internal control deficiencies identified in the previous 
period allows cross-listed firms to plug the transparency and credibility gap then α1 is 
expected to be positive and significant. 
Finally, we investigates whether the legal and enforcement characteristics of the 
countries where cross-listed firms are domiciled are associated with cross-sectional differences 
in the effects of SOX302 disclosures across cross-listed firms. To measure the extent to which 
countries differ in terms of legal and enforcement characteristics, we use the following 
variables taken from Kaufman et al. (2007) for the year 2005: (1) Government Effectiveness; 
(2) Regulatory Quality; (3) Rule of Law; (4) Control of Corruption.  Higher values of each of 
these variables implies higher levels of legal enforcement. To partition the sample, we first 
take the sum of these legal environment variables, then we split the sample according to the 
sample median. Next, we code up a binary variable  (LAW) equals to one if an observation 
comes from a country that is above the sample median, zero otherwise. As a consequence, 
firms for which LAW is equal to zero are categorized as firms incorporated in lax legal 
environment countries. To test our last set of hypotheses, we estimate the following model: 
 

%6	 = & + &	.= + &'% + &#-.% + &$'% ∗ .= 	+ &?-.% ∗ .=	 +
	∑ &4%44 + ε%         (4) 
 
According to the bonding hypothesis, cross-listing effects should be stronger for cross-
listed firms domiciled in country with weak legal enforcement. As a consequence, we expect 
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that the difference in the firm information environment benefits between firms disclosing and 
not disclosing internal control deficiencies to be stronger for firms from weak legal 
environment countries. The coefficient of the interaction between GOOD and LAW (BAD and 
LAW) captures if the relationship between the successful (mimicking) adoption of stricter 
rules in terms of internal controls over financial reporting on the firm information environment 
is associated with the strength of the enforcement. In both the cases (successful adoption and 
mimicking adoption) we expect the coefficient to be negative (&$ and &? respectively) whether 
the effects are weaker in countries with strong legal enforcement. In addition, α2 is expected to 
be significantly larger than α3, while α1 + α4  is expected to be not different from α3 +α5.  
 
Firm information environment 
Following previous literature (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Hutton and Palepu 1999; 
Gebhardt et al. 2001), we operationalize the firm information environment using the properties 
of analyst earnings forecasts. We first focus on forecast accuracy, dispersion and analyst 
following as previous studies suggest that be followed by more analysts with more accurate 
and less dispersed forecasts indicates a better information environment (Lang and Lundholm 
1996; Hutton and Palepu 1999; Gebhardt et al. 2001).  
We calculate forecast accuracy (ACC) as the negative of the absolute value of the 
analyst forecast accuracy, deflated by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year: ACCit 
= |Actual Earningsit – Median Forecastit| / Stock Priceit,, where Actual Earningsit is the Actual 
I/B/E/S annual EPS for firm i in year t, Median Forecastit is the median of forecasts made by 
analysts in our sample from the 11th month of the fiscal year to 3 days before the annual 
earnings announcement for firm i and year t, and Stock Priceit is the stock price of firm i at the 
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end of year t.28 We remove the effect of stale forecasts by employing the last forecast made by 
each analyst if they issue more than one forecast. Using the same forecast window we 
calculate forecast dispersion (DISP) as the Standard Deviation of Forecasts/Stock Price. 
Analyst following (FOLL) is the number of analysts who issue at least one annual forecast for 
a given firm-year. Following prior research (Byard et al., 2011), we use a use a logarithm 
transformation to reduce the skewness.  
These measures on the characteristics of the firm information environment might 
depend on changes in common or idiosyncratic information. For this reason, we employ the 
measures proposed by Barron et al. (1998) (BKLS, hereafter): the precision of analyst public 
information (H), private information (S), and analyst consensus (CONS)29.  
We consider BKLS because analysts have two sources of information: an information 
signal common to all analysts and a signal observed separately by each analyst. These 
measures allow us to disentangle to what extent differences in the quality of firms information 
environment are driven by differences in the commonality of information among analysts or in 
the private information acquisition by single analysts. Our setting is particularly adequate for 
the BKLS measures because the characteristics of the internal controls over financial reporting 
are inherently unobservable from outside bringing to idiosyncratic information. The adoption 
of the SOX302 makes available to all market participants the information upon the adequacy 
of internal controls over financial reporting, leveling the information field. As a result, a 
change in the firm information environment can be achieved through an increase of the 
precision of common information that might be accompanied by a decrease in the precision of 
private information.  
                                                    
28
 The results are similar when we use the mean forecast rather than the median forecast. 
29
 See Appendix A for details about the calculation of the BKLS metrics. 
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Control variables  
All models include year-country-industry fixed effects using the industry classification 
as in Campbell (1996) and heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors, which are adjusted at 
firm-level clustering (Gow et al. 2010). In addition, the models include a set of control 
variables that prior research finds to be associated with the properties of analyst information 
environment. The size of a firm is related to the level of pre-disclosure information, thereby 
we control for firm size (SIZE), using the natural logarithm of the total assets at the beginning 
of the year. Hwang et al. (2002) finds that analyst forecast for firms reporting losses are less 
accurate than for firms reporting a profit. We control for loss reporting firms through a dummy 
variable that is equal to one if actual earnings per share are less than zero, and zero otherwise 
(LOSS). Earnings skewness and the magnitude of the annual change in earnings are likely to 
affect the properties of analyst earnings forecast (Lang and Lundholm 1996, Gu and Wu 2001, 
Duru and Reeb 2002). Skewed earnings are associated with more optimistic forecasts, while 
larger changes in earnings from one year to the other make more difficult for analyst to predict 
expected earnings. We control for earnings skewness (SKEW) using the statistical definition 
of skewness over the past five years, while we measure the change in earnings (∆EAR) using 
as the absolute value of the difference between the current year earnings per share and the last 
year’s earnings per share, scaled by the closing price as the end of the current year. We 
include the standard deviation of the return on assets over the past five years (σROA) to 
control for the possible effects of earnings volatility on firm information environment 
(O’Brien and Bhushan, 1990; Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Frankel et al., 2006). In all but the 
analyst forecast dispersion regression, we include forecast dispersion as a control, to the extent 
that previous empirical evidence (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Bamber et al. 1997; Gu and Wu 
111 
 
2001) documents that the amount of dispersion among analyst reflects uncertainty and lack of 
consensus about the impact of future events on firms expected performances. We hence 
control for forecast dispersion as the standard deviation of analyst earnings forecasts, scaled 
by stock price as the beginning of the year (DISP). Finally, we consider firm performance, 
using return on asset (ROA), measured as the ratio between net income and total assets as the 
beginning of the year, and financial leverage (LEV) as the ratio between total debts and total 
assets as the beginning of the year. 
 
3.4. Results 
Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
Table 3.2 provides the sample distribution by country. The overall sample consists of 
10,822 firm-year observations between August 2002 and July 2006. Column (2) shows that 
the number of observations varies widely across the sample countries: from a maximum of 
2,614 non cross-listed firms domiciled in Japan (26% of the total sample) to a minimum of 2 
domiciled in Ghana and from a maximum of 152 cross-listed firms domiciled in the UK to a 
minimum of domiciled in Hungary and Turkey.  
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Country Firm-years Non Cross-listed firms Cross-listed firms
Australia 498 480 18
Austria 77 74 3
Bahamas 24 19 5
Belgium 141 138 3
Bermuda 200 167 33
Brazil 104 68 36
Cayman Island 103 66 37
Chile 32 19 13
China 183 162 21
Denmark 158 150 8
Finland 246 237 9
France 719 656 63
Germany 508 475 33
Ghana 3 2 1
Greece 148 141 7
Hong Kong 126 105 21
Hungary 17 16 1
India 299 287 12
Indonesia 90 86 4
Ireland 69 45 24
Israel 52 15 37
Italy 297 276 21
Japan 2,701 2,614 87
Korea 403 387 16
Liberia 8 5 3
Luxembourg 22 10 12
Mexico 51 37 14
New Zealand 80 76 4
Norway 224 208 16
Panama 13 8 5
Papua New Guinea 6 4 2
Peru 17 14 3
Philippines 25 22 3
Portugal 73 67 6
Russia 15 10 5
Singapore 233 223 10
South Africa 188 165 23
Spain 215 198 17
Sweden 318 298 20
Switzerland 285 254 31
Taiwan 230 213 17
The Netherlands 313 257 56
Turkey 21 20 1
United Kingdom 1,286 1,135 152
Total 10,822 9,909 913
Table 3.2
Sample distribution by country
Table 3.2 reports the sample distribution. The full sample comprises 10,822 firm-year observations from
44 countries around the world  during the period from 2002 to 2006.
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Table 3.3 panel A presents the descriptive statistics relating to the variables used in the 
full sample. The mean (median) of ACC is -0.017 (-0.005), which indicates the mean (median) 
difference between analyst consensus forecast and actual earnings is about -1.74 percent (-0.45 
percent) of the lagged share price. The mean (median) of DISP is 0.016 (0.004) of lagged 
share price indicating that the mean (median) dispersion is about 1.52 percent (0.42 percent) of 
lagged share price. The mean (median) of the logarithm of analyst following is 3.206 (3.218). 
The mean (median) of public (H) and private information (S) is 0.859 (0.363) and 0.803 
(0.243), respectively.  
 
 
Variable N Mean Std.Dev P5 P25 Median P75 P95
ACC 10,822 -0.017 0.052 -0.066 -0.012 -0.005 -0.002 0.000
DISP 10,822 0.016 0.077 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.011 0.054
FOLL 10,822 3.206 0.956 1.609 2.485 3.218 3.871 4.796
H 10,557 0.859 1.292 0.000 0.026 0.363 1.108 3.574
S 10,557 0.803 1.894 0.023 0.097 0.246 0.680 3.122
CONS 10,557 0.471 0.402 0.000 0.010 0.468 0.902 0.992
LOSS 10,822 0.096 0.295 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
σ(ROA) 10,822 0.045 0.065 0.005 0.013 0.025 0.049 0.151
∆EAR 10,822 125.750 652.790 0.019 0.177 1.200 12.271 261.120
SKEW 10,822 -0.039 0.649 -1.189 -0.472 0.000 0.384 1.078
SIZE 10,822 6.684 1.714 3.996 5.471 6.621 7.809 9.612
LEV 10,822 1.678 1.843 0.210 0.626 1.173 2.005 4.906
ROA 10,822 0.037 0.127 -0.076 0.015 0.041 0.076 0.156
GOOD 861
BAD 52
UP 29
DOWN 14
See APPENDIX III.B for variable definitions.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for dependent and control variables
Panel B: Cross-listed firms distribution according to SOX302 disclosure
Table 3.3
Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Regression Analyses
Table 3.3 reports descriptive statistics for the dependent variables and the continuous and binary
independent variables. 
The full sample comprises 10,822 firm-year observations from 44 countries around the world during the
period from 2002 to 2006.
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The mean (median) of analyst consensus is 0.471 (0.468). The sample distribution of 
the control variables used in the analyses is comparable to that reported in prior research. 
Table 3.3. Panel B shows that out of 913 cross-listed firm-years, 52 firms disclose at least one 
internal control deficiency according to SOX302 in term of “material weakness”, “significant 
deficiency”, or “deficiency” in internal control systems during the period August 2002 – July 
2006. On the other side, 861 cross-listed firm-year observations do not disclose any internal 
control deficiency during the same time period30. 
Table 3.4 reports the Pearson correlations among the variables used in the empirical 
analyses. Cross-listing (XLIST) is positively and significantly associated with ACC (p < 
0.050), FOLL (p < 0.001) and CONS (p < 0.050). These associations are still significant only 
for cross-listing firms not reporting internal control deficiencies (GOOD) while are not 
significant for cross-listing firms that report internal control deficiencies (BAD). The 
associations among the dependent variables are in the expected direction. Forecast accuracy is 
negatively and significantly associated with forecast dispersion, and positively with H, and 
CONS. At the same time, correlations among control variables are in the expected direction.
                                                    
30
 The disclosures of internal control deficiencies by cross-listed firms are about ineffective control environment, inadequate 
qualified staff, who are familiar with U.S. GAAP, complexity of transactions such as derivatives, taxes and stock option 
compensation, etc. Due to the small sample size, we do not separately analyze each category of internal control deficiencies in 
our empirical analyses. 
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XLIST GOOD BAD ACC DISP FOLL S H CONS LOSS σ(ROA) ∆EAR SKEW SIZE LEV ROA
XLIST  1
GOOD  0.96***  1
BAD  0.29***  0.18***  1
ACC  0.02**  0.02*  0.00  1
DISP  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.40***  1
FOLL  0.29***  0.28***  0.06*  0.00  0.00  1
S  0.03***  0.01  0.00 -0.66***  0.58***  0.04***  1
H -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01  0.05*** -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.11***  1
CONS  0.05***  0.06***  0.01*  0.05*** -0.24***  0.01 -0.23***  0.39***  1
LOSS  0.01  0.00  0.01 -0.16***  0.29*** -0.07***  0.19*** -0.09*** -0.10***  1
σ(ROA)  0.03***  0.02***  0.01** -0.06***  0.14*** -0.07***  0.05*** -0.02*** -0.03***  0.20***  1
∆EAR -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01* -0.05***  0.05***  0.08***  0.25*** -0.08*** -0.13***  0.04***  0.01  1
SKEW  0.02***  0.02***  0.01  0.04*** -0.06***  0.05*** -0.04***  0.00  0.04*** -0.13*** -0.08***  0.00  1
SIZE  0.30***  0.29***  0.07***  0.00  0.00  0.54***  0.05*** -0.12***  0.03 -0.11*** -0.24***  0.02*** -0.01  1
LEV  0.01  0.01  0.01 -0.11***  0.13***  0.05***  0.13*** -0.08*** -0.06***  0.09*** -0.04***  0.03*** -0.05***  0.29***  1
ROA -0.02** -0.01 -0.01**  0.09*** -0.21***  0.10*** -0.12***  0.11***  0.07*** -0.40*** -0.24*** -0.02*  0.12*** -0.03*** -0.16***  1
See APPENDIX III.B for variable definitions. 
 ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively.
Table 3.4
Correlation matrix
Table 3.4 reports Pearson correlations.  See APPENDIX A for variable definitions. 
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Table 3.5 presents descriptive statistics of the analyst information environment variables. 
We split the sample in four groups: (i) not cross-listed firms (column 1); (ii) cross-listed firms 
(column 2); and within the latter group between (iii) cross-listed firms not disclosing internal 
control deficiencies (column 3), and (iv) cross-listed firms disclosing internal control 
deficiencies (column 4).  
 
 
Through this preliminary (descriptive) analysis we find that analyst forecast accuracy is 
significantly higher for cross-listed firms than for not cross-listed firms [(2) – (1): p-value = 
Non XLIST XLIST GOOD BAD p -value of 
testing
p -value of 
testing
p -value of 
testing
p -value of 
testing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (2)-(1) (3)-(1) (4)-(1) (3)-(4)
Mean Mean Mean Mean t -test t -test t -test t -test
(median) (median) (median) (median) Ranksum Ranksum Ranksum Ranksum
[STD] [STD] [STD] [STD]
-0.018 -0.016 -0.016 -0.018 0.020 0.019 0.540 0.019
(-0.005)  (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.004) 0.046 0.046 0.210 0.046
[0.052] [0.045] [0.046] [0.034]
0.016 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.285 0.289 0.256 0.241
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) -0.004) 0.184 0.151 0.158 0.194
[0.080] [0.018] [0.019] [0.015]
3.112 4.152 4.166 3.881 0.011 0.008 0.092 0.043
(3.135) (4.204) (4.219) (3.891) 0.009 0.001 0.089 0.051
[0.914] [0.889] [0.885] [0.931]
0.8528 0.927 0.934 0.813 0.095 0.053 0.480 0.301
(0.362) (0.365) (0.371) (0.351) 0.000 0.003 0.889 0.410
[1.251] [1.667] [1.669] [1.386]
0.796 0.867 0.893 0.536 0.278 0.095 0.235 0.099
(0.241) (0.329) (0.338) (0.322) 0.000 0.000 0.977 0.474
[1.893] [1.897] [1.948] [0.818]
0.473 0.466 0.466 0.459 0.731 0.821 0.837 0.507
(0.742) (0.432) (0.433) -0.437 0.003 0.002 0.954 0.455
[0.404] [0.377] [0.377] [0.369]
  ***, ** and * denote significance at 1% , 5% and 10%  levels (two-tailed), respectively
See APPENDIX III.B for variable definitions.
FOLL
H
S
CONS
Table 3.5 reports univariate tests of differences in analyst information environment metrics among cross-listed firms disclosing internal
control deficiencies, cross-listed firms non disclosing internal control deficiencies and not cross-listed firms. 
Table 3.5
Univariate Tests of differences in analyst information environment metrics between the groups of firms
Variable
ACC
DISP
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0.020], consistently with the literature on cross-listing. When we split the sub-sample of cross-
listed firms according to the content of the SOX302 (disclosure or non-disclosure of internal 
control deficiencies), we find that cross-listing benefits are experienced only by those who do not 
disclose internal control deficiencies [(3) – (1): p-value = 0.019], while cross-listed disclosing 
internal control deficiencies are not different from the not cross-listed firms [(4) – (1): p-value = 
0.540]. We do not find a similar pattern for forecast dispersion since there is not a statistically 
significant difference in each of the pairs considered for the comparison. For analyst following 
we find that the results are driven both by the cross-listing status since cross-listed firms 
experience as expected more analyst following than not cross-listed firms [(2) – (1): p-value = 
0.011] and by the adequacy of internal controls since cross-listed firms without internal control 
deficiencies have more analyst following than cross-listed firms showing internal control 
deficiencies [(3) – (4): p-value = 0.043].  
 
Multivariate analysis 
We start our empirical analysis by examining the effect of the first disclosure of internal 
control deficiency according to SOX302 using a difference-in-difference design.  Table 3.6, 
panel A reports the regression results from the estimation of model (1) using ACC, DISP and 
FOLL as dependent variables. The coefficient on the interaction between POST_302 and 
GOOD_first is insignificant for all the dependent variables, suggesting the cross-listed firms not 
disclosing internal control deficiencies do not experience a change in firm information 
environment after the first SOX302 disclosure. On the other side, we find that cross-listed firms 
disclosing internal control deficiencies experience a decrease in the quality of firm information 
environment after the first SOX302 disclosure.  
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(1) (2) (3)
ACC DISP FOLL
GOOD_FIRST 0.047** -9.071* 0.453***
(1.996) (-1.901) (8.839)
BAD_FIRST 0.033* -2.014* 0.348
(1.711) (-1.717) (1.220)
POST_302 0.000 0.635 0.135***
(0.074) (0.967) (9.222)
POST_302*GOOD_FIRST -0.001 -9.684 -0.214
(-0.217) (-1.143) (-0.959)
POST_302*BAD_FIRST -0.128** 5.402* -0.224***
(-2.035) (1.783) (-6.141)
SD(ROA) -0.082** 51.363 0.476***
(-2.344) (0.947) (4.071)
DISP -0.970*** - -0.680***
(-24.681) (-4.182)
∆EAR 0.000 0.023 0.000***
(0.837) (0.783) (2.715)
LOSS -0.029*** 0.685 -0.095***
(-5.777) (0.571) (-3.162)
EAR_SKEW 0.005*** -0.028 0.021
(3.072) (-0.104) (1.159)
SIZE 0.001 1.025 0.321***
(0.832) (1.139) (36.699)
LEV -0.000 -0.003 -0.001
(-1.446) (-1.251) (-0.907)
ROA 0.002 20.517 0.164
(0.131) (0.908) (1.437)
COSTANT -0.010 -12.538 1.347***
(-0.930) (-0.887) (5.892)
Year fe No No No
Industry fe Yes Yes Yes
Country fe Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,341 4,341 4,341
R-squared 0.651 0.095 0.490
Table 3.6 reports estimated coefficients and reported t-statics based on robust standard errors that are
clustered at firm level (in parentheses) from the estimation of model (1). See APPENDIX III.B for variable
definitions. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1% , 5% and 10%  levels (two-tailed), respectively
Table 3.6: panel A
Diff-in-diff at the SOX320 first adption
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In panel B we combine the coefficients of the variables of interests and test the 
significance of the aggregate coefficients. Results show that before the first SOX302 disclosure 
there is not difference across cross-listed firms while after the first SOX302 disclosure, only 
cross-listed firm non disclosing internal control deficiencies are still different from their home 
countries peers. On the contrary, cross-listed firms disclosing internal control deficiencies suffer 
by a worse firm information environment than home country firms. 
 
 
 
We next exploit data from 2002 to 2006 to  examine the average association between the 
quality of the internal controls over financial reporting and cross-listed firm information 
environment Table 3.7 presents the regression results from the estimation of model (2) using 
ACC, DISP and FOLL as dependent variable. Columns 1-3 confirm the beneficial effects of 
cross-listing (XLIST) on the firm information environment. Consistent with literature, we find 
that cross-listing firms experience, on average, a higher forecast accuracy (XLIST = 0.04, p < 
0.001), less forecast dispersion (XLIST = -0.014, p < 0.001) and more analyst following (XLIST 
= 0.255, p < 0.001) than non cross-listed firms. These results still hold after considering 
differences in firm-characteristics between cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms by propensity 
score matching models (Columns 4-6).  
ACC DISP FOLL
(a) (b) (b) - (a) (a) (b) (b) - (a) (a) (b) (b) - (a)
PRE POST PRE POST PRE POST
GOOD_FIRST (i)  0.037  0.036 -0.001 GOOD_FIRST (i) -21.609 -30.658 -9.049 GOOD_FIRST (i) 1.800 1.721 -0.079
BAD_FIRST (ii)  0.023 -0.105 -0.128** BAD_FIRST (ii) -14.552 -8.515  6.037* BAD_FIRST (ii) 1.695 1.606 -0.089***
CONTROL (iii) -0.010 -0.010  0.000 CONTROL (iii) -12.538 -11.903  0.635 CONTROL (iii) 1.347 1.482  0.135***
(i)-(ii)  0.014  0.141**  0.127** (i)-(ii) -7.057 -22.143* -15.086* (i)-(ii) 0.105 0.115  0.011
(i)-(iii)  0.047**  0.046** -0.001 (i)-(iii) -9.071* -18.755* -9.684 (i)-(iii) 0.453*** 0.239 -0.214
(ii)-(iii)  0.033** -0.095 -0.128** (ii)-(iii) -2.014* 3.388  5.402* (ii)-(iii) 0.348 0.124 -0.224***
Table 3.6: panel B - Two-by-two analysis on the effect of SOX302 disclosure on cross-listed firms information environment 
120 
 
Columns (7)-(9) report our main findings. We claim the within the population of cross-
listed firms there is not a pooling equilibrium in which all cross-listed firms experience the same 
cross-listing benefits. We contend that there is a substantial heterogeneity in term of the firm 
information environment benefits and that this cross-sectional variation is associated with 
SOX302 disclosures on the adequacy of the internal controls over financial reporting. We find 
that the positive and significant association between cross-listing status and forecast accuracy is 
still significant only for cross-listing firms not disclosing internal control deficiencies (GOOD: 
0.004, p < 0.001). But, when we consider cross-listed firms disclosing internal control 
deficiencies, we find that these firms suffers by a worse forecast accuracy than home country 
firms (BAD: -0.003, p < 0.1). These firms not only lose the positive effects of cross-listing on the 
firm information environment but show a worse information environment than their non cross-
listed peers. We find similar results for dispersion and analyst following. The decrease of 
dispersion, that represents a better firm information environment, holds only for cross-listed 
firms that effectively adopt stricter internal controls. Firms that have ineffective internal controls 
show more dispersed earnings forecasts than non cross-listed firms (GOOD: -0.013, p < 0.001; 
BAD: 0.006, p < 0.1). Finally, we find that the positive and significant association between 
cross-listing status and analyst following is still significant only for cross-listing firms not 
disclosing internal control deficiencies (GOOD: 0.268, p < 0.001) while we do not find any 
statistically significant differences between cross-listed firms disclosing internal control 
deficiencies and non cross-listed firms (BAD: -0.003, p = 0.509). We obtain similar results in the 
propensity score matching sample. These results suggest that cross-listing is associated with a 
higher quality of information environment only for firms that have effectively adopted stricter 
internal controls. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ACC DISP FOLL ACC DISP FOLL ACC DISP FOLL ACC DISP FOLL
XLIST 0.004*** -0.014*** 0.255*** 0.005** -0.045** 0.585*** - - - - - -
(2.971) (-3.548) (5.512) (1.977) (-2.321) (8.689)
GOOD - - - - - - 0.004*** -0.013*** 0.268*** 0.004* -0.042** 0.566***
(2.751) (-3.295) (6.153) (1.778) (-2.265) (8.644)
BAD - - - - - - -0.003* 0.006* -0.077 -0.002 -0.021 -0.049
(-1.787) (1.922) (-0.665) (-0.726) (-1.208) (-0.335)
LOSS -0.021*** 0.045*** -0.053 -0.028*** 0.372 -0.284*** -0.021*** 0.041*** -0.053 -0.028*** 0.373 -0.275***
(-4.152) (5.527) (-1.413) (-2.875) (1.461) (-3.101) (-4.154) (4.903) (-1.417) (-2.857) (1.462) (-2.998)
SD'(ROA) -0.006 0.128*** 0.497*** 0.003 -0.243 -0.973** -0.006 0.115*** 0.500*** 0.004 -0.252 -0.910**
(-0.738) (3.355) (2.722) (0.211) (-0.827) (-2.191) (-0.729) (3.253) (2.746) (0.267) (-0.856) (-2.216)
DISP -0.719*** - -0.936*** -0.701*** - -0.2247 -0.719*** - -0.942*** -0.702*** - -0.2927
(-17.037) (-5.181) (-7.796) (-0.452) (-17.042) (-5.232) (-7.799) (-0.588)
∆EAR 0.000 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.001***
(-0.999) (6.597) (1.862) (-0.019) (0.821) (5.948) (-1.005) (1.536) (1.847) (-0.065) (0.826) (5.878)
EAR_SKEW 0.000 -0.001 0.052*** 0.000 -0.019 -0.0124 0.001 -0.001 0.052*** 0.001 -0.019 -0.013
(1.380) (-0.779) (2.810) (0.362) (-0.929) (-0.303) (1.398) (-0.602) (2.834) (0.359) (-0.924) (-0.309)
SIZE -0.002 0.004*** 0.374*** - - - 0.000 0.003*** 0.375*** - - -
(-0.449) (3.307) (33.128) (-0.355) (2.954) (33.513)
LEV -0.001** 0.000 -0.0006 - - - -0.000** 0.000 -0.001 - - -
(-2.360) (-0.121) (-1.155) (-2.350) (-0.102) (-1.146)
ROA 0.004 -0.021 0.671** - - - 0.004 -0.072*** 0.667** - - -
(0.768) (-1.477) (2.517) (0.754) (-3.058) (2.506)
COSTANT -0.007 -0.011 0.172 -0.002 0.245 3.686*** -0.007 -0.009 0.141 -0.002 0.245 3.686***
(-0.963) (-1.556) (0.655) (-0.513) (1.064) (46.875) (-1.029) (-1.222) (0.539) (-0.520) (1.064) (46.875)
Test on coeff.
GOOD=BAD - - - - - - 2.07 -2.93 4.63 1.98 -2.06 4.23
Year fe  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,822 10, 822 10,822 1,565 1,565 1,565 10,822 10,822 10,822 1,565 1,565 1,565
R-squared 0.517 0.077 0.564 0.535 0.022 0.137 0.517 0.077 0.564 0.535 0.022 0.133
Table 3.7
Base regression 
Table 3.7 reports estimated coefficients and reported t-statics based on robust standard errors that are clustered at firm level (in parentheses) from the estimation of model
(2). Columns 1-3 and columns7-9 employ as control sample the worldwide population of non cross-listed firms, while colums 4-6 and columns 10-12 use a control sample
obtained with a propensity score matching
***, ** and * denote significance at 1% , 5% and 10%  levels (two-tailed), respectively
See APPENDIX III.B for variable definitions. 
Full Sample PSM Full Sample PSM
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Next, we examine to what extent differences in the quality of the firm information 
environment are driven by differences in the commonality of information among analysts or in 
the private information acquisition by single analysts. Table 3.8, columns (1)-(3), shows that 
cross-listing is associated with a higher precision of public information (0.159, p < 0.050) and 
analyst consensus (0.094, p < 0.001), while no association has been fond with the precision of 
private information. Also for the BKLS metrics, we fail to find any significance differences 
between cross-listed disclosing internal control deficiencies and not cross-listed firms. A possible 
interpretation of this result is that internal controls over financial reporting are inherently 
unobservable by outsiders. Under SOX302, this information becomes available to the market, 
leading to a higher the precision of public information and consensus (the level of communality 
among analysts).  
When SOX302 disclosures inform that internal controls are ineffective, financial analysts 
make equal cross-listed firms with ineffective internal controls (firms over which we have a bad 
information) and non cross-listed firms (firms over which we do not have information on internal 
controls).  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
S H CONS S H CONS S H CONS S H CONS
XLIST 0.005 0.159** 0.094*** 0.008 0.107 0.105*** - - - - - -
(0.949) (2.089) (5.163) (1.539) (1.356) (5.305)
GOOD - - - - - - 0.006 0.177** 0.097*** 0.009* 0.131* 0.109***
(1.127) (2.236) (5.636) (1.825) (1.669) (5.601)
BAD - - - - - - -0.009 -0.158 0.025 -0.011* -0.121 0.011
(-1.501) (-1.131) (0.683) (-1.794) (-0.665) (0.336)
LOSS 0.015** -0.225*** -0.033 -0.006 -0.293*** -0.031 0.015** -0.226*** -0.033 -0.006 -0.292*** -0.0311
(2.021) (-6.623) (-1.015) (-0.343) (-3.093) (-0.989) (2.016) (-6.643) (-1.026) (-0.324) (-3.082) (-0.988)
SD'(ROA) -0.034* -0.044 0.004 -0.059*** -0.076 -0.169*** -0.034* -0.043 0.004 -0.057*** -0.064 -0.161**
(-1.815) (-0.330) (0.107) (-3.830) (-0.245) (-2.597) (-1.815) (-0.321) (0.126) (-3.588) (-0.207) (-2.582)
DISP 1.973*** -3.101*** -1.973*** 2.260*** -2.408*** -1.750*** 1.973*** -3.108*** -1.975*** 2.257*** -2.427*** -1.759***
(11.633) (-10.217) (-15.679) (5.263) (-3.419) (-9.187) (11.633) (-10.247) (-15.681) (5.257) (-3.450) (-9.206)
∆EAR 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(5.127) (-1.341) (-5.147) (9.924) (-11.606) (-5.482) (5.127) (-1.340) (-5.149) (9.904) (-11.358) (-5.464)
SKEW -0.001 -0.026 0.007 0.006 0.021 -0.001 -0.001 -0.026 0.007 0.006* 0.021 -0.001
(-0.605) (-1.438) (1.345) (1.673) (0.425) (-0.086) (-0.593) (-1.417) (1.353) (1.695) (0.430) (-0.084)
SIZE 0.002** -0.055*** 0.004 - - - 0.002** -0.055*** 0.004 - - -
(1.979) (-5.611) (0.715) (1.989) (-5.602) (0.702)
LEV 0.000 0.000 0 - - - 0.000 -0.003 0.000 - - -
(-0.258) (-1.057) (-0.574) (-0.254) (-1.023) (-0.553)
ROA 0.059*** 0.296* 0.029 - - - 0.058*** 0.284* 0.026 - - -
(2.773) (1.779) (0.535) (2.742) (1.707) (0.480)
COSTANT -0.024** 2.418*** 0.882*** -0.006 0.803*** 0.657*** -0.026*** 2.382*** 0.877*** -0.006 0.803*** 0.658***
(-2.055) (11.759) (10.108) (-0.589) (6.794) (17.969) (-2.191) (11.441) (10.285) (-0.592) (6.792) (17.961)
Test on coeff.
GOOD=BAD - - - - - - -0.45 2.23 3.06 1.98 -2.06 3.01
Year fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,557 10,557 10,557 1,545 1,545 1,545 10,557 10,557 10,557 1,545 1,545 1,545
R-squared 0.561 0.161 0.095 0.572 0.023 0.118 0.561 0.161 0.095 0.572 0.023 0.023
See APPENDIX III.B for variable definitions. 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1% , 5% and 10%  levels (two-tailed), respectively
Table 3.8
Base regressions on BKLS metrics
Table 3.8 reports estimated coefficients and reported t-statics based on robust standard errors that are clustered at firm level (in parentheses) from the estimation of model (2) on
BKLS metrics. Columns 1-3 and columns7-9 employ as control sample the worldwide population of non cross-listed firms, while colums 4-6 and columns 10-12 use a control
sample obtained with a propensity score matching
Full Sample PSM Full Sample PSM
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We now examine whether the firm information environment changes after a remediation of 
previously disclosed internal control deficiencies. UP captures the difference in the change in the 
properties of the firm information environment between cross-listed firms that remediate to an 
internal control deficiency and control firms. We use two control samples: cross-listed firms that 
never disclose internal control deficiencies (table 3.9, columns 1-3) and all non-cross-listed firms 
(Table 3.9, columns 4-6).  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ACC ∆DISP ∆FOLL ∆ACC ∆DISP ∆FOLL
UP 1.102*** -0.819** 0.199 1.497*** -0.917*** 0.169
(3.153) (-2.250) (1.046) (2.525) (-3.904) (0.897)
∆EAR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** -0.000* 0.000
(0.386) (0.043) (-0.115) (3.746) (-1.870) (-0.367)
∆DISP
-14.093*** - 1.595 -1.570*** - 0.396**
(-2.628) (1.469) (-2.588) (2.198)
∆SD_ROA 0.34 0.307 -1.350* 0.006 -0.399*** -0.21
(0.385) (0.533) (-1.706) (0.101) (-3.382) (-1.355)
∆SIZE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000**
(1.136) (-0.925) (-0.847) (-0.470) (-1.346) (-2.514)
∆ROA -0.535* -0.065 0.215 0.124** -0.221*** -0.056
(-1.690) (-0.323) (0.758) (2.113) (-4.274) (-0.719)
∆LEV -0.039*** 0.049*** 0.000 -0.013*** 0.002 -0.002
(-2.726) (2.361) (0.033) (-2.982) (1.023) (-0.491)
COSTANT -0.013 0.008 0.008 0.012 -0.008 0.098
(-0.700) (0.672) (0.490) (0.205) (-0.153) (0.663)
Observations 511 511 511 6,108 6,108 6,108
R-squared 0.334 0.173 0.016 0.536 0.131 0.074
Table 3.9
Conditional analysis
Table 3.9 reports estimated coefficients and reported t-statics based on robust standard errors that
are clustered at firm level (in parentheses) from the estimation of model (3). Columns 1-3 employ
as control sample cross-listed firms that never disclose internal control deficiencies. Colums 4-6
employ as control sample non-cross-listed firms. 
See APPENDIX III.B for variable definitions. 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1% , 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively
Control sample: non cross-
listed firms
Control sample: cross-listed 
firms never disclosing ICD
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We find that firms that remediate to previously disclosed internal control deficiencies 
experience an increase in the quality of the firm information environment relative of the control 
samples. If we consider as a control sample cross-listed firms that never disclose internal control 
deficiencies (columns 1-3) we find a positive association with change in accuracy (1.102, p < 
0.001), a negative association with the change in dispersion (-0.819, p < 0.050) and no association 
with the change in analyst following (0.199, p =1.046). These results are consistent across the two 
control groups.  
Our last set of analysis explore whether the association between the quality of the internal 
controls and firm information environment depends on the level of enforcement of the country in 
which the cross-listed firm is domiciled. We expect that the difference in the benefits on the 
information environment between firms disclosing and not disclosing internal control deficiencies 
are stronger for firms domiciled in weak legal environment countries. Table 3.10, columns (1)-(3) 
confirm that cross-listing effects are stronger for firms from weak legal environment countries. 
Across the models, the dummy variable XLIST is associated with an higher quality of the firm 
information environment but the interaction between cross-listing and the level of enforcement 
(XLIST×LAW) is significant but goes in the opposite direction. Results are unchanged when we 
consider the propensity score matched sample (columns (4)-(6)). In columns (7)-(9) we explore 
whether the relationship between the successful (mimicking) adoption of stricter rules in terms of 
internal controls on firm information environment is associated with the strength of the legal 
environment. We find that only cross-listed firms not disclosing internal control deficiencies 
domiciled in weak legal enforcement country experience cross-listing benefits in term of forecast 
accuracy (GOOD: 0.004, p < 0.001); while cross-listed firms from strong legal environment 
countries do not get information benefits (GOOD+GOOD×LAW = 0.000, p < 0.945).   
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ACC DISP FOLL ACC DISP FOLL ACC DISP FOLL ACC DISP FOLL
LAW β1 0.003*** -0.003** -0.039 0.008** -0.003 -1.168*** 0.003*** -0.003** -0.023 0.007** -0.003 -1.182***
(4.423) (-2.146) (-0.413) (2.553) (-0.503) (-6.516) (4.393) (-2.109) (-0.240) (2.462) (-0.508) (-6.656)
XLIST β2 0.005*** -0.014*** 0.325*** 0.008** -0.012*** 0.342*** - - - - - -
(3.215) (-4.367) (6.846) (2.275) (2.751) (5.650)
XLIST*LAW β3 -0.004** 0.005* -0.200* -0.009** 0.001 -0.159 - - - - - -
(-2.170) (1.817) (-1.965) (-2.234) (0.201) (-1.156)
GOOD β2 - - - - - - 0.004*** -0.013*** 0.323*** 0.007** -0.010** 0.332***
(3.024) (-4.105) (7.292) (2.005) (-2.561) (5.860)
BAD β3 - - - - - - -0.002 -0.005 0.028 0.000 -0.005 0.032
(-0.749) (-1.404) (0.299) (0.047) (-1.587) (0.336)
GOOD*LAW β4 - - - - - - -0.004* 0.006** -0.163* -0.008* 0.002 -0.121
(-1.869) (1.986) (-1.698) (-1.961) (0.288) (-0.976)
BAD*LAW β5 - - - - - - -0.001 -0.002 -0.18 -0.003 -0.002 -0.219
(-0.238) (-0.454) (-0.726) (-0.535) (-0.424) (-0.819)
LOSS -0.020*** 0.045*** -0.053 -0.026*** 0.042*** -0.005 -0.020*** 0.045*** -0.054 -0.026** 0.039*** -0.007
(-7.338) (5.599) (-1.422) (-2.582) (4.506) (-0.053) (-7.336) (5.597) (-1.428) (-2.573) (4.501) (-0.077)
SD'(ROA) -0.006 0. 132*** 0.495*** 0.009 0.041*** 0.389** -0.006 0.131*** 0.498*** 0.009 0.039** 0.410**
(-0.817) (3.588) (2.693) (0.660) (4.512) (2.337) (-0.804) (3.573) (2.718) (0.729) (2.015) (2.642)
DISP -0.723*** - -0.934*** -0.700*** - -0.845** -0.724*** - -0.940*** -0.701*** - -0.878**
(-18.651) (-5.176) (-7.706) (-2.034) (-18.653) (-5.221) (-7.708) (-2.114)
∆EAR -0.000* 0.000*** 0.000* -0.000 0.000 0.000*** -0.000* 0.000*** 0.000* -0.000 0.000 0.000**
(-1.896) (7.130) (1.925) (-0.259) (0.576) (3.080) (-1.909) (7.143) (1.890) (-0.318) (0.568) (2.666)
SKEW 0.000 0.000 0.051*** 0.001 -0.001 0.010 0.005 -0.0005 0.052*** 0.001 -0.001 0.012
(0.779) (-0.484) (2.803) (0.319) (-0.471) (0.442) (0.792) (-0.495) (2.810) (0.307) (-0.450) (0.505)
SIZE 0.000 0.003*** 0.374*** - - - 0.001 0.003*** 0.374*** - - -
(0.304) (3.116) (34.128) (0.398) (3.071) (34.251)
LEV -0.000*** 0.000 0.000 - - - -0.000*** 0.000 -0.001 - - -
(-2.709) (-0.102) (-1.159) (-2.708) (-0.102) (-1.152)
ROA 0.002 -0.018 0.671** - - - 0.002 -0.018 0.666** - - -
(0.471) (-1.296) (2.507) (0.464) (-1.296) (2.497)
COSTANT -0.012** 0.006 0.101 -0.011** 0.015* -1.130*** -0.0120** 0.007 0.095 -0.010** 0.017* -1.122***
(-1.970) (0.934) (0.439) (-2.008) (1.654) (-8.143) (-2.000) (0.997) (0.377) (-1.977) (1.728) (-8.139)
Test on coeff.
β2+ β3 =0 -0.45 -1.72 3.56 -0.25 -1.97 2.56 - - - - - -
β2+ β4 =0 - - - - - - -0.08 -1.69  4.56 -0.12 -1.63  3.71
β3+ β5 =0 - - - - - - -1.08 -1.84 -0.45 -0.82 -1.31 -0.05
β2 = β3 - - - - - -  3.27 -2.86  4.30 4.12 -1.11  5.91
β2 + β4= β3 +β5 - - - - - -  0.56 -0.89  1.34  0.01 -0.89  1.46
Year fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fe No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Observations 10,822 10,822 10,822 1,562 1,562 1,562 10,822 10,822 10,822 1,562 1,562 1,562
R-squared 0.514 0.069 0.564 0.548 0.062 0.672 0.514 0.069 0.564 0.548 0.061 0.673
Full Sample PSM Full Sample PSM
See APPENDIX III.B for variable definitions. 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1% , 5% and 10%  levels (two-tailed), respectively
Table 3.10
Regression by home country legal characteristics
Table 3.10 reports estimated coefficients and reported t-statics based on robust standard errors that are clustered at firm level (in parentheses) from the estimation of model (4). Columns (1)-(3) and columns (7)-
(9) employs as control sample all non-cross-listed firms, while columns (4)-(6) and (10)-(12) a propensity score matched sample.
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In addition, cross-listed firms from lax legal environment countries that disclose internal 
control deficiencies lose information environment benefits in term of forecast accuracy (BAD: -
0.002; p > 0.600; GOOD ≠ BAD, p < 0.001). Results on dispersion and analyst following are 
similar. Columns (10)-(12) provide essentialy the same results using the propensity score matched 
sample. This evidence suggests that information provided through SOX302 is useful especially for 
firms that come from countries where investors are poorly protected. On the other side, for cross-
listed firms that come from strong legal environment countries, where the information environment 
is supposed to be already rich these disclosures seem to be not as relevant as it is for the latter. Un-
tabulated results show that the higher quality of the firm information environment is achieved 
through an increase of the precision of common information and it does not depend on the 
characteristics of the legal environment. 
 
3.5. Robustness checks 
Over-representation of some countries 
Japan and United Kingdom account for about the 20 percent and 10 percent, respectively, of 
the total sample. We verify whether these two countries drive our results by estimating all the 
models without firms domiciled in these countries. Results are basically unchanged. We perform 
the same analyses using only European countries: also in this case results remain unchanged. 
 
Measurement issues 
The variables ACC and DISP are scaled by the closing price as the end of the year. Another 
scaling factors widely used in analyst literature is the absolute value of the earnings per share (i.e. 
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EPS). Using EPS as scaling factor do not affect the results. We also consider both longer (i.e. from 
the earnings announcement date of year t-1 to the earnings announcement date of year t) and shorter 
(i.e. from the closing date of year t to the earnings announcement of year t+1) forecasting windows. 
Also in this case results are consistent with those reported. Previous literature provides several 
proxies of the level of the enforcement in a country. In our main analyses, we consider the average 
score of the four dimensions Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and 
Control of Corruption (Kaufman et al., 2007) for the year 2005. Rather than considering the sum of 
the four measures to partition the sample we consider the four variables one by one. Also in these 
cases, our results are unchanged.  
 
3.6. Conclusions 
Extant research documents an enhancement in the firm information environment for firms 
cross-listed in the U.S.This paper disputes the underlying premise that cross-listing per se enhances 
the quality of the firm information environment, arguing that it depends on an effective commitment 
to achieve higher levels of corporate transparency of cross-listed firms. As research setting, we use 
the adoption of the Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley act that requires disclosing any discovered 
internal control deficiencies on internal controls over financial reporting. Using this research 
setting, we examine whether firm information environment benefits following cross-listed vanish 
when cross-listed firms mimic the adoption of effective internal controls 
Our result shows that cross-listing is associated with an increase in the quality of the information 
environment only for firms that have effectively adopted stricter internal controls over financial 
reporting. We also find that a better information environment for cross-listed firms is achieved 
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through an increase in the higher precision of common information. On the other side, our evidence 
shows that cross-listed firms disclosing internal control deficiencies do not enjoy a better 
information environment and do not differentiate themselves, in terms of firm information 
environment, from their domestic peers. We also find that cross-listed firms that remediate to 
internal control deficiencies, experience an improvement in the quality of the information 
environment. We finally show that the association between the properties of the firm information 
environment and the effective adoption of stricter internal controls depends on the level of 
enforcement of the country in which the cross-listed firm is domiciled. We find that the difference 
in the benefits on the information environment between firms disclosing and not disclosing internal 
control deficiencies are stronger for firms domiciled in weak legal environment countries. Overall, 
our findings support the idea that the quality of the firm information environment increases 
following cross-listing only when cross-listed firms effectively commit themselves to higher levels 
of corporate transparency, and not merely in name just mimicking the adoption of stricter rules. 
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Appendix III.A: BKLS metrics 
Barron et al. (1998) develop a model in which N financial analysts forecast expected 
earnings per share (y). Each analyst information set encompass a part of public (with precision h) 
information and a private (idiosyncratic) signal zi = y + εi. Each εi is independent of all other 
variables and follows a normal distribution: εi~N(0,1/s). In forming forecasts, each analyst assigns a 
weight to her common and private information according to their respective precision (h or s). To 
model the precision of common and private information, the model require the following 
assumption to hold: (1) analyst issued unbiased forecasts; (2) earnings forecast do not determine 
earnings realizations; (3) all analysts’ idiosyncratic information is of equal precision; (4) forecast 
error are normally distributed. If these conditions hold, then the precision of public and private 
information could be expressed in term of the expected square error in the mean forecast (SE), 
expected forecast dispersion (D), and the number of analyst following (N) as follow: 
 
H = (SE − D/N)/[(1 − 1/N) D + SE]2              (A.1) 
S = D/[(1 − 1/N) D + SE] 2          (A.2) 
 
Analyst consensus is the ratio between the precision of analyst public information (H) and 
the precision of the total information (i.e. CONS= H/H+S). The Barron et al.’s model is based on 
unconditional expectations of dispersion and error in the mean forecast, but only realizations of 
these variables are available to construct proxies. We calculate for each firm i the ex-post realized 
forecast dispersion (Dit) and squared error in the mean forecast (SEit) as follow: 
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@% = (.% + B%CCCCCC) 
D% = 	EFG:	∑ (
EH	 % − B%CCCCCC) 
 
where: 
 %= is the forecast of year t annual earnings per share for firm i from analyst j from the 11th 
month of the fiscal year to three days before the annual earnings announcement; 
B%CCCCCC = is the median of the individual % forecasts of year t annual earnings per share for firm i 
from the 11th month of the fiscal year to three days before the annual earnings announcement; 
Nit = is the observed number of analyst j forecasts of year t annual earnings per share for firm i from 
the 11th month of the fiscal year to three days before the annual earnings announcement; 
@%= is the estimated of square error in the mean forecast B%CCCCCC for firm i; 
.% = is the actual annual earnings per share for firm i in year t; 
D% = is the estimated of dispersion from the observed forecasts for firm i. 
 
We scale both D% and D% for the closing price as the end of year t. Next, we substitute them, 
within the number of analyst (Nit) into equations A.1 and A.2. to calculate H, S, and CONS. The 
Barron et al.’s model relies on the assumption that forecast accuracy and dispersion are related to 
the public and idiosyncratic components of bias in individual analyst forecast. On the one side, error 
in the mean forecast reflects error in the public information available to all the analysts that they use 
to make their forecast, on the other side forecast dispersion is related only to uniquely private (i.e. 
idiosyncratic) information upon which each individual analyst base her forecast.  
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Appendix III.B: Variable definition 
Variable Definition 
XLIST Binary variable equals to one if a firm is cross-listed, zero 
otherwise. 
GOOD Binary variable equals to one if a cross-listed firm discloses no 
internal control deficiency in year t, zero otherwise. 
BAD Binary variable equals to one if a cross-listed firm discloses an 
internal control deficiency in year t, zero otherwise. 
UP Binary variable equals to one if a cross-listed firm discloses an 
internal control deficiency in year t-1 and no internal control 
deficiency in year t.  
ACC Analyst forecast accuracy computed as ACCURACYit = |Actual 
Earningsit – Median Forecastit|/Stock Priceit,, 
DISP Analyst forecast dispersion computed as the Standard Deviation of 
Forecasts/Stock Price.  
FOLL Analyst following computed as the logarithm of the total number of 
analysts who issue at least one annual forecast for a given firm-year 
H Average precision of analyst public information 
S Average precision of analyst private information 
CONS Analyst consensus computed as H/(H+S) 
LAW Binary variable equals to one if a firm is incorporate in a country 
that is the above the sample median of the summation between the 
following legal environment variables taken from Kaufmann et al. 
(2007) for the year 2005: (1) Government Effectiveness; (2) 
Regulatory Quality; (3) Rule of Law; (4) Control of Corruption, 
zero otherwise. 
LOSS Binary variable equals to one if a firm actual earnings per share is 
less than zero, zero otherwise 
σROA Standard deviation of the return on assets over the past five years 
∆EAR Absolute value of the difference between the current year’s 
earnings per share and the last year’s earnings per share 
SKEW Skewness of earnings over the past five years 
SIZE Natural logarithm of the total assets as the beginning of the year 
LEV Ratio between total debts and total assets as the beginning of the 
year 
ROA Ratio between net income and total assets as the beginning of the 
year 
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